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Chapter 1 
Introduction: Individual differences in judgment accuracy in 
personnel selection – What makes the ‘good judge’?  
 
The judgment accuracy of assessors has been an enduring research topic in personnel 
selection studies. Assessors produce ratings that affect the quality of personnel selection 
decisions. Although it is well known that assessors differ in judgment accuracy, we do not yet 
understand why this is so. This dissertation drew on social cognition literature and judgment 
accuracy models (Funder, 1999) to study assessor constructs that may predict their judgment 
accuracy in personnel selection. In order to advance contemporary practices designed to select 
and train assessors, an integrative profile of the ‘good judge’, informed by empirical evidence, 
is needed. The dissertation therefore presents four studies – one systematic review and three 
empirical studies – that investigated individual difference constructs in judgment accuracy 
within a personnel selection context. First, a systematic review of empirical literature was 
conducted, which, in addition to determining what we know and do not know about the good 
judge, identified focal constructs for further empirical research. In the subsequent empirical 
investigations, the role of specific individual difference constructs in judgment accuracy was 
explored. The dissertation advances an understanding of how dispositional reasoning (the 
complex knowledge of traits, behaviors, and situations’ potential to elicit traits into manifest 
behaviors) and personality trait chronic accessibility (the degree to which individuals differ in 
the readiness with which constructs are utilized in information processing of behavioral 
stimulus input) may be characteristics of the good judge in personnel selection. The general 
project goal was to determine the extent to which assessor individual differences are able to 
explain judgment accuracy in personnel selection ratings. 
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The search for the good judge of personality is the oldest pursuit in the accuracy 
literature and was nearly its sole concern during the early incarnation from the 
1930s…the prey proved to be unexpectedly elusive. Despite the research attention 
it has received, the good judge is the potential moderator concerning which the 
accuracy literature has the sparsest data and fewest firm findings to report. 
Funder (1999, p. 142) 
Modern personnel selection approaches rely heavily on assessors as judges of 
applicants’ characteristics. Assessors may include interviewers, assessment centre 
observers, or line managers observing work-sample performances. Assessors are 
typically called upon to produce subjective ratings of applicants’ performances in 
selection procedures. Eventually, these ratings form the lifeblood of important 
personnel selection decisions about offers of employment or promotions. Given their 
centrality in human resource management, it is surprising that our understanding of 
rater characteristics, which may affect rating quality in personnel selection, has not 
developed correspondingly to other factors in personnel selection (cf. Guion & 
Gibson, 1988; Hough & Oswald, 2000; Sackett & Lievens, 2008). 
Over the last few decades, consistent evidence shows that individual assessors 
appear to differ in their judgment accuracy (e.g., Borman, Eaton, Bryan, & Rosse, 
1983; Dipboye, Gaugler, & Hayes, 1990; Heneman, Schwab, Huett, & Ford, 1975; 
Kinicki, Lockwood, Hom, & Griffeth, 1990; Pulakos, Schmitt, Whitney, & Smith, 
1996; Ryan & Sackett, 1989; Sackett & Wilson, 1982; Schneider & Bayroff, 1953; Van 
Iddekinge, Sager, Burnfield, & Heffner, 2006; Zedeck, Tziner, & Middlestadt, 1983). 
However, the reasons for these individual differences in judgment accuracy are not 
well known. The present dissertation reports on assessor constructs as potential 
explanatory variables for the variance in judgment accuracy outcomes. In this 
dissertation, assessors constructs are treated as ‘individual difference’ variables that 
“are linked to differences in job [criterion] performance” (Salgado, Viswesvaran, & 
Ones, 2001, p. 166), referring in this case to assessors’ ability to produce accurate 
ratings in personnel selection. Individual differences between assessors that are 
relevant and which find easy expression in behavior are abilities (cognitive ability 
and physical ability), personality (including social skills, emotional intelligence, and 
dark traits), interests and self-evaluations (Murphy, 2012). This research on which 
this dissertation reports, employed a broad framework (See Figure 1.1) of 
psychological individual difference constructs (adapted from Farr & Tippins, 2010) 
as a lens to study the assessor. More specifically, this dissertation sought to advance 
understanding of how assessor constructs predict judgment accuracy in personnel 
selection. 
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Figure 1.1 Assessor individual differences framework and visualizing the linkages between 
studies in the present dissertation. Adapted from Farr, J. L., & Tippins, N. T. (Eds.). (2010). 
Handbook of employee selection. New York, NY: Routledge. 
 
Within this broad framework, the study delved into areas that held most 
potential for advancing understanding of judgment accuracy. The accuracy of 
judgments in subjective rating methods relies heavily on cognitive processes 
(DeNisi, Cafferty, & Meglino, 1984; Lance, Foster, Gentry, & Thoresen, 2004). As 
such, assessor cognitive factors are promising to help understand and improve the 
rating process (Jones & Born, 2008; Landy & Farr, 1980; Lievens, Tett, & Schleicher, 
2009; Nathan & Alexander, 1985). In response, the present study focused on two key 
assessor constructs1, namely dispositional reasoning (the complex knowledge of traits, 
behaviors, and situations’ potential to elicit traits into manifest behaviors; 
Christiansen, Wolcott-Burnam, Janovics, Burns, & Quirk, 2005) and personality trait 
chronic accessibility (the degree to which individuals differ in the readiness with 
which constructs are utilized in information processing of behavioral stimulus input; 
Higgins, King, & Mavin, 1982). 
In this chapter, first, an overview will be given of the role of assessors in 
personnel selection. Second, a primer on judgment accuracy will be provided. 
Finally, assessor characteristics will be introduced as potential individual difference 
predictors of judgment accuracy in personnel selection. The discussion of these 
factors identifies several important research questions, outlined in each section. 
 
                                                     
1 As far as possible, these focal constructs are studied in conjunction with others (e.g. general mental 
ability, Big Five personality traits) in the empirical studies contained in the present dissertation. 
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1.1 The Role of Assessors in Personnel Selection 
In personnel selection, subjective rating measures (such as interviews and 
assessment center evaluations) form the backbone of most personnel selection 
programmes. In fact, in an earlier survey of assessment practices, individual 
interviews were indicated as the most frequently used method across 20 countries 
(Ryan, McFarland, Baron, & Page, 1999). The widespread use of methods that rely on 
subjective ratings is also unlikely to change soon (Levashina, Hartwell, Morgeson, & 
Campion, 2014) and, therefore, subjective ratings have been described as “ubiquitous 
in the workplace” (Guion, 2011, p. 541). 
Invariably, assessors’ ratings in subjective assessment measures involve some 
degree of judgment (Gatewood, Feild, & Barrick, 2010). For example, assessors are 
responsible for observing and evaluating how candidates respond to an interview 
question or other assessment task and, consequently, they must infer the underlying 
characteristics (e.g., levels on interview dimensions) of these candidates. As they 
produce important assessment information about candidates, assessors2 lie at the 
heart of subjective rating methods – assessors may be interviewers, trained 
assessment centre (AC) assessors, or psychologists. Assessors play a major role in the 
effectiveness of subjective rating methods – typically they have to elicit, evaluate and 
rate candidate behavior (Dipboye, Macan, & Shahani-Denning, 2012). In fact, many 
models of rating effectiveness (for example, Dipboye & Macan, 1988; Graves, 1993; 
Klimoski & Donahue, 2001; Wherry & Bartlett, 1982) place the assessor centre stage.  
As such, it is ironic that of the various factors that may affect rating accuracy 
(for an overview, see Klimoski & Donahue, 2001) the characteristics of the assessor 
have been least studied. Over the last few decades, a great deal of effort has been 
spent on studies on rating errors or biases (e.g., Landy & Farr, 1980; Saal, Downey, & 
Lahey, 1980; Thorndike, 1920; Wherry & Bartlett, 1982) but these have been largely 
supplanted by later research (e.g., Barrick, Patton, & Haugland, 2000; Borman et al., 
2001; Funder, 2012; Nathan & Alexander, 1985; Zalesny & Highhouse, 1992) which 
focused on judgment accuracy. Judgment accuracy is conceptually defined here as “a 
person’s ability, given limited information about a target person, correctly to judge 
other pertinent characteristics about that person” (Jackson, 1972, p. 185). However, 
although the characteristics of the ‘good judge’3 (Funder, 1995) have intrigued 
researchers and practitioners for a long time (e.g., Adams, 1927; Cronbach, 1955; 
Funder, 2012; Taft, 1955), we still know very little about them. In this regard, Funder 
(1999) states:  
                                                     
2 In this dissertation, the term ‘assessor’ is used as a general term for individuals required to observe 
and evaluate others in personnel selection methods such as interviews and assessment centers.  
3 Any investigation into accuracy of judgment normally requires some people to do the judging – 
judges – and those who are judged – targets (Cook, 1979). 
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The oldest concern in the history of research on accuracy is the search for the 
good judge … the kind of individual who truly understands his or her fellow 
humans.” It is not entirely clear whether such a person exists…Evidence of 
consistent individual differences in accuracy has always been surprisingly 
difficult to find (p. 138). 
It is, therefore, not surprising that human resource management practices 
today appear to largely ignore the possibility that individual differences exist in 
judgment accuracy. For example, assessor training and evaluation strategies tend to 
focus on the assessment process, materials, key dimensions that are being rated 
(Krause & Thornton, 2009), and establishing a common frame of reference across 
assessors (Woehr & Huffcutt, 1994). Furthermore, it is also common practice in 
assessment center operations to combine ratings from different assessors (Gatewood, 
et al., 2010), reflecting an implicit belief that assessors may be interchangeable, or 
psychometrically speaking, ‘parallel’ measures (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994) of 
applicants’ characteristics. Judging from the available surveys on personnel selection 
practices used in the field (e.g., Huo, Huang, & Napier, 2002; Ryan, et al., 1999), 
individual difference constructs that may distinguish assessors in terms of their 
rating quality do not feature strongly. For example, it is uncommon for interviewers 
or AC assessors to be screened on any individual difference measures. Moreover, 
developmental methods used to enhance assessor rating quality  (e.g., frame-of-
reference training, FOR; Roch, Woehr, Mishra, & Kieszczynska, 2012) also tend to 
take a ‘once-size fits all’ approach and individual differences in accuracy and the 
constructs that may cause them are largely ignored in these training methods. 
However, individual differences do exist in the ability of assessors to produce 
accurate judgments (e.g., Borman, et al., 1983; Dipboye, et al., 1990; Heneman, et al., 
1975; Kinicki, et al., 1990; Pulakos, et al., 1996; Ryan & Sackett, 1989; Sackett & 
Wilson, 1982; Schneider & Bayroff, 1953; Van Iddekinge, et al., 2006; Zedeck, et al., 
1983). That is, some assessors consistently outperform other assessors in terms of the 
quality of their ratings of candidates. As a consequence, it becomes important to 
understand why assessors differ in judgment accuracy in personnel selection 
methods that rely on subjective ratings. The studies contained in this dissertation 
explore assessor individual difference constructs as potential explanations for 
variability in assessor judgment accuracy. 
In the remainder of this chapter, we first discuss judgment accuracy (as the 
main dependent variable under investigation) before, second, assessor constructs are 
introduced as explanatory variables of accuracy. The latter section also discusses 
how assessor constructs are studied by the respective chapters contained in this 
dissertation. 
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1.2 A Primer on Judgment Accuracy 
The discussion of judgment accuracy in the following section comprises of an 
overview of conceptual and operational definitions of judgment accuracy, provided 
not only as broad context, but also to underline the important issue of accuracy 
measurement in this line of research. Next, studies are reviewed to determine 
whether assessors show variability in their judgment accuracy, before relevant 
theoretical perspectives are highlighted that may explain these differences.  
 
Judgment Accuracy: A Universal Interest 
How accurately people judge others is a problem important for its practical 
significance and for its theoretical implications (Cronbach, 1955). The study of 
judgment accuracy has come a long way (for reviews, see Funder, 1999; Jussim, 2005; 
Kruglanski, 1989; Zaki & Ochsner, 2011) and it has also been explored in a wide 
variety of disciplines where interpersonal judgments are important, including 
personality psychology (Funder, 1995, 2001, 2012), social psychology (Asch, 1946; 
Heider, 1958; Kenny, 2004a; Kenny & Albright, 1987), social-cognition (Fiske & 
Taylor, 2013), social neuroscience (Zaki & Ochsner, 2011), and clinical psychology 
(Friedman, Oltmanns, & Turkheimer, 2007). The study of individual differences in 
judgment accuracy has also been of interest in more specific applications, for 
example detecting deceit (Bond & DePaulo, 2006, 2008; Porter, Campbell, Stapleton, 
& Birt, 2002), witness identification (Olsson, 2000), and finally, psychometrics 
(Cronbach, 1955). Judgment accuracy is important in many different contexts and, 
therefore, it continues to attract much research interest (e.g., Borkenau, Mosch, 
Tandler, & Wolf, 2015; Funder, 2012; Zaki & Ochsner, 2011). 
Judgment accuracy studies in these different fields use research approaches 
that reflect their particular focus. For example, in personality psychology studies of 
judgment accuracy (e.g., Blackman & Funder, 1998; Hall, Goh, Schmid Mast, & 
Hagedorn, 2015; Letzring, Wells, & Funder, 2006) researchers often employ small-
group approaches where research participants (typically college students) rate one 
another’s personalities after a brief interaction. In social psychological studies, the 
judgment tasks presented to subjects often require them to evaluate the emotions 
(e.g., Hall & Bernieri, 2001; Murphy & Hall, 2011) or nonverbal behavior (e.g., 
Ambady, Hallahan, & Rosenthal, 1995; Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992) of people 
depicted in brief observations of behavior (so-called ‘thin-slice’ stimuli) such as 
pictures, videos and audio segments. In some of these studies, experimental tasks 
occur in a ‘zero-acquaintance’ context, in which judges (the observers) and targets 
(those that are observed) are unfamiliar with one another. 
In industrial organizational (I-O) psychology studies of judgment accuracy, the 
experimental methods and tasks used are very diverse. These appear to reflect the 
relevant rating context, such as performance appraisal, training evaluation or 
personnel selection. The bulk of rating accuracy research has traditionally been 
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conducted in the performance rating literature (e.g., Borman, 1977; Heneman, 
Moore, & Wexley, 1987; Zalesny & Highhouse, 1992). In this field, research 
participants are often required to rate the actual or simulated performance (in video 
stimuli, for example) of employees. In personnel selection studies of accuracy, 
researchers present judgment tasks to research participants that reflect various types 
of ‘target constructs’ to be rated, such as interview competencies (e.g., Melchers, 
Lienhardt, Von Aarburg, & Kleinmann, 2011), assessment centre dimensions (e.g., 
Lievens, 2001; Melchers, Kleinmann, & Prinz, 2010), or personality traits (Barrick, et 
al., 2000; Blackman, 2002; Powell & Goffin, 2009; Schmid Mast, Bangerter, Bulliard, & 
Aerni, 2011; Townsend, Bacigalupi, & Blackman, 2007). In summary, the study of 
individual differences in judgment accuracy is not only of interest in many areas of 
psychology, but also across different domains of I-O psychology. 
Defining Accuracy 
Conceptual Definitions 
A number of theoretical perspectives of accuracy in social judgment exist (for 
reviews, see Funder, 1995; Jussim, 2005; Kruglanski, 1989). As a consequence, a rich 
diversity of conceptual definitions of judgment accuracy has developed over the 
years. These are reflected in the use of various terms to denote judgment accuracy, 
such as rating accuracy (e.g., Borman, 1977; Sulsky & Balzer, 1988; Zalesny & 
Highhouse, 1992), inferential accuracy (Jackson, 1972), rater validity (Zedeck, et al., 
1983), realistic accuracy (Funder, 1995), empathic accuracy (Davis & Kraus, 1997; 
Hall & Schmid Mast, 2007; Taft, 1966), interpersonal sensitivity (Hall, Andrzejewski, 
& Yopchick, 2009; Kenny & Winquist, 2001), signal detection (Lord, 1985), to 
mention only a few. In the I-O psychology literature alone, a confusing array of 
definitions of ‘rating accuracy’ exists (for extensive reviews, see Murphy, 1991; 
Murphy & Balzer, 1989). Although these definitions will not be discussed at length 
in this dissertation, some brief comments are relevant. 
Types of Judgments. Conceptual definitions for accuracy should be distinguished 
on the basis of the nature of inferences (see Binning & Barrett, 1989) required of the 
judge – are they about measurement or about prediction? Assessors make diagnostic 
judgments of applicants’ characteristics when they infer the degree to which the 
target (e.g. the interviewee) holds certain characteristics. Diagnostic judgments result 
in statements such as, “… the applicant is probably a three (out of five) on the 
dimension of verbal communication”. Diagnostic inferences may also differ in depth, 
that is, ‘shallow’ inferences may require a judgment of whether a behavior has 
occurred or not (i.e. behavioral inference). Other ‘deeper’ inferences – known as 
dispositional inferences (Trope & Higgins, 1993) – may require a judgment of the 
underlying trait or dimension that may have caused a behavior. Research shows 
behavioral and dispositional inferences are separate and complexly interrelated 
(Trope, Cohen, & Alfieri, 1991), for example, the ability to observe performance and 
the ability to evaluate performance are different things altogether (Murphy, Garcia, 
Kerkar, Martin, & Balzer, 1982). The second broad class of inferences that assessors 
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may be required to make in personnel selection are predictive judgments, performed 
when assessors infer or predict applicants’ future behavior (e.g. expected future job 
performance) from measures (which may be diagnostic judgments themselves or 
scores from standardized tests). Predictive judgments are also known as ‘clinical 
predictions’ (Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989; Meehl, 1954). 
In light of these distinctions between types of inferences in assessor judgment, 
the focus of the present study was on diagnostic judgments about others’ underlying 
characteristics, for example, applicants’ levels of interview competencies, personality 
traits, and so forth. The accuracy of dispositional inferences is also known as 
inferential accuracy. Inferential accuracy has earlier been defined as “a person's 
ability, given limited information about a target person, correctly to judge other 
pertinent characteristics about that person” (Jackson, 1972, p. 185). When applied to 
judgments in personnel selection rating devices (e.g. interviews and ACs), inferential 
accuracy is the ability of an assessor to correctly infer the ‘true’ characteristics of 
applicants from behavioral information gathered with personnel selection measures. 
Being ‘wrong’ vs being ‘right’. Practitioners and researchers may use assessors’ 
proneness to make errors in their judgments on the one hand and their accuracy on 
the other, as conceptually related. Practically speaking, it is often thought that being 
accurate means being free from error, and vice versa. This is not the case, however. 
On the basis of meta-analytic findings (Murphy & Balzer, 1989), it is clear that rating 
accuracy is not the opposite thing as rating error. For example, in their meta- 
analysis, Murphy et al. reported an average correlation of .05 between indices of 
rating error and rating accuracy (see also Kasten & Weintraub, 1999). 
Operational Definitions of Accuracy 
The measurement of judgment accuracy with meaningful indicators has been a 
persistent issue in accuracy research (for a review of performance rating measures of 
accuracy, for example, see Sulsky & Balzer, 1988). In this regard, Fiske and Taylor 
(2008, p. 203) state: 
The task of assessing if and when a person’s inferences are accurate is 
more complex than one might suppose. One can determine whether a 
judgment corresponds to some criterion…; whether it is shared with 
others…, or whether it is adaptive, pragmatic or useful. 
Operational measures of accuracy tend to “describe both the strength and kind 
of relation between one set of measures and a corresponding set of measures (e.g. 
true scores) considered to be an accepted standard for comparison” (Guion, 1965, 
quoted in Sulsky & Balzer, 1988, p. 498). As such, a rich diversity of accuracy 
measures have been developed in different fields, including ‘consensus’ and 
‘agreement’ (Funder & Colvin, 1997; Funder & West, 1993). 
Early Approaches. Reviews of the development of accuracy measures (e.g., 
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Funder, 1987; Funder & Colvin, 1997) show that these early approaches to accuracy 
measurement often involved simple indices of correlation or agreement between the 
assessors’ judgments of targets’ characteristics and the actual profiles of the targets. 
For example, Cronbach and Gleser (1953) proposed the D-index to assess profile 
similarity, essentially the sum of the squared deviations of corresponding scores. In 
their review of the development of accuracy measures in performance rating, Sulsky 
and Balzer (1988) report that difference scores were also widely used to assess rater 
judgment accuracy in early research. However, they also point out that simple 
indices for estimating accuracy were flawed since they collapse potentially 
meaningful information into a single index, and, for instance, do not take into 
account the direction of deviations from true scores. 
Cronbach Accuracy Measures. Cronbach and colleagues (Cronbach, 1955; Gage & 
Cronbach, 1955) further criticized simple squared deviation indices of accuracy as 
confounding various important aspects of accuracy. Cronbach’s (1955) seminal 
contribution represented a watershed moment to accuracy research, however, 
inadvertently, his critique reached quite the opposite effect: instead of improving 
accuracy research by providing much-needed improved operationalisations of 
accuracy, his critique of squared deviation measures stalled accuracy research for the 
next few decades (Funder, 1995). Cronbach (1955) and colleagues’ (Gage & 
Cronbach, 1955) solution was to decompose accuracy into four separately 
measurable components. In short, these accuracy measures provided an overall 
measure of accuracy of a judge’s ability to perceive others by averaging his or her 
squared errors over all items and all targets. This overall score should be broken 
down into four components, that is, elevation (E), differential elevation (DE), 
stereotype accuracy (SA), and differential accuracy (DA). For the sake of brevity, 
only differential accuracy (DA) will be discussed4, as it has particular relevance to 
studies in the present dissertation. Differential accuracy reflects the ability to detect 
differences between targets on any item, averaged over items (Cronbach, 1955). As 
such, it represents the ability of the judge to diagnose the individual target’s trait 
profile (Powell, 2008). 
Borman’s Differential Accuracy. Borman (1977) identified Cronbach’s DA as the 
most conceptually appropriate component score in performance rating accuracy 
research because it helps determine how accurately raters can discriminate among 
people being evaluated on a number of dimensions. Sulsky and Balzer (1988) explain 
that, to compute Borman's DA index, an assessor’s ratings for each dimension are 
correlated with corresponding true scores across ratees, yielding a DA score per 
dimension. An overall DA score is then derived by averaging the correlations across 
dimensions using Fisher’s (date) r-to-z transformation. However, Borman’s DA 
provides only correlational information and the actual distances between a subject’s 
                                                     
4 Interested readers may consult Sulsky and Balzer (1988) for an overview of Cronbach’s remaining 
indices of accuracy. 
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ratings and true scores are not considered (Becker & Cardy, 1986). Sulsky and Balzer 
(1988) argued that, conceptually, Borman’s DA does not qualify as an index of 
accuracy because it is insensitive to distances between ratings and true scores. 
Rather, it should be seen as an index of rater validity that provides important 
preliminary information for accuracy. 
In summary, it is clear that many different operational measures of judgment 
accuracy exist, each focusing on a unique aspect of judgment accuracy. Different 
measures do not necessarily co-vary empirically (Roch, et al., 2012; Sulsky & Balzer, 
1988) and may imply different aspects of accuracy. As such, they may all be relevant 
to understand accurate judgment, depending on the need of the researcher. On the 
basis of earlier recommendations by Borman (1977) and Sulsky and Balzer (1988), the 
present study will rely on the differential accuracy (DA) criterion measures, 
although some chapters of this dissertation also report findings on other indices.  
True score estimation. A key issue in conversations about accuracy measures is 
the ‘criterion problem’ – the lack of a dependable golden standard against which 
assessors’ judgments may be compared (Colvin & Bundick, 2001). For this reason, 
Funder (1995, 2012) suggests that comprehensive accuracy criteria, called realistic 
accuracy, should be considered in accuracy studies, as they overcome shortcomings 
of idiosyncrasies associated with specific rater perspectives on the target’s behavior, 
such as peer, self- or subject matter expert (SME) perspectives. Funder suggests that 
by combining these views through triangulation it is more likely that a true 
representation of the target’s characteristics may be obtained. Realistic accuracy 
measures are often represented operationally in scores aggregated from various 
perspectives. However, it stands to reason that realistic accuracy measures would 
stand and fall to the degree to which there is agreement between various sources of 
rating of the target’s characteristics. As the issue of true score estimation in accuracy 
research is so important as the basis for calculating accuracy criterion scores (Sulsky 
& Balzer, 1988) each of the empirical studies presented in the current dissertation 
report thoroughly on true-score estimation and the determination of accuracy scores. 
Are Assessors Accurate? 
Despite earlier criticism about people’s abilities to make judgments about others 
(Einhorn & Hogarth, 1978; Grove, Zald, Lebow, Snitz, & Nelson, 2000; Meehl, 1954)5 
evidence to the contrary view – that judges can be quite accurate – seems more 
voluminous and also better substantiated with empirical evidence. Even using so-
called ‘thin slices’ (Ambady, Bernieri, & Richeson, 2000) of expressive behavior, 
research experiments have shown that people can make remarkably accurate 
judgments. For example, investigations that utilize so-called ‘zero acquaintance’ 
                                                     
5 This line of research appears to investigate a different issue than the issue addressed in the present 
dissertation, that is, the notion that judges can make ‘clinical predictions’ (Guion, 2011) from sets of 
assessment scores about candidates. In the present dissertation, the issue is whether or not assessors 
can infer the characteristics of targets. 
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settings have found that judges are able to judge personality and intelligence from 
limited cues (Borkenau & Liebler, 1993; Borkenau, Mauer, Riemann, Spinath, & 
Angleitner, 2004) and also predict others’ behavior at greater than chance levels 
(Levesque & Kenny, 1993). However, these effects increase with acquaintance 
(Paunonen, 1989) and may depend on the trait being judged (Gangestad, Simpson, 
DiGeronimo, & Biek, 1992). Even naïve judges can infer others’ personality profiles 
from relatively brief information (Carney, Colvin, & Hall, 2007; Schmid Mast, et al., 
2011). An extreme example of subjects’ ability to infer others’ characteristics from 
thin-slice stimuli was in a study using extreme rating conditions. Borkenau, Brecke, 
Möttig, and Paelecke (2009) showed photographs of faces to students as stimuli from 
which they had to infer the personalities of individuals portrayed in the 
photographs. Students were able to judge extraversion accurately after receiving 
only 50 milliseconds of exposure to the photographs. And in a recent study 
(Borkenau, et al., 2015), strangers were able to judge the personality of targets 
accurately from only text-based information provided by targets: Targets wrote 
essays on their hobbies, friends, family and academic studies, and judges had to 
infer the personality profiles of targets from cues in this text-based information. 
The effect sizes for accuracy of interpersonal judgments in accuracy studies are 
impressive, given the complexity of the judgment task. Whereas most of the studies 
outlined above used ‘above chance’ levels as a threshold for inferring accuracy, 
others have quantified accuracy more clearly. Similarly, in a recent meta-analysis of 
accuracy studies (k = 263) where Big Five personality traits were judged, Connelly 
and Ones (2010) found substantial rater accuracy for three different accuracy criteria, 
namely rater consensus (uncorrected mean rrr = .30 to .45), self–other agreement 
(corrected ρo=∞= .71 to .82), and accuracy for predicting job performance (corrected ρ 
= .31 to .55). In an earlier review of 32 studies in the social and personality 
psychology literature, consensus correlations ranged from zero to .30 (Kenny, 
Albright, Malloy, & Kashy, 1994). Taken together, these results support the notion 
that assessors can be accurate judges of others’ characteristics. 
Do Assessors Differ in their Judgment Accuracy? 
An important assumption of the present study was that assessors do, in fact, differ in 
their levels of judgment accuracy. If there are no differences, a search for predictors 
of these differences becomes moot. In this section, we address the question, “Are 
judgments of some people more valid, as measures of traits or as predictors, than 
those of others?” (Guion, 2011, p. 391). 
Studies of judgment accuracy tend to support the notion that some assessors’ 
judgments are more accurate than those of other assessors (e.g., Biesanz, 2010; 
Borman, et al., 1983; Dipboye, et al., 1990; Heneman, et al., 1975; Kinicki, et al., 1990; 
Pulakos, et al., 1996; Ryan & Sackett, 1989; Sackett & Wilson, 1982; Schneider & 
Bayroff, 1953; Van Iddekinge, et al., 2006; Zedeck, et al., 1983). In laboratory research, 
some judges appear to be more effective than others. For example, Ambady and 
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Rosenthal (1992) meta-analyzed (k = 44) the accuracy of judges’ predictions of 
various objective outcomes from brief (< 5 min) observations of expressive behavior, 
where the overall effect size (reffect size) for prediction accuracy was .39. In a later 
replication within a workplace setting, (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1993) found in their 
‘thin-slice’ study that student ratings of brief (6 s, 15 s, 30 s) silent videotapes of their 
college lecturers predicted job performance outcome criteria – end-of-semester 
teacher evaluations, as well as the principal’s ratings of the same teachers – strongly. 
Various other investigations (e.g., Ambady, Krabbenhoft, & Hogan, 2006; DeGroot & 
Motowidlo, 1999) report similar findings. In the recent meta-analysis of accuracy 
studies (k = 263) by Connelly and Ones (2010), where observer ratings of Big Five 
personality traits were considered, accuracy indices reported in the cited studies 
varied considerably. 
Whereas the aforementioned investigations considered diagnostic judgments 
(i.e. trait or dimension inferences), individual differences in judges’ predictive 
judgments (i.e. behavioral predictions) have also been found. For example, the 
results of Zedeck, et al. (1983) demonstrated how 10 interviewers in a military 
training organization differed in the criterion-related validity of their ratings of 
N = 121 candidates admitted to officers’ training school. In their study, three 
interviewers’ ratings were more predictive of candidates’ training evaluation scores 
after a six-week period, as compared to the remaining interviewers. In a later 
investigation using structured interviews, Pulakos, Schmitt, Whitney, and Smith 
(1996) studied behavioral interview ratings by N = 62 interviewers of N = 515 federal 
agency employees, where each interviewer assessed between 11 and 48 interviewees. 
Again, the results showed that interviewers differed in their criterion-related 
validity for predicting subjective ratings of job performance, although the authors 
were concerned about the effect of sampling error on observed differences in 
validity between interviewers. In another study of accuracy within a structured 
interview, Van Iddekinge, Sager, Burnfield, and Heffner (2006) examined differences 
in criterion-related validity of individual interviewers’ (N = 564) ratings of 944 
military non-commissioned officers (NCOs) in the US Army. Their results showed 
considerable variation in coefficients estimating interviewer validity in relation to 
multiple performance criteria, although these authors were also concerned that 
sampling error may partially have accounted for these variations. 
In summary, individual differences in assessor judgment accuracy are 
consistently found in most accuracy studies conducted in I-O psychology. To shed 
light on how individual differences in judgment accuracy may develop, we turn 
briefly to relevant judgment theories. 
Interpersonal Judgment Theories 
The process of forming judgments in interviews, for example, is essentially a person 
perception process (Parsons, Liden, & Bauer, 2001). Interviewers pose questions to 
interviewees and evaluate the verbal and non-verbal responses, before assigning a 
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rating that reflects their impression of the interviewee’s characteristics. The accuracy 
of these judgments relies heavily on cognitive processes (DeNisi, et al., 1984; Lance, 
et al., 2004) and the individual differences that drive them (Jones & Born, 2008). 
An impressive array of theories has been developed to explain how individuals 
form impressions of others and the factors affecting the accuracy of interpersonal 
judgments. These theories generally fall in the domain of social cognition – defined 
as the medium through which our worlds are construed and actions initiated (Fiske 
& Macrae, 2012). Although various judgment theories6 (for a review, see Fiske & 
Taylor, 2013; Wyer & Srull, 2014) and judgment process models (for example, 
Biesanz, 2010; Kenny, 2004b) exist to explain judgment accuracy processes and 
outcomes, amongst other things, social judgment theory (SJT) (Brehmer, 1988) has 
laid the foundation for the study of accuracy of person perception. Social judgment 
theory is described (Brehmer, 1988, p. 13) as: 
… the result of a systematic application of Brunswik's probabilistic 
functionalism to the problem of human judgment in social situations. 
Brunswik's theory of perception is also called “cue theory”. According to 
such a theory, a person does not have access to any direct information 
about the objects in the environment. Instead, perception is seen as an 
indirect process, mediated by a set of proximal cues. In accordance with 
this view, SJT defines judgment as a process which involves the 
integration of information from a set of cues into a judgment about some 
distal state of affairs. 
Realistic Accuracy Model (RAM) 
The most influential manifestation of social judgment theory in personnel selection 
research has been the realistic accuracy model (Funder, 1995, 1999, 2012). On the 
basis of earlier ‘cue’ models of perception (e.g., Brunswik, 1956), RAM proposes that 
the path to judgment accuracy involves a number of interdependent steps (see 
Figure 1.2). In this framework, an interviewer’s judgment accuracy results from a 
social cognitive process that proceeds in four stages (from left to right in the 
diagram). The behavior displayed by a target (interviewee) serves as a cue and must 
be relevant to the trait being judged, in a manner where this information is available to the 
interviewer, who must then detect; and correctly utilize the information to form an 
accurate judgment. Only when all four steps have been achieved effectively – these 
processes are interdependent – can a perceiver correctly judge another person’s 
characteristics (Funder, 2012). 
 
                                                     
6 A selection of specific theories will be introduced and reviewed in greater detail within the 
respective chapters of this dissertation. 
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Figure 1.2 The Realistic Accuracy Model applied in interview judgments: Processes and 
moderators. Adapted with permission from Funder, D. C. (1995). On the accuracy of 
personality judgment: A realistic approach. Psychological Review, 102, p. 659. 
By implication, cue detection and cue utilization may or may not work 
effectively. RAM further proposes that the degree to which trait or dimension 
judgments are accurate is moderated by a number of key factors: good targets, good 
traits, good information, and finally, good judges (Funder, 2012). Good targets are 
simply highly judgable people – their behavior is relevant to their underlying 
personalities and they may be more transparent than poor targets. Good traits (e.g. 
expressiveness) are more visible than others (e.g. deceptiveness) and therefore, are 
more easily judged. Good information is a function of both quantity (e.g. a one-hour 
interview provides more trait cues than a speed-dating interview) and quality (e.g. 
when a person is relaxed and responds to good interview questions, higher-quality 
cue information results). Finally, good judges are better able to detect and use 
behavior cues to form an accurate personality trait inference. 
The RAM is an important framework that highlights how ‘good judges’ (in 
addition to good targets, good traits and good information) can be moderators of 
accuracy. Naturally, perceivers have to bring together all the relevant information 
about the ratee and other factors (for example, about the situational context, ratee 
characteristics to be rated, rating procedure, and rater characteristics; Guion, 2011) 
and form an overall judgment. Although the RAM framework explains how accurate 
judgments are formed, and also addresses potential moderators of accuracy, it does 
not provide much detail on the characteristics of the good judge7. That is, more work 
                                                     
7 Funder (1999) suggests a cursory selection of individual difference constructs that may enhance 
personality judgment accuracy, but these individual differences are not fully representative of the 
literature and their empirical support is not fully assessed. In addition, they are also not linked to 
judgment accuracy in the human resource management (HRM) literature. 
Interviewee 
trait
Judgment 
of trait
Relevance Availability Detection Utilization
Accuracy
Good target
Good trait
Good information
Good judge
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is needed to determine the individual differences of assessors that may facilitate 
important judgment processes. 
 
1.3 Individual Differences Constructs in Judgment Accuracy 
There are likely to be identifiable assessor constructs that may help explain their 
judgment accuracy (Guion, 2011). By implication, an individual differences approach 
is needed to uncover assessor constructs that may affect rating accuracy in personnel 
selection (for example, see discussion in Jones & Born, 2008). Our main research 
question, therefore, is: 
To what extent do assessor constructs explain differences in judgment accuracy in 
subjective rating selection measures? 
In addition to its theoretical relevance, a better grasp of the assessor constructs 
that influence accuracy could help us to select and train the most effective 
interviewers or assessors. For example, interviewers may be screened with measures 
that tap into constructs associated with rating accuracy. Or they may receive training 
to develop specific individual differences that may enhance accuracy. So, research 
that explores the individual differences in judgment accuracy may have potential 
practical implications for personnel selection. 
The Profile of the Good Judge in HRM: A Systematic Review 
As basis for this dissertation, Chapter 2 reviews empirical literature in HRM that 
have addressed the characteristics of a good judge. As a consequence of its breadth, 
RAM does not focus on assessor individual differences that may facilitate judgment 
processes. Although Funder (1999) suggested a few characteristics of the good judge, 
a better understanding is needed of what these are. Furthermore, we do not know 
how assessor constructs (for example, see discussion in Jones & Born, 2008) may 
affect judgment processes that lead to accuracy – it is unclear from the HRM research 
base how various assessor individual differences facilitate judgment processes. 
Stated otherwise, we do not know the link between individual differences and cue 
detection and cue utilization in the HRM domain. This might be another reason why 
personality and social psychological studies mostly failed to identify characteristics 
associated with being a good judge. 
Over more than 60 years in HRM literature, we have seen a steady flow of 
empirical studies in human resource management that tested individual difference 
constructs as predictors of accuracy (e.g., Borman, 1979; Christiansen, et al., 2005; 
Powell & Goffin, 2009). However, this work has not been synthesized into a profile 
of the good judge that is supported by empirical evidence. As such, we are not sure 
what we know, or do not know, about the individual difference constructs of 
accurate assessors in human resource management (Guion, 2011). Furthermore, a 
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better understanding is needed of how assessor individual differences can be linked 
to judgment processes outlined in RAM. 
In order to provide a synthesis of empirical research studies, Chapter 2 will 
construct an evidence-based profile of the ‘good judge’ in the specific HRM context. 
Our overview draws from three primary HRM fields: performance appraisal, 
interviews, and assessment centres (ACs). 
By weighing the evidence in support of individual difference predictors of 
accuracy in Chapter 2, we were able to outline what we know, and do not yet know, 
about the characteristics of the good judge in a HRM context. In this review, the 
overall aim is to crystallize the evidence pertaining to the link between various 
individual differences and accuracy and to identify directions for future research. A 
key contribution of this study will be to link individual difference constructs to 
processes thought to influence judgment accuracy. Funder’s RAM (1999, 2012) 
proposes that the ability to detect and use behavior cues may influence the quality of 
the judges’ impression. As such, our review develops a conceptual model that 
portrays empirical support for (and gaps between) individual difference constructs 
and key judgment processes. 
Consequently, the following research question is formulated: 
 
Research Question 1: From the empirical HRM literature, which individual 
differences explain judgment accuracy, in other words, what is the profile of the 
good judge? 
The various individual difference constructs that are investigated in the three 
empirical studies of the present dissertation are now discussed in more detail. 
 
The Internal Factor Structure of Dispositional Reasoning 
As a result of the conceptual review conducted in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 reports the 
first of three empirical studies that explored specific individual difference predictors 
of judgment accuracy. Of the many individual difference constructs that may predict 
accuracy, the most promising factors are likely to be cognitive characteristics (Guion, 
2011). Indeed, a contemporary review of general interview literature (Dipboye, et al., 
2012) concludes that good interviewers have higher general cognitive ability relative 
to poor interviewers. In recent years, the focus of individual differences research has 
shifted toward exploring specific abilities related to being a good judge (for example, 
see Letzring, 2008; McLarney-Vesotski, Bernieri, & Rempala, 2011; Powell, 2008). 
One of these specific abilities, dispositional reasoning, is the focus of both 
Chapters 3 and 4. Dispositional reasoning is defined as the complex knowledge of 
traits, behaviors, and situations’ potential to elicit traits into manifest behaviors 
(Christiansen, et al., 2005). Earlier research findings suggest that dispositional 
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reasoning may be a key individual difference construct to explain why judges differ 
in accuracy. For example, Christiansen et al. (2005) asked students (N = 122) to watch 
videotaped segments of individuals responding to employment interview questions, 
after which students also judged the personality of the video interviewees and rated 
acquaintances who later completed self-report personality inventories. Among a set 
of constructs that included general cognitive ability and personality, dispositional 
reasoning was the best predictor of interview accuracy (r = .42). The ability of 
dispositional reasoning to predict interview-related accuracy was partially replicated 
in a follow-up study (Powell & Goffin, 2009). In summary, these findings suggest 
that dispositional reasoning seems to facilitate interviewer accuracy. 
Dispositional reasoning was initially conceptualized as a broad set of 
conceptually distinguishable components, namely behavior-trait knowledge, judges’ 
implicit personality theories, and judges’ understanding of situation-trait relevance 
(Christiansen, et al., 2005). In the present dissertation, these components are labelled 
as ‘trait induction’, ‘trait extrapolation’, and ‘trait contextualization’, respectively. As 
studies up to now (e.g., Christiansen, et al., 2005; Powell & Goffin, 2009) have not 
been able to measure these components reliably, they collapsed scores from 
conceptually distinct clusters of items into a broad dispositional reasoning measure. 
In doing so, the underlying facets of dispositional reasoning lie obscured from 
measurement and further use in research and practice. Chapter 3 takes a closer look 
at the internal factor structure of dispositional reasoning. In the current 
investigation, a revised measure of the interpersonal judgment inventory (IJI) 
(Christiansen, et al., 2005) was developed8 to yield reliable and measurement valid 
component scores. In doing so, the study sought further evidence of construct 
validity of the measure in the form of internal validity. 
Finally, we were also interested in the usefulness of the revised measure in two 
different populations of assessors, namely managers and psychology students. These 
populations were selected as they typically receive assessor training in personnel 
selection (Krause & Thornton, 2009). Users of the dispositional reasoning measure 
may want to administer the measure in different populations of assessors. Therefore, 
the issue of measurement invariance needs to be addressed in order to determine 
whether “an assessment instrument is measuring the same constructs in exactly the 
same way across groups” (Byrne & Stewart, 2006, p. 287). The analysis of 
measurement invariance has become popular in HRM (Schmitt & Kuljanin, 2008) as 
a means to establish measurement properties of a measure when it is used between 
two or more groups. If the issue of measurement (Millsap, 2011) equivalence 
between managers and students is not addressed, between-group comparisons of 
test scores may be misleading, because we would not be sure if observed group 
differences are ‘real’ or confounded with differences in the structure of the 
                                                     
8 The development of the revised interpersonal judgment inventory (RIJI) (De Kock, Lievens, & Born, 
2015) is described at length in Chapter 4. Chapter 3 presents an analysis of its measurement validity. 
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constructs and/or functioning of the measurement scales (Cheung, 2008). As such, 
the present study determines to what extent does the revised dispositional reasoning 
instrument measure the same constructs for managers compared to students? 
 Information on the measurement properties of the revised interpersonal 
judgment inventory can be useful for researchers and practitioners in human 
resource management in different ways. It may help to support the use of the 
measure of dispositional reasoning in judgment accuracy research studies – a 
reliable and valid measure that provides both overall as well as component-level 
scores. In practice, the revised measure may be used to establish the profile of 
assessors on overall- and component-level scores of dispositional reasoning. For 
example, interviewers and assessors can be screened on the measure, or feedback by 
targeting specific assessor constructs may be given to assessors to develop them in 
rater training (e.g., Lievens, 2001; Roch, et al., 2012). 
The research question addressed in Chapter 3, therefore, is as follows: 
Research Question 2: How can dispositional reasoning be measured reliably and 
with measurement validity at the component level? 
a) Can the components of dispositional reasoning be measured reliably with a 
revised measure, the RIIJ? 
b) Can the components of dispositional reasoning be measured validly with a 
revised measure, the RIIJ? 
c) Which factor structure best represents a dispositional reasoning construct, 
among a choice of a global factor, a component-only (first-level) model, or a 
hierarchical model (where a second-order global factor influences 
component scores at first level)? 
d) To what extent does the revised dispositional reasoning instrument 
measure the same constructs for managers compared to students? 
To address these questions, Chapter 3 reports on a factor analysis of 
dispositional reasoning scores in two distinguishable samples of respondents, 
namely managers and psychology students. We tested alternative hypothesized 
factor structures for dispositional reasoning. This allowed us to accomplish three 
important objectives that all focus on assessing internal measurement properties: 
• First, we tried to shed light on the internal composition of the dispositional 
reasoning construct, that is, is it a single, broad ability, or many specific 
abilities that are related? Or, could it be considered both, in other words, 
would a hierarchical factor structure make more sense, where a broad 
dispositional reasoning ability influences specific components?  
• Our second objective was to make practical recommendations about the best 
way to use the dispositional reasoning measure: For example, should it be 
used as an overall measure, or rather, can the individual subtests be used to 
assess the subcomponents reliably and validly?  
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• Our third objective addressed generalizability issues: we compared the factor 
structures underlying our dispositional reasoning measure between different 
assessor types (managers vs psychology students). It was important to 
compare the construct validity of dispositional reasoning between these 
groups, as they both provide pools of assessors that are often trained to 
provide ratings of applicants in workplace assessments (Krause & Thornton, 
2009). 
An In-depth Look at Dispositional Reasoning and Interviewer Accuracy 
As opposed to the previous chapter that focused on internal construct validity 
issues, Chapter 4 focuses on external construct validity and criterion-related 
evidence. On the basis of theories that suggest that judges’ interpretation of 
behaviors, traits, and situations are intertwined (e.g., Trope, 1986), Christiansen, 
Wolcott-Burnam, Janovics, Burns, and Quirk (2005) introduced dispositional 
intelligence9 and defined it as complex knowledge of traits, behaviors, and the 
potential of situations to elicit traits into manifest behaviors. According to 
Christiansen et al., dispositional intelligence is a “declarative knowledge structure” 
(p. 126) that enables behavioral information processing. According to the original 
framework, judgment accuracy may depend on three separate components in this 
construct, namely behavior-trait knowledge (the ability to know how traits manifest 
themselves in behavior), understanding of trait co-occurrence (an understanding of 
how traits and their behavioral manifestations naturally co-vary), and situation-trait 
relevance. In order to enhance conceptual clarity and ease of use in our discussion, 
we use the following labels for these components, namely trait induction, trait 
extrapolation, and trait contextualization. 
However, these earlier studies on dispositional reasoning did not consider its 
underlying components, that is, the role of trait induction, trait extrapolation and 
trait contextualization in judgment accuracy is unclear. As a result, we know little 
about the componential nature of dispositional reasoning and how these 
components individually facilitate interviewer accuracy. Furthermore, if it were 
possible to measure the components of dispositional reasoning reliably, it would 
enable tests of whether it may be understood as an intelligence measure. For it to be 
considered an intelligence measure, a specific mental ability should meet several 
conceptual and empirical criteria (Carroll, 1993; Flanagan, Genshaft, & Harrison, 
1997; Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 1999). To this end, we developed a revised measure 
of dispositional reasoning, that is, one with reliable components. In Chapter 4, 
therefore, we report on the testing of whether the components of dispositional 
reasoning adhered to the criteria for classic intelligence measures. 
                                                     
9 In our view, it is too early to conclude that this construct can be classified as an intelligence, and 
therefore we label it as dispositional reasoning henceforth in the present dissertation. 
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In summary, then, the second research question addressed by the present study 
was formulated as follows: 
Research Question 3: Does dispositional reasoning meet the classic criteria for an 
intelligence measure, considering the relationship between interviewers’ 
dispositional reasoning components, general mental ability, personality, and 
their judgment accuracy for rating interview dimensions? 
a) Do the components of dispositional reasoning (trait induction, trait 
extrapolation, and trait contextualization) converge with one another and 
with general mental ability? 
b) Do the components of dispositional reasoning show discriminant validity 
with Big Five personality measures? 
c) Do the components of dispositional reasoning show incremental validity 
over general mental ability in predicting interview dimension rating 
accuracy? 
Although the implicit question embedded in these series of tests was whether 
or not dispositional reasoning would adhere to the standard criteria for a classic 
intelligence, our research also sought to position the dispositional reasoning 
construct within a nomological network of other individual differences and 
judgment accuracy. Taken together, this evidence allowed us to further assess the 
construct validity (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955; Messick, 1995) of dispositional 
reasoning. 
Does it take one to know one? Interviewer personality, chronically accessible traits, and trait 
judgment accuracy 
Reporting on the final empirical study in this dissertation, Chapter 5 presents the 
findings of an investigation into the relationship between interviewer personality 
traits, their chronically accessible personality traits, and trait-specific judgment 
accuracy. Personality judgments are increasing in importance in personnel selection 
as they not only underlie ratings used in selection devices such as interviews 
(Huffcutt, Conway, Roth, & Stone, 2001; Lievens, De Fruyt, & Van Dam, 2001; Van 
Dam, 2003), but also hold many potential benefits over self-report measures of 
personality. For example, these so-called ‘observer ratings’ (such as those by work 
colleagues or supervisors) can be more predictive of criteria (e.g. academic 
performance and job performance) and incremental to self-ratings (Connelly & Ones, 
2010; Zimmerman, Triana, & Barrick, 2010). 
For these reasons, it is important to understand the factors that affect the 
accuracy of observer ratings of personality, such as interviewer characteristics. 
Although interviewer cognitive factors (Christiansen, et al., 2005) appear to be 
consistent predictors of personality trait judgment accuracy, interviewer personality 
traits show relatively inconsistent, poor, and often counterintuitive relationships 
(e.g., Borman, 1979; Borman & Hallam, 1991; Christiansen, et al., 2005; Hjelle, 1969; 
Lippa & Dietz, 2000; Powell & Goffin, 2009; Vogt & Colvin, 2003). The reasons for 
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these findings are counterintuitive as they suggest that interviewer personality plays 
little to no role in person perception in organizations. However, personality is the 
predisposition to respond to stimuli in a certain way (John, Robins, & Pervin, 2008) 
and it affects most areas of functioning, including social functioning and social 
judgment in the workplace (e.g., Tziner, Murphy, Cleveland, Yavo, & Hayoon, 2008). 
Earlier studies on the relationship between interviewer personality traits and 
personality trait judgment accuracy have two major drawbacks. First, they often 
used trait-generic accuracy criteria that measure how well an interviewer is able to 
infer a complete personality profile. A relatively unexplored avenue is the notion 
that personality trait judgment accuracy may be trait-specific, rather than trait-
generic. As predicted by Funder (1995) that traits have been found to differ in their 
judgability – accuracy scores for judging Big Five traits vary predictably (Allik, 
Realo, Mõttus, & Kuppens, 2010; Connolly, Kavanagh, & Viswesvaran, 2007; Funder 
& Dobroth, 1987). Given these findings, we know little about how interviewers’ 
traits may predict trait-specific, or trait-level judgment accuracy. 
The second drawback of earlier studies was neglecting to offer an explanatory 
social-cognitive mechanism through which interviewer personality traits may affect 
their ability to judge others’ traits. A growing line of research suggests that the self 
may be a basis for social cognitive schemas when forming impressions of others 
(Dunning & Cohen, 1992; Dunning & McElwee, 1995). Along these lines, 
interviewers’ understanding of particular traits may be related to their own 
personalities. For example, is it possible that extraverts would be better at rating 
extroversion, in other words, ‘does it take one to know one?’ in personality trait 
judgments? A complementary explanation may be that interviewers’ own traits are 
more salient in their perceptual schemas. Drawing on construct accessibility theory 
(Higgins, 2012) we also determine in Chapter 5 whether interviewers’ chronically 
accessible traits, defined as the degree to which individuals differ in the readiness 
with which each construct is utilized in information processing of behavioral 
stimulus input (Higgins, et al., 1982, p. 45), may possibly predict their personality 
trait judgment accuracy. Moreover, would a more parsimonious account, where the 
chronic accessibility for a trait partially mediates the effect of an interviewers’ 
personality trait on judging the corresponding trait in others, be supported? To our 
knowledge, no earlier studies have tested these ideas empirically. 
Research question 4: Would interviewers’ personality traits and their chronically 
accessible traits predict personality judgment accuracy that is trait-specific? 
a) To what extent are interviewers more accurate at judging traits they share 
with targets? 
b) Is there a relationship between interviewers’ personality traits and chronic 
accessibility for corresponding personality traits? 
c) Is interviewers’ trait accessibility for personality traits related to the degree 
of accuracy for judging corresponding traits? 
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d) What is the incremental validity of personality trait chronic accessibility 
over personality in predicting trait judgment accuracy? 
e) Does trait chronic accessibility partially mediate the effect of traits on 
judgment accuracy for corresponding traits? 
In answering these questions, Chapter 5 presents two empirical studies. In 
Study 1, college students were asked to infer the personality profiles of hypothetical 
interview applicants from behavioral descriptors. We also measured students’ own 
personalities and determined whether trait-level accuracy could be predicted from 
their personality traits. In Study 2, the first investigation was replicated in a field 
sample of interviewers in a large financial company and we also measured their 
chronically accessible personality traits and investigate their predictiveness of trait-
specific judgment accuracy for corresponding traits. Together, these studies aimed to 
add to the current understanding of the role of interviewer personality and trait 
construct accessibility as individual differences in interviewer judgment accuracy. 
The four research questions as described above have guided the research that is 
presented in the five chapters to follow. Each chapter describes a unique study, 
which may be read independently from the other chapters of this dissertation. The 
samples utilized between studies were relatively independent10 and some studies 
contained multiple samples. In closing, Chapter 6 presents answers to the research 
questions and presents practical implications and recommendations. Chapter 6 also 
carves out ideas for future research. 
                                                     
10 The only exception was the inclusion of dispositional reasoning item scores of managers in the 
study reported in Chapter 4, within our sample of managers used for the analysis of measurement 
properties, reported in Chapter 3. 
The profile of the good judge in HRM: A systematic review 29 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
The profile of the ‘good judge’ in HRM: A systematic review11 
 
In this chapter, we provide an overview of individual difference characteristics that have been 
associated with the ‘good judge’ in human resource management over more than 60 years. 
We review empirical findings to identify what we know and do not know about the individual 
difference causes of rating quality. Overall, findings suggest that cognitive factors show 
stronger and more consistent relationships with rating accuracy than personality-related 
factors. The discussion concludes with some thoughts about the future of individual 
differences studies. 
  
                                                     
11 This chapter is in preparation for publication review as: 
De Kock, F. S., Born, M. Ph., & Lievens, F. (2015). The profile of the ‘good judge’ in 
HRM: A systematic review. Manuscript in preparation. 
An earlier version of the study in this chapter was presented at the 29th annual 
conference of the Assessment Centre Study Group (ACSG), Stellenbosch, South 
Africa, March 2009. 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
In human resource management (HRM), ratings of others are ubiquitous (Guion & 
Highhouse, 2011). As organizations rely on ratings to make important selection and 
promotion decisions (Schmitt & Chan, 1998), it is easy to understand why so much 
effort has gone into understanding not only how people evaluate others (see Graves 
& Karren, 1992; London, 2001; Parsons, et al., 2001) but also into identifying the 
characteristics of effective raters (e.g., Christiansen, et al., 2005; Graves, 1993; Powell 
& Goffin, 2009). 
In social and personality psychology, a longstanding line of research has 
sought to determine what makes the ‘good judge’. In this vein, Funder (1999, p. 142) 
concluded that: 
The search for the good judge … is the oldest pursuit in the accuracy literature and was 
nearly its sole concern during the early incarnation from the 1930s … the prey proved to 
be unexpectedly elusive. Despite the research attention it has received, the good judge is 
the potential moderator concerning which the accuracy literature has the sparsest data 
and fewest firm findings to report. 
In pursuit of a coherent explanation for judgment accuracy, Funder developed 
the Realistic Accuracy Model (RAM; Funder, 1995, 1999, 2012), one of the most well-
known models of a good judge in personality and social psychology. RAM suggests 
that judges12 are important moderators of accuracy. In Funder’s (1995) framework 
(see Figure 2.1), accurate judgment results from a social cognitive process that 
proceeds in four stages, in which the target person first emits a behavior that is 
relevant to the trait to be judged, in a manner where this information is available to the 
perceiver, who must then detect and correctly utilize the information to form an 
accurate judgment. In an interview, for example, assuming there is useful behavioral 
information available to the evaluator, the interviewer can make accurate judgments 
of an interviewee only if it is possible for them to correctly detect and use behavioral 
cues displayed by the interviewee. 
                                                     
12 In this chapter, the terms ‘judge’ and ‘rater’ refer to interviewers and assessors (e.g. psychologists, 
managers, or other trained assessors). 
The profile of the good judge in HRM: A systematic review 31 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. The Realistic Accuracy Model, applied in interviewer judgments: processes and 
moderators. Adapted with permission from Funder, D. C. (1995). On the accuracy of 
personality judgment: A realistic approach. Psychological Review, 102, p. 659. 
As a consequence of its breadth, RAM does not focus on rater individual 
differences that may facilitate judgment processes. Although Funder (1999) suggests 
a few characteristics of the good judge, a better understanding is needed of what 
these are. Furthermore, we do not know how assessor constructs (for example, see 
discussion in Jones & Born, 2008) may affect judgment processes that lead to 
accuracy. It is unclear from the HRM research base how various rater individual 
differences facilitate judgment processes. Stated otherwise, we do not know the link 
between individual differences and cue detection and cue utilization in the HRM 
domain. This might be another reason why personality and social psychological 
studies often fail to identify characteristics associated with being a good judge. 
A review of more than 60 years in the HRM literature shows a steady flow of 
empirical studies in HRM that tested individual difference constructs as predictors 
of accuracy (e.g., Borman, 1979; Christiansen, et al., 2005; Powell & Goffin, 2009). 
However, this work has not been synthesized into a profile of the good judge that is 
supported by empirical evidence. As such, we are not sure what we know, or do not 
know, about the individual difference constructs of accurate raters in HRM (Guion, 
2011). Furthermore, a better understanding is needed of how rater individual 
differences can be linked to judgment processes outlined in RAM. 
Information on the good judge can be useful for HRM in different ways. A 
profile of the characteristics of accurate raters cannot only help reveal how 
individual differences enable better judgments; it may also have practical benefits. 
For example, interviewers and assessors can be screened on measures of individual 
differences that predict their judgment accuracy. One such individual difference 
Interviewee 
trait
Judgment 
of trait
Relevance Availability Detection Utilization
Accuracy
Good target
Good trait
Good information
Good judge
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construct, dispositional reasoning, is defined as a judges’ complex understanding of 
traits, behaviors and a situation’s potential to manifest traits into behaviors) 
(Christiansen et al., 2005). In addition to rater screening applications, knowledge 
about rater constructs may inform better ways to develop raters (e.g., Lievens, 2001; 
Roch, et al., 2012) by targeting specific constructs in rater training. By illustration, if 
managers’ knowledge about performance dimensions affects rating quality (Woehr, 
1992) it may help to implement training programmes that focus on enhancing these 
schemas. 
The Present Study 
In the present study, we reviewed empirical research on individual differences that 
predict rating quality in the HRM domain.13 As an organising framework for our 
review (see Figure 2.2), we relied on the Realistic Accuracy Model (RAM) (Funder, 
1995, 1999). According to this framework, judges’ ability to detect and use behavior 
cues holds the most potential to advance our understanding of individual difference 
constructs that may affect rating quality in HRM. As such, we also link the 
constructs reviewed to the specific stages of RAM and underline their relative degree 
of empirical support. 
Our review draws from three primary HRM fields: interviews, assessment 
centres and performance appraisal. By weighing the evidence in support of 
individual difference predictors of accuracy, we are able to outline what we know 
and do not yet know about the characteristics of the good judge in HRM. We 
summarize this empirical research base in Table 2.1. Finally, the review outlines 20 
questions (see Table 2.2) that hold most potential for advancing knowledge of 
individual differences in judgment accuracy. 
2.2 Method 
Literature Search 
Collecting Possible Studies 
Four methods were used to locate relevant studies. First, a computer search of Web 
of Science and Dissertation Abstracts was conducted to retrieve research studies 
containing the terms accuracy, rater, rating, judgment, interview, performance, assessment 
centre. We filtered the resulting list according to publication field and research area. 
The second method was a manual search of major journals within the domain of 
HRM and industrial and organizational (I-O) psychology that have published 
accuracy studies, including Journal of Applied Psychology, Personnel Psychology, 
International Journal of Selection and Assessment, Human Performance and others. Third, 
publications were located within reference lists of major accuracy review studies, 
                                                     
13 For this reason, our study does not consider investigations in adjacent disciplines, such as social 
psychology, nor in more specific lines of research, such as the study of judgments of non-verbal 
behavior. 
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and individual relevant studies, published both in journal article and book form. 
Last, we also trawled the personal research websites of active accuracy researchers. 
Inclusion Criteria 
These searches resulted in a large number of studies. To be included in our review, a 
study had to meet the following six criteria: 
 
1. Most important, the study had to include individual differences as predictors 
of rating quality indices. Rating quality is broadly defined here as the degree 
to which ratings reflect desirable psychometric characteristics. As such, rating 
quality measures include rating accuracy indices (construct validity) and 
rating validity coefficients (criterion-related validity), but none of the various 
rating error measures, such as halo, leniency, etc. Even though both accuracy 
and error measures are often used as rating outcomes, these measures show 
little empirical relationships with one another. For example, in a meta-
analysis by Murphy and Balzer (1989), the average correlation between rating 
error (various indices) and rating accuracy indices was a mere .05 (see also 
Kasten & Weintraub, 1999). Because of this limited overlap, rating error 
measures will not be considered as dependent variables in this review; rating 
accuracy measures will be our focus. 
2. We excluded accuracy studies that used rating tasks, stimuli or target 
dimensions that were not immediately relevant to practical HRM 
applications. For example, studies that used students to judge the sexuality of 
other students from non-verbal behavior were not considered relevant. This 
criterion excluded a large number of studies from our main review, as many 
studies (e.g., Davis & Kraus, 1997; Murphy & Hall, 2011) focused on judging 
moods, emotions or affective states of others. As the bulk of this work may be 
peripheral to HRM applications, we do report on their findings in this review. 
However, a summary of these studies is available from the first author. 
3. We considered only peer-reviewed publications, but irrespective of 
publication date. The studies retained ranged from 1953 to 2011. 
4. We only retained empirical studies reporting relationships between any rater 
characteristic and rating quality indices such as accuracy and validity. For 
example, if a study reported the effect between a rater’s demographic 
characteristic, for example, gender, and accuracy, it was retained. Quite a 
large number of studies reported multiple rater characteristics and, as such, 
the number of observations in our review are greater than the number of 
studies reviewed. 
5. A few studies were available in both dissertation and journal article format. If 
we could confirm it was the same study, only the journal article information 
was included. Often only dissertation abstracts were available – if incomplete 
34  Chapter 2 
or ambiguous information was available to determine the study result, a 
study was omitted from the review. 
6. Finally, some studies included individual differences that we considered 
‘borderline’ to our exclusion criteria, as we were not sure whether they 
actually addressed constructs related to the good judge. Examples are 
perceived similarity in attitudes with targets (Zalesny & Highhouse, 1992), 
demographic or cultural similarity (Letzring, 2010), and interpersonal 
acquaintance (Kenny, et al., 1994; Paunonen, 1989). These were deleted from 
the review, although they are available from the first author for future studies 
of possible moderators of accuracy. 
Coding Procedures 
Each study that fulfilled our criteria was coded by the first author on the following 
dimensions: (1) year, (2) sample size, (3) type of sample (students, employees, 
managers, country, etc.), (4) criterion measure, (5) rating task/stimuli, (6) target 
dimension/trait, (7) theoretical framework, (8) accuracy operationalization, and (9) 
effect size. 
Study Characteristics 
Table 2.1 shows the studies reviewed in terms of categorization variables. The 
majority of effects were observed in college samples (79.3%), with only a small 
proportion in field samples (14.9%) or mixed groups (5.8%). To employ laboratory 
studies that were cross-sectional was a popular choice. The mean sample size for the 
studies reviewed was approximately 166 participants (SD = 116; Min = 44; Max = 
898). Apparently, the majority of studies were conducted in North America, 
although it is hard to quantify the proportion as many studies did not reveal the 
location of the research. More information about the study characteristics, such as 
tests used, choice of accuracy measure, and other information that was coded for 
each study reviewed, may be requested from the first author. 
 
2.3 Results 
 
We present the empirical research on individual difference characteristics in rating 
quality according to our organizing framework (see Figure 2.2). In this heuristic, we 
group judges’ individual differences into constructs that are general, such as 
cognitive ability and personality traits, or others that are more specific, such as 
observation ability, cognitive styles and others. The RAM suggests that, first, target 
characteristics emit behavior cues that are available and relevant to the perceiver. In 
turn, the degree to which good judges can detect and utilize these cues will influence 
their rating quality (Funder, 2012). In these processes, a variety of general and 
specific characteristics can play an important role, reviewed next. 
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Figure 2.2. A model of individual differences in judgment accuracy, structured according to 
Funder’s (1995) RAM. Solid arrows indicate relationships with empirical research support, 
whereas dotted arrows indicate relationships with limited/inconsistent research support. 
 
General Characteristics 
General Intelligence 
In their seminal review of performance rating research, Landy and Farr (1980) 
conclude, “in general, cognitive characteristics of raters seem to hold the most 
promise for increased understanding of the rating process”(p. 72). We found 18 
studies that reported the relationship between cognitive characteristics and accuracy 
as dependent variable (see Table 2.1). These include general intelligence, and other 
specific factors,14 including specific intelligences (dispositional reasoning, verbal or 
spatial reasoning), cognitive heuristics and attributional complexity as predictors. 
Intelligence may affect rating quality because intelligence enables behavior 
information processing: a key process in trait cue utilization (Funder, 1999). Because 
judging others is a highly complex task that places a heavy information processing 
load on the rater (Kolk, Born, Van der Flier, & Olman, 2002; Lance, et al., 2004), 
cognitive processing abilities may be an important key to producing accurate 
judgments (Dipboye, et al., 2012; Wyer & Srull, 2014). 
                                                     
14 The specific cognitive characteristics are discussed in a later section “Specific Characteristics”. 
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In an early review of studies on cognitive ability and accuracy, Allport (1937) 
concluded, “Experimental studies have found repeatedly that some relationship 
exists between superior intelligence and the ability to judge others” (p. 514). In later 
work that we reviewed, intelligence is the most consistent predictor of rating 
accuracy (uncorrected validity coefficients = .31; Borman, 1979; .24; Borman & 
Hallam, 1991; .25; Christiansen, et al., 2005; .23 - .34; Hauenstein & Alexander, 1991; 
.36; Lippa & Dietz, 2000; average .54; Schneider & Bayroff, 1953) of all individual 
differences we reviewed. That said, effect sizes are often rather modest (e.g. 
uncorrected .10 < r < .30), and some studies actually found no relationship between 
intelligence and accuracy (Letzring, 2008; Powell, 2008; Powell & Goffin, 2009). 
Although the evidence in support of the link between cognitive ability and 
rating accuracy is substantial, there are still unresolved questions. First, intelligence 
may be complexly related to accuracy, as opposed to having a simple relationship 
with accuracy. For example, while most studies have assumed that these constructs 
are linearly related, their relationship may in fact be non-linear: Smither and Reilly 
(1987) for instance found that the most intelligent raters were generally less accurate 
than moderately intelligent raters, although moderately intelligent raters were more 
accurate than the least intelligent raters. To add to this complexity, studies often 
report significant relationships between intelligence and accuracy dependent on 
moderators, such as interview structure (George, 2006), motivation (Davis, 1999) or 
environmental complexity (Brecker, 1988). To address this complexity, more studies 
should explore possible moderating, mediating and non-linear effects of intelligence 
to unravel its role in judgment outcomes. As intelligence has been the most 
consistent predictor of accuracy, it is a prime candidate for these studies. 
Second, in addition to the need to explore more complex effects, the field 
should also consider how intelligence explains accuracy in different judgment tasks 
and rating contexts. Could the influence of intelligence on judgment quality be 
affected by what is being judged, for example, interview dimensions, personality 
traits, or assessment centre dimensions? Logically, we expect the effect of 
intelligence on accuracy to increase with task complexity, as social cognitive theory 
suggests that intelligence can be expected to relate stronger to accuracy when it 
plays a greater substantive role in producing accurate judgments, such as when 
information processing demands are high (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992). In this line, 
Lippa and Dietz (2000, p. 514) state “we suspect that intelligence will prove to 
correlate even more strongly with judgmental accuracy in studies that ask 
participants to judge personality from complex, extended information, rather than 
from ‘thin slices’ of relatively impoverished video information”. In assessment 
centre judgments, for example, information processing loads are higher than in 
interviews, for example, as multiple candidates are judged, often on multiple 
dimensions, and also in varying situations (Melchers, et al., 2010; Melchers, Meyer, & 
Kleinmann, 2008). More complex judgment tasks may increase difficulty of detection 
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and use of multiple cues. Therefore, intelligence may explain accuracy better in high-
complexity tasks as compared to low-complexity tasks. Studies could also consider 
varying task complexity by manipulating aspects of the rating design, such as rating 
stimuli (e.g. vignettes, videos vs live people), or number of targets rated (e.g. single, 
typical in interviews vs multiple, typical in assessment centres). Researchers may 
therefore want to explore the intelligence–accuracy link by considering variations of 
the rating context. 
Third, we speculate that intelligence may be more important to rating quality 
than the extant empirical literature suggests. With few exceptions, all the studies 
reviewed here used college students, which may cause restriction of range in ability-
based measure scores. Restriction of range (see Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994) could 
have deflated the observed correlations we have reported, due to the relatively 
homogenous nature of the typical university samples used in accuracy studies. That 
is, intelligence may actually predict accuracy in general, non-college populations 
(where people may reside who may often do lay interviews) at a much higher level 
than usually observed in college samples. 
Finally, we note that all the studies we have found have tested direct effects 
between intelligence and rating quality as distal outcome measure. As a 
consequence, the role of intelligence in the intermediate stages of cue detection and 
cue utilization is not yet clear. However, direct measures of cue utilization and cue 
detection to test this hypothesis have not been used before. The effect of intelligence 
on cue detection15 has not been explored and deserves more attention. From a signal-
detection theory (Lord, 1985) point-of-view, it is possible that intelligence may 
enable an increased sensitivity to the perception of social cues. 
Personality-Related Variables 
Personality Traits. Judges’ personalities may regulate their social functioning 
in the workplace, including aspects of interpersonal judgment (e.g., Tziner, et al., 
2008). Personality may affect rating quality, but this link is probably more complex, 
as compared to the case of cognitive predictors. A number of conceptual arguments 
have been proposed for the process through which personality may affect accuracy 
(for an overview, see Christiansen, et al., 2005; Funder, 1999). Broadly, these can be 
grouped into two streams. First, more proximally, personality may enhance accuracy 
motivation, primarily by affecting perceptual processes. That is, some people may be 
inclined to study and interpret the behaviors and dispositions of others because of 
the instrumental value of understanding others’ intentions, or because they simply 
enjoy studying others socially. So, as a function of their traits, judges may differ in 
the importance they attach to social information and in their motivation to judge 
others accurately. 
                                                     
15 See our discussion of problems with behavior observation measurement later in this chapter. 
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Second, a distal explanation holds that personality may influence social 
interaction which, in turn, gives the judge the opportunity to develop accuracy faster 
than judges who have less social interaction. Stated otherwise, personality may affect 
accuracy through the mediating role of social interaction. Instead of exerting a ‘main 
effect’ on accuracy, personality affects preferences for social interactions – and 
importance attached to relationship skills in general – to such an extent that accurate 
judgment either develops or deteriorates because of increased or decreased social 
interaction. 
Specific traits may enhance or detract from accuracy when we apply both of 
these views. For example, agreeable individuals show more concern for others’ 
feelings (Digman, 1990) and should, therefore, be more attuned to other individuals 
with whom they are required to interact and about whom they form impressions. 
Extraverts are further known to seek out social interactions and, because of this 
increased social exposure, are likely to have more opportunity to hone their 
interpersonal judgments through practice and feedback (Costa & McCrae, 1992), 
resulting in higher accuracy. However, a counter-argument could hold that, due to 
their higher tendency to be focused on the self (Goldberg, 1992), extroverts may be 
less likely to detect behavioral cues about others’ behavior. Conscientiousness, on its 
part, manifests in greater detail orientation (Goldberg, 1992) generally, but may also 
affect how we form impressions about others. For example, high conscientiousness 
judges are likely to be more attentive in cue detection than low-conscientious judges 
and show greater consistency in cue utilization. Furthermore, persons higher in 
openness are more inquiring and frequently enjoy working with abstract ideas or 
concepts (Goldberg, 1992). They are also more likely to actively develop mental 
representations of other’s traits and behavior (Kihlstrom & Hastie, 1997), seek 
patterns of consistencies and inconsistencies, and form and test hypotheses about 
behavior (Kruglanski & Ajzen, 1983). This personality trait may also relate to either 
the cognitive style of the judge, such as his/her need for cognition – a construct 
which has explained accuracy of performance judgments in at least one study 
(Palmer & Feldman, 2005). Or, openness could affect accuracy through its 
relationship with dispositional reasoning (Christiansen, et al., 2005). Openness to 
experience tends to correlate with measures of cognitive ability (Ackerman & 
Heggestad, 1997) and social intelligence (Shafer, 1999) – both characteristics which 
have been linked to higher accuracy. There are therefore numerous ways in which 
openness to experience could potentially enhance accuracy. We urge researchers to 
look into these opportunities. 
Despite their theoretical relevance to social interaction and judgment accuracy, 
these hypothesized links between personality and accuracy have received very little 
and generally inconsistent empirical support (e.g., Borman, 1979; Borman & Hallam, 
1991; Hjelle, 1969; Lippa & Dietz, 2000; Powell & Goffin, 2009; Vogt & Colvin, 2003). 
As a case in point, Christiansen et al. (2005) found that, out of the Big Five factors 
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and using three accuracy criterion measures (interview accuracy, acquaintance 
accuracy, overall accuracy), only openness (r = .23, p < .05) showed a small to 
medium effect16 with one of the accuracy measures, namely interview accuracy. 
Overall, it appears that the good judge most likely does not score higher (or lower) 
on certain traits, given the empirical evidence we have gathered thus far. That is, no 
trait seems to emerge as consistent predictor of accuracy. Our review shows that 
most empirical studies including personality as predictor of accuracy outcomes have 
shown null or inconsistent findings (for a detailed list, see Table 2.1). Generally, the 
observed effects of personality on accuracy, where found, are also rather small 
(e.g. .10 < r < .20). In fact, there are some traits that may also be detrimental to 
accuracy, for example aggression (Borman, 1979), being domineering and vindictive 
(medium effects, Letzring, 2008), and neuroticism (Gibson, 2006). Counterintuitively, 
judges who are less sociable may be more accurate (Ambady, et al., 1995; Sait, 2014) 
than sociable individuals. 
Moreover, we interpret the personality–accuracy literature with caution, as 
some of the studies we surveyed are often plagued by high family-wise error rates. 
That is, by combining multiple personality traits and behaviors (often more than 30) 
and various operationalizations of accuracy (e.g. by relying on permutations of ‘true-
score’ source, accuracy index, and so forth) very large correlation matrices result. 
Even when using these ‘empirical dragnets’ (often employed in the earlier stages of 
exploratory research of individual differences), only a few studies report relatively 
few notable effects (for an example of such a 'broad' study, see Borman, 1979). 
A number of questions remain about possible links between personality and 
accuracy. A useful area for future research is to explore more complex hypotheses. 
Perhaps personality constructs are more complexly related to rating quality than 
thought earlier. For example, personality may affect accuracy indirectly as a 
moderator variable. On the basis of their analyses, Christiansen et al. (2005) 
concluded that the relationship between ‘dispositional intelligence’ and 
acquaintance accuracy was moderated by conscientiousness and agreeableness. 
When elevation on these two traits was high, dispositional intelligence predicted 
acquaintance accuracy better than when elevation on these traits were low. So, as 
with cognitive constructs, perhaps the field of accuracy research can benefit from 
moving away from simple effects studies and explore more complex questions. 
Personality-related Behavior. Another avenue for study is to consider the links 
between judges’ behaviors, as manifestations of their personality, and rating quality. 
It is likely that judges’ behaviors affect the availability and relevance of cues. Good 
judges are not ‘passive perceivers’, but seem to participate actively in interpersonal 
situations when forming impressions (Graves, 1993). When judges interact with 
                                                     
16 Effects reported are observed correlations and have not been corrected for unreliability, nor for 
restriction of range, unless stated explicitly that they have been corrected. 
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targets, judges’ personalities may play an important role in creating the conditions 
for forming accurate impressions. For example, in an experimental study using 
unstructured interactions in triads of previously unacquainted students, 
Letzring (2008) found that students’ judgment accuracy of their acquaintances was 
related to their social skill, agreeableness and adjustment, implying that judges’ 
personalities and behaviors are important for creating situations within which 
targets are likely to reveal relevant personality cues (Letzring, 2008). More 
specifically, accurate judges emphasized others’ accomplishments (uncorrected 
correlation = .32), engaged in constant eye contact (.28), compared themselves to 
others (.21), expressed warmth (.21), enjoyed the interaction (.20), displayed 
ambition (.20), seemed interested (.19), and expressed sympathy (.18). This emerging 
line of research is introducing new elements into RAM, as the interviewers’ behavior 
does not relate to either detecting or using cues better, but actually, to elicit cues. By 
actively taking part in the social interaction, accurate raters may elicit more and 
better (relevant) cues from those being judged (Lievens, Schollaert, & Keen, 2015). As 
such, cue elicitation is a promising future avenue for work on the good judge 
(Lievens, et al., 2015). 
A relatively unexplored avenue lies in the use of behavior prompts to actually 
test or confirm initial impressions of targets, just like an interviewer would use 
verbal prompts to confirm or disconfirm an initial ‘impression hypothesis’. For 
example, in Kruglanski’s lay epistemic theory of judgment (Kruglanski, 1990), it is 
proposed that judges go through a cyclical process of hypothesis generation and 
hypothesis testing (see also Sackett, 1979, 1982) of an inferred profile of the target. If 
so, how do interviewers employ specific behaviors to test these impressions by using 
verbal and non-verbal behaviors? We encourage more research along these lines. 
 
Motivation. For the purposes of this review, rater motivation is discussed 
under the broad umbrella term of ‘personality-related factors’. When raters are 
motivated to produce accurate ratings, they may produce more accurate ratings. 
Developed in the performance appraisal context, the cognitively oriented rater 
motivation model of Harris (1994) suggests that personal (mood, self-efficacy, 
information quantity) and situational (accountability measures, trust, forms, etc.) 
factors are likely to affect cognitive processes (rating context, including observation, 
storage, retrieval, integration and rating) thought to affect judgment accuracy. 
To enhance rater motivation, perceived intrinsic and/or extrinsic rewards for 
producing accurate ratings may be effective, but it appears there is little research 
evidence on this matter. In one study, incentives to produce accurate ratings led to 
higher accuracy (Salvemini, Reilly, & Smither, 1993), but it is unclear whether 
accuracy motivation was the cause of this effect – accuracy motivation was not 
measured explicitly – or something else. Another plausible, but relatively 
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unexplored question is whether the avoidance of negative consequences (e.g. scorn 
by one’s supervisor) may lead to accuracy motivation. 
Rater motivation may be influenced by perceived accountability for one’s 
ratings (Mero & Motowidlo, 1995; Mero, Motowidlo, & Anna, 2003). For example, 
across a number of studies (e.g., Strupeck, 2004; Wood & Marshall, 2008), 
accountability expectations were fairly effective at improving judgment accuracy, 
showing medium to large effects. In another investigation (Rosenbaum, 1992), when 
study participants were held accountable for their ratings, or perceiving high 
consequences from their ratings, it promoted accuracy. However, the type of 
accountability may also play a role: Brtek and colleague (2002) observed that 
procedure accountability increased interview validity (r = .26), although outcome 
accountability lowered it (r = -.17), but these results ran counter to findings from an 
earlier investigation (Craven, 1988). From empirical work, it seems that being held 
accountable for one’s ratings may enhance accuracy, but more research is needed to 
explore the generalizability of these findings across HRM contexts, as most of these 
studies were conducted in performance ratings.  
Motivation may increase attention to behavior cues, as well as lead to judges 
assigning greater cognitive resources to cue utilization, that is, through expending 
greater effort. For example, when raters believe that rating effort would result in 
desired rating outcomes (e.g., expectancy, valence, and instrumentality; Vroom, 
1964) they may invest greater effort in the rating process. However, it does not seem 
that rating effort enhances accuracy (Borman, 1979).  
These questions therefore remain conjecture, however, pending empirical 
evidence. Such studies could provide answers to how rater motivation may enhance 
accuracy. A fruitful avenue for future research is to test dual-processing theories of 
judgment developed in the social-cognition field, where it is well established that 
factors such as motivation or mood may act as a ‘gear lever’ that selects the 
operation of either conscious (and deliberate) judgment processes, or unconscious 
(and automatic processes) (Fiske & Taylor, 2013). 
Specific Characteristics 
Demographic characteristics 
A number of demographic characteristics have been considered as direct effects on 
rating quality measures, although none have considered why or how the judges 
‘physical’ characteristics may affect cue availability, relevance, detection or 
utilization. As such, we discuss only the available empirical evidence on ‘direct’ 
effects. 
Rater Gender. Of all the demographic characteristics, rater gender has been the 
most often-studied predictor of judgment accuracy. Hypotheses about gender 
differences in accuracy have been driven by gender disparities in constructs that are 
thought to drive accuracy, for example, interpersonal sensitivity (Hall & Bernieri, 
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2001). However, research findings are not clear-cut. In some studies (Ambady, et al., 
1995; Carney, et al., 2007; Letzring, 2010; Schmid Mast, et al., 2011; Vogt & Colvin, 
2003), female judges were more accurate than male judges, while others showed no 
gender differences (Christiansen, et al., 2005) or reported mixed findings (Chan, 
Rogers, Parisotto, & Biesanz, 2011; Letzring, 2008). In others, the trait moderated this 
effect. For example, female judges are sometimes better at rating only certain single 
specific traits, but not all, e.g. extraversion and positive affect (Ambady, et al., 1995), 
neuroticism (Lippa & Dietz, 2000; Schmid Mast, et al., 2011), and vulnerability to 
stress (Powell, 2008). In the emotions literature, women’s superiority in accuracy is 
also qualified by the content domain and gender-specific motivation. In the 
judgment of non-verbal expressions of emotions, women are generally more 
accurate (Hall & Schmid Mast, 2008) – an interesting avenue for future research to 
explore possible links between gender-related personality traits (i.e. measures of 
masculinity and femininity) and accuracy (Lippa & Dietz, 2000). 
Rater Age. Except for gender, other demographic factors (e.g. ethnicity, 
culture, age and others) have received scant research attention. Age does not appear 
to affect accuracy in the few studies that have reported these findings (e.g., Borman, 
1979), although we may expect age effects when age is confounded with rater 
experience (see below; rating experience). 
Culture/Ethnicity. An interesting direction for research is to consider culture or 
ethnicity effects in judgment accuracy (e.g., Albright et al., 1997). For example, in one 
study of performance dimension judgments, collectivism was related to lower 
differential accuracy (Paquet, 2005). In an increasingly multicultural workplace, 
cultural or ethnic differences in judgment accuracy should be explored further. 
Rating Experience. Rating experience may also enhance rating quality. When 
judges continuously refine schemas and heuristics, based on feedback in the form of 
observing judgment outcomes (Fiske & Taylor, 2013), it becomes possible to refine 
their judgment ‘algorithms’. We expect that, when an initial impression of a target 
turns out to be accurate (the target does something that confirms the judges’ 
expectations), this information may enhance not only the rater’s schemas, but also 
bolster rater self-efficacy and confidence. Empirical studies show that accuracy may 
be higher for judges with more experience (Kolk, et al., 2002), but these effects are 
rather small (uncorrected validities = .18, Wood & Marshall, 2008) or negligible 
(Borman, 1979). In one study, observational accuracy was actually lower for judges 
with more experience (-.16, Borman & Hallam, 1991) than for judges with less 
experience. In an experimental investigation (Schmid Mast, et al., 2011), recruiter job 
experience positively predicted lie detection accuracy, but lowered accuracy for 
judging extraversion. The link between rater experience and accuracy is therefore 
not as straightforward as theory may suggest. 
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Attributional/Cognitive Complexity 
Attributional Complexity. Attributional complexity is defined here as the 
tendency to engage in complex social information processing and inferential 
reasoning (Fletcher, Danilovics, Fernandez, Peterson, & Reeder, 1986). Raters with 
high levels of attributional complexity spend more time processing complex social 
cognitive stimuli (Fletcher, et al., 1986), most likely because they are more motivated 
to understand other’s behavior and show preference for in-depth attributional 
reasoning, than raters low on attributional complexity (Fletcher, Rosanowski, 
Rhodes, & Lange, 1992). It is clear, then, that attributional complexity may influence 
cue detection and utilization: high-complexity raters are more likely to spend time 
looking for, and thinking about, others’ behavior and what it says about them. 
The research base for attributional complexity as a predictor of accuracy is 
scant. High-complexity raters produce more accurate causal answers to difficult 
causal social cognitive problems (Fletcher, et al., 1986) than low-complexity raters 
and make more accurate judgments of traits and attitudes (Fletcher, Grigg, & Bull, 
1988). This is because “both [attribution making and empathic accuracy] may be 
outcomes or products of a more general epistemic attempt to ‘understand’ another 
person” (Ickes, Stinson, Bissonnette, & Garcia, 1990, p. 736). However, more work 
must be done to link attributional complexity with rating quality outcomes in HRM 
contexts. As far as we know, there are no empirical studies that have tested the 
predictiveness of attributional complexity measures to predict interviewers’ or 
assessors’ rating quality. 
Cognitive Complexity. Attributional complexity is closely related to cognitive 
complexity (Bieri, 1955), defined as “the degree to which a person possesses the 
ability to perceive behavior in a multidimensional manner”(Schneier, 1977, p. 541). 
Rooted in personal construct theory (Kelly, 1955), cognitive complexity speaks to 
raters’ ability to perceive behavior in a multidimensional fashion. As with the sparse 
evidential basis for attributional complexity as predictor of rating quality, later 
research efforts on cognitive complexity (Adair, 1987; Bernardin, Cardy, & Carlyle, 
1982; Borman, 1979; Gerber, 2013) have consistently failed to support the complexity 
of a rater’s attributional processes as a predictor of accuracy, despite early optimism. 
It is possible that more conceptual clarity and better operationalization of 
cognitive complexity may lead to more empirical support in accuracy studies 
(Guion, 2011; Woehr, Miller, & Lane, 1998). We urge more research that addresses 
measurement issues associated with attributional and cognitive complexity. For 
example, these measures are typically based on self-reports. As such, we have 
questions about their validity as indicators of actual complexity, as opposed to 
preferences for or self-perceived complexity. For example, it is not uncommon to see 
that ability-based measures have higher criterion-related validity than trait-based 
measures (e.g., for emotional intelligence; Van Rooy & Viswesvaran, 2004). 
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Behavior Observation 
Raters are also required to detect manifestations of traits (Funder, 1999) in order to 
pass this information on to cue utilization functions. Observation and categorisation 
of ratees’ behavior is the first task in producing judgments about performance 
(Borman & Hallam, 1991). Surprisingly little research has studied behavior 
observation ability as a predictor of judgment accuracy. We say this because most 
studies of ‘behavior accuracy’ (e.g., Lewis, 2002; Middendorf & Macan, 2002; 
Murphy & Balzer, 1986; Murphy, Garcia, et al., 1982; Sanchez & De La Torre, 1996; 
Sulsky & Balzer, 1988) seem to confound behavior detection with behavior recall. 
That is, studies typically use measures that target both the ability to observe behavior, 
as well as the ability to remember what they saw in the task. For example, these 
studies would ask raters to use a behavior list and tick off behaviors they ‘remember 
seeing’, after viewing an interview video. Often, there is a considerable delay 
between showing behaviors and asking raters to indicate their observations. 
More thought should therefore be given to tasks that do not confound behavior 
observation with behavior recall (Murphy, Martin, & Garcia, 1982). More 
specifically, cue detection (in RAM) (Funder, 1995) may be facilitated by both cue 
identification on the one hand (signal detection), and cue encoding, storage and 
recall (memory processes) on the other. Therefore, ‘pure’ tests of behavior 
observation ability – the ability to detect behavior cues – would require study 
participants to indicate cue detection as behavioral cues occur, that is, in a ‘live’ 
stream of verbal and non-verbal behavior cues. To test cue detection, video stimuli 
may be pre-coded by expert raters who ‘flag’ objective behavior cues. Against this 
normative base-line, raters’ cue detection can be analysed through their verbal 
protocols (e.g. ‘think-out-loud studies’). Alternatively, raters may be shown video 
footage of targets and asked to tag behavior cues using a clicker. After viewing the 
interview footage, raters may be asked to explain their behavior markers after 
viewing the video. These tests are not contaminated with behavior memory (or 
recall) and would be considered ‘pure’ tests of behavior observation ability. 
 
Chronic Accessibility 
Raters’ ability to detect and perceive cues may also be influenced by their perceptual 
‘filters’. One such filter, construct chronic accessibility, can be defined as the degree 
to which individuals differ in the readiness with which constructs are utilized in 
information processing of behavioral stimulus input (Higgins, et al., 1982). 
Individual differences in the subjective meaning of social events may be especially 
evident in the personal constructs individuals employ (Mischel, 1973). A personal 
construct system is “a kind of scanning pattern which a person continually projects 
upon his world. As he sweeps back and forth across his perceptual field he picks up 
blips of meaning” (Kelly, 1955, p.145). In turn, person-memory (that is, of targets’ 
traits and behaviors) may be affected by trait accessibility, because trait category 
accessibility affects the storage, encoding and retrieval of behavioral information 
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(Bargh & Thein, 1985; Srull, 1981, 1983). Observed stimulus information that is 
related to a rater’s individual accessible constructs would therefore be more readily 
processed and retained than information that is related to inaccessible constructs 
(Srull & Wyer, 1979). In this way, chronically accessible constructs may affect the 
degree to which performance-related dimensions are accessible for use (Woehr, 
1992). 
As far as we know, no studies have used chronic accessibility measures to 
explain rating quality outcomes directly, nor explored their link with the stages of 
RAM. Nevertheless, there is a compelling argument: accessibility may affect 
accuracy because it influences perceptual selection (Higgins, et al., 1982). Individuals 
with accessible constructs are more sensitive (than individuals with inaccessible 
constructs) to stimuli associated with those constructs (Bargh & Pratto, 1986). As 
such, we do not know whether judges would have higher accuracy for traits that are 
accessible to them. For example, would a judge with extroversion accessibility also 
be more adept at detecting and using extroversion-related cues? If so, it may have 
implications for practice. For example, assessors with chronically accessible traits 
may be employed as trait experts to rate specific traits in an interview. Overall, 
chronic accessibility is a relatively unexplored predictor of rating quality and 
deserves more research attention. 
Behavior Memory 
Social cognitive theories of judgment that are based on person-memory (e.g., Srull & 
Wyer, 1989) assume that memory of others’ behavior and traits plays an important 
role in producing accurate judgments. The ability to store and recall information 
about targets is an important link in the judgment process. Personality trait terms 
can be considered as summary labels for broad conceptual categories that are used to 
encode information about others’ behavior into memory (Srull & Wyer, 1979). 
Empirical studies on memory-accuracy links are mixed, as some (DeNisi & 
Peters, 1996; Murphy, Garcia, et al., 1982; Rush, Phillips, & Lord, 1981) find positive 
effects with accuracy, and others (Lewis, 2002; Middendorf & Macan, 2002; Murphy 
& Balzer, 1986; Sanchez & De La Torre, 1996; Sulsky & Balzer, 1988) find trivial or no 
effects. 
To address this apparent stalemate, researchers may benefit from rethinking 
the way we understand person-memory. Conceptually, person-memory models 
have evolved to a view that splits person-memory into two general types of 
information: one about specific behaviors demonstrated by a person, and the other 
referring to abstract personality traits or dispositions (Srull & Wyer, 1989). For 
example, an interviewer would recall both applicants’ actions during the interview, 
but also the trait impressions the interviewer formed about each applicant. These 
memories are distinct. As we do not yet understand the comparative role of 
impression-memory versus behavior-memory in judgment processes, we would like 
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to see the comparative predictive validity for accuracy criteria. Moreover, we 
reiterate our view earlier that behavior memory and behavior detection measures are 
typically confounded in accuracy studies – these need to be teased apart in future 
accuracy studies. 
Cognitive Style and Heuristics 
The way judges think about others’ behavior and form resulting impressions may 
affect accuracy (Brehmer, 1994). Perhaps good judges have special ways they 
assemble other-related information when forming a mental picture of the target 
person. While we know that individual differences exist in a number of ‘heuristics’, 
including implicit theories of performance (Cardy, Bernardin, Abbott, Senderak, & 
Taylor, 1987; Hauenstein & Alexander, 1991), ‘personal constructs’ (Borman, 1987), 
decision processes (Arvey & Campion, 1982; Graves & Karren, 1992; Ostroff & Ilgen, 
1992), and weighting of applicant information (Dougherty, Ebert, & Callender, 1986; 
Kinicki, et al., 1990; Sackett & Hakel, 1979; Zedeck & Kafry, 1977), we need more 
empirical studies to show whether and how these heuristics predict rating quality. 
For example, Hauenstein and Alexander (1991) found that students possessing a 
normative implicit theory of performance were more accurate in their ratings of 
teachers’ performance than students possessing an idiosyncratic implicit theory. 
However, like many other largely ‘once-off’ investigations of individual constructs 
(see Table 2.1) in this category, the study has not been replicated. Therefore, the field 
needs larger studies and a more solid research base before firm conclusions may be 
drawn about the usefulness of cognitive styles and heuristics. 
Dispositional Reasoning 
In addition to general cognitive ability constructs, more specific abilities may also be 
involved in judgment accuracy. Dispositional reasoning is defined as complex 
knowledge of traits, behaviors and the potential of situations to elicit traits into 
manifest behaviors (for a recent discussion, see De Kock, et al., 2015). The construct 
was originally introduced as dispositional intelligence by Christiansen et al. (2005), 
who defined it as “knowledge of personality and how it manifests in 
behavior” (p. 139). The same authors experimentally tested the notion that 
dispositional reasoning may allow good judges to process behavioral information 
towards accurate trait inferences. Using a lab study where students (N = 122) 
watched videotaped segments of individuals responding to employment interview 
questions, judged the personality of the video interviewees and rated acquaintances 
who later completed self-report personality inventories, dispositional reasoning was 
the best predictor of various accuracy indices (with r ranging from .41 to .52), in fact, 
better than general mental ability and personality. More recent work has partially 
replicated the predictive validity of dispositional reasoning for judging personality 
(Powell & Goffin, 2009) and interview dimensions (De Kock, et al., 2015), but trivial 
effects have been observed with judges’ self-rating accuracy (that is, self-perceptions 
of their own strengths and weaknesses) (Janovics, 2003). 
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Although the research base about this construct is in its adolescence, findings 
are promising. More work is needed to consider its constituent components and 
their role in producing quality ratings. For example, De Kock, et al. (2015) developed 
reliable component17 measures of dispositional reasoning (for trait induction, trait 
extrapolation, and trait contextualization) that each predicted accuracy and jointly 
incremented general cognitive ability to predict accuracy. Also, judged against a 
number of criteria for classic intelligences (Mayer, et al., 1999), the results showed 
that dispositional reasoning was characteristic of an intelligence measure. Future 
studies could assess the nomological placement (in a network) of dispositional 
reasoning components in relation to ‘adjacent’ constructs that are conceptually 
similar, such as emotional intelligence and social intelligence. For example, 
Christiansen, et al. (2005) report that dispositional reasoning co-varied with general 
intelligence (r = .43) and also mediated its effect on accuracy outcomes, suggesting a 
more complex interrelationship with accuracy as a mediator of other variables. 
Other Characteristics 
In this category, a number of ‘other’ individual difference constructs are discussed, 
none of which have received much attention, nor have they suggested potential 
usefulness as predictors of accuracy. Attitudes have been inconsistent (cf. Gibson, 
2006; Hartog, 1991) and vocational interests (e.g., Holland’s [1973] six interest types 
were studied in  Borman, 1979) were poor predictors of judgment accuracy. In this 
sparse research base, findings are often counterintuitive (for example, 'social interest' 
correlated negatively, -.17, in Borman, 1979). A number of other diverse constructs, 
not discussed, are listed in Table 2.1. On the whole, there is not yet a compelling case 
to take note of ‘other’ characteristics as predictors of rating quality. For the time 
being, it would be better for the field to invest energy elsewhere where more 
promising research findings have emerged. 
Pseudo-Constructs 
We reserve this category for individual difference constructs that may require more 
attention to operationalization. That is, a number of effects that we found relied on 
self-report measures, for example self-rated non-verbal communication skills and 
rating effectiveness (Schmid Mast, et al., 2011), and self-perceived attributional 
complexity (Davis, 1999), which raises questions about successful operationalisation 
of these constructs. Future studies should consider using ability-based measures of 
individual differences were abilities are implied, for example, to allow more 
conclusive evidence. 
 
                                                     
17 These components were introduced by Christiansen et al. (2005) and they were relabelled for ease of 
use in De Kock et al. (2015) – the latter study is contained in Chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
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2.4 Discussion 
 
Main findings 
Our review of the literature on individual differences in accuracy suggests that more 
is known about the ‘good judge’ than earlier thought. In our review of research from 
1953 to present, we found at least 126 individual effects reported in 48 works 
(published articles and unpublished dissertations and theses). Individual differences 
research therefore remains an active interest in HRM and I-O psychology. Together, 
these studies have explored many rater characteristics that span across various 
functional psychological domains.  
Overall, empirical evidence suggests that cognitive factors play a dominant role 
in judgment accuracy. For example, the good judge is not only more intelligent than 
less accurate judges, but also has better understanding of others’ behaviors, traits 
and situations. By virtue of better social information processing and memory, good 
raters can process, store and recall targets’ behavior better than poor raters can. 
Good judges also seem to possess better developed schemas that relate to social 
information (for example, about the traits that underlie behaviors, implicit 
personality theories, and understanding situational contexts). 
Our review of the individual differences literature shows that effect sizes for 
cognitive factors are normally moderate to large, and these appear to be relatively 
consistent in laboratory studies. It is interesting to note that effect sizes tend to be 
larger when ability-based measures (as opposed to self-report measures) of cognitive 
factors are used. This trend is similar to findings that reveal how ability-based 
measures of emotional intelligence show stronger effects with related outcomes than 
self-reported measures of emotional intelligence (O'Boyle, Humphrey, Pollack, 
Hawver, & Story, 2011). 
It is not only cognitive abilities that may help to explain why judges are accurate 
or not, but also the way judges think about others’ behavior or process behavior 
information (for example, implicit theories, judgment policies and analytic 
orientation). Although replication studies about the predictive validity of non-ability 
cognitive factors are relatively sparse, the emerging results are promising because 
they open up new questions for research. First, can these rating algorithms be 
developed by means of systematic training, similar to frame-of-reference (FOR) 
training (Roch, et al., 2012; Woehr & Huffcutt, 1994), where evaluative schemas for 
judging behaviors into dimensions are imposed on raters in order to enhance 
accuracy? Or are these judgment ‘algorithms’ better acquired by long-term 
experience? Second, are these judgment processes deliberate or do they operate 
automatically? Dual-processing theories of judgment in person perception (Fiske & 
Macrae, 2012) have become the norm in social cognition literature, and these suggest 
that judges use both conscious and unconscious processes to evaluate others. We 
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urge more research that takes a broader view of individuals’ judgment processes (in 
other words, including both deliberate and automatic aspects) and rating quality in 
HRM applications. 
The good judge most likely does not score significantly higher or lower than 
others on a particular personality profile or personality trait. Our review showed 
that none of the broad Big Five traits are consistent predictors of accuracy. Narrow 
traits that are socially oriented may be useful as predictors of accuracy, but little 
research has considered this angle. In studies that do report statistically significant 
effects for personality traits on accuracy, effects tend to be relatively small or trivial 
(Cohen, 1988) and most likely, also practically negligible. This conclusion does not 
preclude the possibility that personality may be more complexly related to accuracy, 
for example, as a moderator of the influence of cognitive variables on judgment 
accuracy (e.g. Christiansen et al., 2005). 
Theoretical implications 
In sum, our study provides support for the notion that ‘good judges’ are moderators 
of accuracy, as proposed by Funder’s RAM (Funder, 1995, 1999). Our review of the 
empirical evidence shows that a vast array of rater constructs has been considered as 
predictors of accuracy in HRM settings such as interviews, assessment centres and 
performance rating. Overall, we found evidence that some individual differences 
may indeed explain the ‘good judge’, but that much remains to be learned. We have 
synthesized this literature into a comprehensive ‘good judge’ model (see Figure 2.2) 
that answers calls (see Jones & Born, 2008) to explain how assessor constructs may 
facilitate specific judgment processes. 
Moreover, our model links individual differences to rater judgment processes 
thought to cause accuracy (RAM) (Funder, 1999), namely cue detection and cue 
utilization, and we weigh the evidence in support of each hypothesized link. The 
bulk of work has implicitly argued that constructs that were studied may enhance 
cue utilization. As such, assessor constructs that may enhance cue detection is an 
area that is ripe for study. In fact, not many studies have taken a broad perspective 
by integrating individual differences that are implied in both cue detection and cue 
utilization – both processes are needed in order to produce an accurate impression of 
the target. 
Our review has also identified potential extensions of Funder’s RAM. Built on 
the basis of physical perception models (e.g., Brunswik's Lens model; Brunswik, 
1956), RAM implies a view of the judge as a passive observer: waiting to pick up on 
behavior signals and using these validly in forming a mental picture of the target. In 
contrast, research findings (e.g., Letzring, 2008) suggest that when they interact with 
targets, good interviewers actively elicit good behavior cue information. That is, they 
actively encourage the interviewee to express useful trait-relevant information: They 
use interviewing and other skills (for example, listening or non-verbal 
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communication) to put the interviewee at ease, draw out more information, test 
initial impressions, and so forth. These findings suggest the need to consider adding 
a third judgment process to RAM, namely cue elicitation (see Lievens, et al., 2015). 
 
Future research directions 
The field of individual differences research on the good judge in HRM needs to grow 
in several directions. First, researchers in this field stand to benefit from drawing 
upon social-cognition frameworks and methods to illuminate judgment accuracy 
issues in the workplace. Although social psychology theories may sometimes not 
generalize easily to other settings (Ilgen & Favero, 1985), our review shows many 
successful applications of social cognition theories and principles to workplace 
rating accuracy problems. In this work, it should be kept in mind that “individual 
differences ought to be considered central in theory construction, not peripheral” 
(Underwood, 1975, p. 129, cited in Revelle, Wilt, & Condon, 2013). From our review 
of the field, we suggest that two primary candidate constructs, dispositional 
reasoning and personality trait chronic accessibility, in conjunction with general 
intelligence, may feature in future theory development, as their conceptual linkage 
with the judgment processes in RAM is compelling and emerging evidence is 
suggestive.  
Second, we foresee opportunities to determine how interviewers and assessors 
manage the interpersonal interaction to elicit useful behavioral data for their 
judgments. Only recently, have constructs related to cue elicitation (such as 
behavior; Letzring, 2008) entered the mainstream of accuracy research. As studies up 
to now have also not disentangled judgment processes (cue detection vs cue 
utilization), experimental research that considers the main and interactive effects of 
interviewers’ cue elicitation, cue detection, and cue utilization (see Funder, 1999) 
would be useful. Along the same lines, we note that with few exceptions (such as 
Borman, 1979) extant work on individual differences in accuracy have considered 
judges’ characteristics in isolation. But we also know that behavior is complexly 
determined (Stanovich, 1992), that is, they are a function of various constructs that 
operate in different functional psychological domains. Future studies should, for 
example, consider how judges’ characteristics interact in producing accuracy. For 
example, Davis (1999) found that assessors’ cognitive ability and motivation 
interacted to produce accuracy. Are these linearly combined to produce accurate 
judgments, or can they compensate for one another? Or, if we consider the various 
constructs that ‘cause’ accuracy, which would provide incremental validity in 
predicting accuracy? We also do not know whether two judges can produce 
judgments with similar accuracy, although they rely on different judgment strategies 
and/or abilities. That is, can they achieve the same objective (same ends) but use 
different paths (different means) to accuracy? 
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Third, there is an interesting and growing divergence in accuracy research 
between the domains of social-cognition and I-O psychology. In particular, we note 
that the dominant perspective in social psychological literature on impression 
formation and interpersonal judgment relies on dual-processing theories of 
judgment (Fiske & Macrae, 2012). In contrast, judgment studies in HRM settings are 
hesitant to explore the role of unconscious processes (e.g., Highhouse, 2008). We 
encourage more work that incorporates both conscious and unconscious judgment 
processes, especially those that determine the possible interplay between these 
processes in producing accurate judgments. Dual-process theories suggest that 
judges employ both deliberate (conscious) and automatic (unconscious) processes to 
interpret others’ behavior, and the degree to which either is used depends on aspects 
of the rating task and other individual differences of the judge (e.g. mood) (Fiske & 
Taylor, 2013). More research can be devoted to this issue in HRM research. 
Finally, we reiterate earlier calls for continued attention to measures of 
accuracy (Colvin & Bundick, 2001). Accuracy studies often find low congruence 
between multiple accuracy operationalisations (e.g., Sulsky & Balzer, 1988), and our 
review showed this incongruence sometimes extends to substantive conclusions that 
depend on which measure is used. Accuracy research can benefit from consensus-
seeking on the meaning and measurement of accuracy by students of accuracy in 
different domains (e.g. HRM contexts, personality, social psychology, non-verbal 
behavior). Similar to other domains of personnel selection, the criterion problem 
(Austin & Villanova, 1992) in individual differences in accuracy research must be 
addressed more satisfactorily before the field can flourish. 
Recommendations for practice 
In our view, there are two promising ways to advance practices used for rater 
training and selection, given the findings of our review. The first is the identification 
of judges on the basis of constructs that predict accuracy. In contrast to earlier 
scepticism that empirical evidence would be found of individual differences that 
predict accuracy, it appears there are constructs that do consistently predict 
accuracy. These appear to lie mostly in the cognitive domain, especially when 
ability-based measures are used. Our results suggest that organizations could 
consider using cognitive ability measures to select raters, as these measures predict 
judgment accuracy and are therefore ‘job-relevant’. The validities in some studies 
approach those for predicting job performance (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). In addition 
to general cognitive ability, specific intelligences related to behavioral information 
processing, such as dispositional reasoning, show promising results as single and 
incremental predictors of accuracy (Christiansen, et al., 2005; De Kock, et al., 2015) in 
HRM. Organizations should consider using, for example, measures of dispositional 
reasoning to select interviewers, assessors and raters of performance. 
A second way to advance rating practices is to develop raters’ constructs that 
predict accuracy. But first, we need to know whether these constructs can be 
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developed. That is, are they malleable at all? The deeper underlying question is 
whether or not the good judge is born, or made? A good example, again, is 
dispositional reasoning. It has been shown that dispositional reasoning may broadly 
adhere to the criteria for an intelligence (De Kock, et al., 2015). Also, early attempts 
to enhance one of the components of dispositional reasoning behavior-trait 
knowledge (also known as ‘induction’), have been unsuccessful (Powell & Goffin, 
2009). So, before we can recommend dispositional reasoning training, we need 
empirical evidence to support it and we call for more research along these lines. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
Through the ebbs and flows over the last century, the question of ‘what makes the 
good judge?’ has endured. Individual differences research in judgment accuracy has 
come a long way. Our review of the empirical research shows that good judges do 
seem to share a number of characteristics (outlined in Table 1). Among these are 
cognitive factors, including dispositional reasoning and general mental ability. 
Although assessors’ personality traits show an inconsistent relationship with rating 
accuracy, specific behaviors may be effective to elicit trait-related behavioral cues 
from targets. Not only are we coming closer to understanding the rater constructs 
that shape judgment accuracy, but we are also gaining insight into how these 
constructs facilitate processes that lead to accurate impressions (portrayed in Figure 
2.2). At the same time, there are aspects of rater individual differences that have 
hardly been touched on, such as emotional intelligence, behavior observation acuity, 
and chronically accessible personality traits. Our study summarizes these in 20 
researchable questions (see Table 2.2). Answers to these questions about what makes 
the good judge hold much potential to enhance the quality of ratings in HRM 
settings. 
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Chapter 3 
The internal factor structure of dispositional reasoning: A 
comparison between managers and psychology students 18 
 
 
In this chapter, we assess the internal construct validity of a revised measure of dispositional 
reasoning. Although earlier studies used dispositional reasoning as a global construct, we 
test whether it consists of empirically distinct components, namely trait induction, trait 
extrapolation and trait contextualization. Using confirmatory factor analysis and structural 
equation modelling, competing models are tested to determine whether the latent structure of 
dispositional reasoning is better represented as (a) a single general construct, (b) three 
correlated components, or last, (c) a higher-order model, combining a broad factor (at the 
second-order) that causes variance in measures of three components at the first level. Results 
from a mixed validation sample (N = 321) of managers and psychology students showed that 
dispositional reasoning is well represented as componential in nature, with a higher-order 
construct underlying three lower-order components. A comparison of managers (n = 160) 
and psychology students (n = 161) through measurement invariance analysis showed 
relatively similar factor structures for dispositional reasoning between these groups, but 
metric invariance was not achieved in the samples we compared. Together, findings support 
the construct validity and limited measurement invariance of the revised dispositional 
reasoning measure to measure assessor’ dispositional reasoning components. 
  
                                                     
18 This chapter is in preparation for publication review as: 
De Kock, F. S., Lievens, F., & Born, M. Ph. (2015). The internal factor structure of 
dispositional reasoning: A comparison between managers and psychology students. 
Manuscript in preparation. 
 
62  Chapter 3 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The characteristics of the good judge have intrigued researchers and practitioners for 
a long time (e.g., see Adams, 1927; Funder, 2012; Hall, et al., 2015; Taft, 1955; Vernon, 
1933). Recent efforts to explain individual differences in judgment accuracy have 
shifted their focus to specific abilities as predictors. By focusing on specific abilities 
(as opposed to more generic constructs, such as general mental ability) we may 
achieve a better understanding of why and how accurate judgments are shaped. It is 
thought that specific schemas, abilities or knowledge structures may enable distinct 
processes involved in behavioral cue utilization (Funder, 1995) and broader 
dispositional inference (e.g., Gilbert, 1989). 
In a recent study, Christiansen, et al. (2005) showed that dispositional 
reasoning, defined as complex knowledge of traits, behaviors and situations’ 
potential to elicit traits into manifest behaviors, can be an important factor in 
producing accurate interviewer ratings. In their investigation, it was the strongest 
predictor of accuracy among a set of assessor individual differences that included 
demographics, personality and general cognitive ability. As such, it deserves more 
research attention. 
A drawback of these earlier approaches (e.g., Christiansen, et al., 2005; Powell 
& Goffin, 2009) was that they tested dispositional reasoning as a broad ability, even 
though it was initially conceptualized as a broad set of conceptually distinguishable 
components19. The facets of dispositional reasoning are behavior-trait knowledge, 
judges’ implicit personality theories, and judges’ understanding of situation-trait 
relevance (Christiansen et al., 2005). However, studies up to now have not been able 
to measure these components reliably. Instead, they collapsed scores from the three 
conceptually distinct components into a broad measure. Consequently, the 
underling facets lie obscured from measurement and this may inhibit their further 
use in research and practice. 
It may be useful to researchers and practitioners to expand our knowledge of 
dispositional reasoning by providing details of its internal composition and internal 
construct validity. For instance, the different components may play a meaningful 
role in advancing understanding of what makes the ‘good judge’ in personnel 
selection. Further, a componential view may enable stronger tests of judgment 
theories (e.g., Gilbert, 1989; Trope, 1986) that involve distinguishable judgment 
processes which, in turn, suggest the operation of different assessor constructs. 
Practically, understanding its internal configuration could also affect how we use the 
measure. For example, distinguishable components dictate that subtest scores may 
be utilized to select or train assessors. Also, assessor training interventions may be 
                                                     
19 In Chapter 4 of this dissertation, we define these components as trait induction, trait extrapolation, 
and trait contextualisation. 
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tailored to target specific components. However, if they are indistinguishable from 
one another, the use of subtest scores is less justifiable. 
The Present Study 
In the present study, we test alternative hypothesized factor structures for 
dispositional reasoning. In so doing, it allows us to accomplish three important 
objectives. First, we provide answers to the questions about the internal composition 
of the dispositional reasoning construct. Is it a single, broad ability, or many specific 
abilities that are related? Or, could it be considered both? In other words, would a 
hierarchical factor structure make more sense (i.e. one where a broad dispositional 
reasoning ability influences specific components?). Second, we make practical 
recommendations about the best way to use the dispositional reasoning measure: 
Should it be used as an overall measure, or rather, can the individual subtests be 
used to reliably and validly assess the subcomponents of induction, extrapolation 
and contextualization. Finally, we compare the internal construct validity of 
dispositional reasoning between managers and psychology students – both groups 
provide pools of assessor that are often trained and used in workplace assessments 
(Krause & Thornton, 2009). In addition to the internal composition of dispositional 
reasoning, we also need to determine whether the revised instrument can measure 
the constructs in the same way between different assessor groups, that is, would it 
show measurement invariance? If the issue of measurement (Millsap, 2011) 
invariance between managers and students is not addressed, between-group 
comparisons of test scores may be misleading, because we would not be sure if 
observed group differences are ‘real’ or confounded with differences in the structure 
of the constructs and/or functioning of the measurement scales (Cheung, 2008). As 
such, the present study determines to what extent the revised dispositional 
reasoning instrument measures the same constructs for managers compared to 
students? 
Competing Models of Dispositional Reasoning 
Model 1: General-Factor Model 
One way to think of dispositional reasoning is the general-factor approach. The 
simplest way to represent dispositional reasoning is that it is a single, monolithic 
entity, where judges’ knowledge, abilities and understanding of information that 
relate to behaviors, traits and situations, join together as a whole. An example of 
general factor models in other domains is in Spearman’s (1904) earlier view that 
individuals’ performance at one type of cognitive task tends to be comparable to her 
or his performance at other cognitive tasks, or ‘g-theory’. In other literatures, there 
are also examples of general factors, such as general affectivity (Cropanzano, Weiss, 
Hale, & Reb, 2003). 
The conceptual basis for a general-factor model for dispositional reasoning lies 
in the possibility that procedural and declarative knowledge structures that relate to 
multiple domains, in this case, behaviors, traits, and situations, are encapsulated in a 
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single broad factor. Applied in the present context, an example of a general factor 
model would be where items that measure knowledge and understanding of traits 
overlap with knowledge and understanding of trait expression in situations, for 
example. If dispositional reasoning is a broad factor that combines multiple, 
interrelated domains, then we should also observe good fit for a model with 
dispositional reasoning items that all load onto a single, underlying broad 
dimension. 
In a general factor model of dispositional reasoning (see Model M1 in Figure 
3.1), a broad dispositional reasoning latent construct is proposed that causes 
variance in all observed variables irrespective of the component that a specific 
indicator variable was initially designed to measure. Conceptually, this model 
assumes no distinction between separate dispositional reasoning components. If this 
model showed the best fit, a single score on overall dispositional reasoning would be 
the most appropriate operationalisation of the construct. This general-factor model 
will be treated as the baseline model for further model comparisons. 
 
Figure 3.1. A confirmatory factor analysis of the structure of 
dispositional reasoning: A general factor model (Model M1). Only 
nine indicator variables are used in this example.
δ 3
x1 x2 x3
δ1 δ 2
λ1 λ2 λ3
δ 9
x7 x8 x9
δ 7 δ 8
λ7 λ8 λ9
δ 6
x4 x5 x6
δ 4 δ 5
λ4 λ5 λ6
x1
DR
 
 
Model 2: Three Components (1st Order) 
In contrast to a broad general factor, we might think of dispositional reasoning as a 
more complex configuration of separate narrow components. In such a componential 
model, specific abilities related to dealing with traits, behaviors and situations 
cluster tidily into three facets (Christiansen, et al., 2005). Conceptually, dispositional 
reasoning has been defined to consist of three distinct, yet related components, trait 
induction (the ability to know how traits manifest themselves in behavior), trait 
extrapolation (an understanding of how traits and their behavioral manifestations 
naturally co-vary), and trait contextualization (the ability to identify situations that are 
relevant to different traits) (see Figure 3.2) (De Kock, et al., 2015). In a componential 
view, judges utilize separate constructs to understand others’ behavior cues, not 
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only broad dispositional reasoning. These may operate relatively independently in 
the dispositional inference process. 
Componential views of constructs are widely encountered in the IO-
psychology literature. For example, many intelligence theories make provision for 
the existence of specific forms of intelligence (e.g., Sternberg, 2000) that operate 
within, and sometimes beyond, the general factors. Another example is emotional 
intelligence (Mayer, et al., 1999) as one of multiple specific intelligences (Gardner, 
1993). 
A componential interpretation of the dispositional reasoning construct space 
would be where test items measure a distinct component only – some tap into 
induction, whereas others tap into extrapolation. Items do not, however, measure 
facets other than those to which they are most closely conceptually related. If 
dispositional reasoning is componential in nature, then we should also observe good 
fit for a model with items that load onto three separate dimensions, with no cross-
loadings allowed. In a three-component model (see Model M2 in Figure 3.2), 
dispositional reasoning is represented as consisting of three distinct facets. From this 
perspective, the model specification for the latent structure of dispositional 
reasoning suggests that trait induction, trait extrapolation and trait contextualization 
represent related but distinct facets. 
Figure 3.2. A confirmatory factor analysis of the structure of 
dispositional reasoning: A three-component (first-order) model 
(Model M2). Only nine indicator variables are used in this example.
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Model 3: Hierarchical Factors (2nd Order) 
We have argued that dispositional reasoning could exhibit a latent structure that 
supports either a general (g-approach) or specific (sn approach) ability approach. It is 
important to consider the possibility where these views are not mutually exclusive, 
that is, its latent structure may be both general and specific.  
Neither general, nor specific models of dispositional reasoning provide 
parsimonious conceptualisations of it as a construct. On the one hand, a general-
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factor model is crude and inelegant, as the components are conceptually meaningful. 
On the other hand, a specific model lacks broader meaning – it does not recognize 
that the components cluster around a central theme as a constellation of constructs 
that enable dispositional inference. In other words, a component-only view sees 
induction, extrapolation and contextualization as isolated but not part of a whole. 
The conceptual basis for the hierarchical model of dispositional reasoning lies 
in theories and empirical evidence that suggest the operation of higher-order 
constructs, for example the Big Five personality traits (McCrae & Costa, 1997) that 
subsume narrow facets. Also, in the intelligence literature, the early general (g) 
versus specific (sn) intelligence debate has largely given way to a consensus view of 
the hierarchical nature of abilities (see Carroll, 2003, for a review) where broad 
factors at a higher stratum affect narrow factors at lower strata. 
A hierarchical structure for dispositional reasoning would suggest that a 
broader dispositional reasoning latent construct causes variance in the more specific 
components of induction, extrapolation, and contextualization. A conceptual model 
for a hierarchical factor structure proposes that the higher-order factor of 
dispositional reasoning has direct effects on the three lower-order factors (see Model 
M3 in Figure 3.3). Here, the latent structure of dispositional reasoning is 
characterized by three first-order factors that represent distinctive facets, but all are 
‘caused’ by a single, second-order latent construct. 
Figure 3.3. A confirmatory factor analysis of the structure of 
dispositional reasoning: Hierarchical (2nd order) model (Model M3). 
Only nine indicator variables are used in this example.
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Measurement Invariance 
Users of the dispositional reasoning measure may want to administer the measure in 
different populations of assessors. Therefore, the issue of measurement invariance 
needs to be addressed in order to determine whether “an assessment instrument is 
measuring the same constructs in exactly the same way across groups” (Byrne & 
Stewart, 2006, p. 287). The analysis of measurement invariance has become popular 
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in HRM (Schmitt & Kuljanin, 2008) as a means to establish measurement properties 
of a measure when it is used between two or more groups. 
 
3.2 Method 
 
Participants and Procedure 
Table 1 shows the distributions of participants that formed part of the study sample. 
For our study, it was important to limit the sample to participants that may 
realistically form part of a broader population of assessors. A combined sample of 
managers and psychology students were selected as these are the people who are 
most likely to be trained as assessors (in interviews, ACs, or performance 
rating)(Krause & Thornton, 2009). 
Combined Sample 
There were 321 respondents in the combined sample (54.4% females and 45.6% 
males). In terms of race, the sample comprised of 46.3% Black African, 35.8% White, 
11.1% Mixed Race and 5.9% Asian/Indian participants. Their mean age was 32.72 
(SD = 11.13) years. Some (59.6%) had tertiary qualifications, although the student 
sample skewed this statistic – 59.5% of psychology students were postgraduates, and 
the rest were Bachelor’s students. A relatively small proportion (16%) of managers 
had Bachelor’s degrees or higher, and 27.8% held a three-year vocational training 
diploma. The prevalent first languages amongst these respondents were English 
(40.8%) and Afrikaans (19%), with the remainder speaking indigenous African 
languages or others. English was the official workplace language of all participants. 
Group 1: Managers 
We recruited 160 personnel that consisted of managers of various line and staff 
functions from two different organizations20. All of these respondents were 
undergoing training when they were assessed.  
Group 2: Psychology Students 
Our second group consisted of 161 psychology students at various levels of 
academic seniority. Most of the students (59.5%) were postgraduates studying 
Industrial-Organizational Psychology, while the rest were Bachelor’s students in the 
same field. 
A further comparison of the two samples revealed that managers were 
generally older (M = 42.3 yrs, SD = 6.7 yrs) than psychology students (M = 22.8 yrs, 
SD = 3.5 yrs), t(221.02) = 31.142, p < .001. The samples differed in terms of ethnic 
composition, as managers were predominantly African (71.4%), as compared to 
students whom were mostly White (55.6%). 
                                                     
20 Some (n = 146) of the manager respondents were included in another study contained within 
another chapter in this dissertation (see Chapter 4).  
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Procedure 
The data collection was completed in multiple sessions in two organizations and two 
universities in South Africa. After introducing the research as part of assessor 
training, we explained participants’ rights and requested their informed consent. 
Next, we explained the research materials before participants independently 
completed the research questionnaire. Last, participants were debriefed and thanked 
for their participation. Data collection across the respective research sites was 
completed between 2011 and 2015. 
Measures 
Dispositional Reasoning 
To measure the dispositional reasoning components, we used the Revised 
Interpersonal Judgment Inventory (IJI)(De Kock, et al., 2015). The revision of the 
original IJI (Christiansen et al., 2005) is thoroughly described in Chapter 4 of this 
dissertation. The Revised IJI consisted of 64 items that measure three distinct 
components. An example item for each scale can be found in the Appendix. 
Induction. The contextualization component of dispositional reasoning was 
measured by 20 items that tapped candidates’ ability to make correct behavior-trait 
inferences. After describing the Big Five personality traits, a list of adjectives from 
Goldberg’s (1992) factor markers were presented. The task was to identify the traits 
(e.g. conscientiousness) that best matched the marker adjectives (e.g. thorough). 
Extrapolation. The extrapolation component of dispositional reasoning was 
measured by 23 items assessing a respondent’s understanding of how traits and 
behaviors co-occur. Items described a fictional person in terms of traits and 
behaviors and required respondents to select which of four descriptions was most 
(or least) likely also true of the person. 
Contextualization. The contextualization component of dispositional reasoning 
was measured by 21 items that test understanding of trait–situation relevance. On 
the basis of empirical results (Tett & Guterman, 2000) one response option for each 
item was keyed as being the most consistent with empirical evidence, theoretical 
relationships and expert judgment. One subset of items presented a trait description, 
e.g. ‘empathy’ by listing examples of behaviors associated with high and low scorers 
on the trait. Next, respondents had to choose which of five situations would most 
likely elicit the relevant behavior. The second subset of items reversed the direction 
of inference.  
Measurement properties for the instrument in the present study are reported in 
the results section of the present chapter. In a recent study (De Kock, et al., 2015) 
conducted with a sample of managerial staff the measure showed acceptable CFA-
derived construct reliabilities for induction (.77), extrapolation (.81) and trait 
contextualization (.76). 
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Biographical Characteristics 
To enable normative comparisons, we also drew respondents’ biographical detail 
from the database of respondents that had completed the dispositional reasoning 
measure. 
Statistical Analysis 
In order to evaluate the latent structure of the revised dispositional reasoning 
measure, we conducted both lower-order and higher-order confirmatory factor 
analysis (HCFA). First-order CFA was used to assess the measurement model fit of 
both the global factor (M1) and three-component (M2) models.  
 
Consequently, HCFA was used to evaluate the higher-order model (M3). 
Hierarchical factor analysis is often used for theory testing (Kline, 2011), for example, 
when it is believed that specialized facets of intelligence (e.g. verbal reasoning, 
memory) are influenced by a broader dimension of intelligence (g). In higher-order 
factor analysis, the factor correlations at a lower level (e.g. between specialized facets 
of a broader construct) become the input matrix for the higher-order factor analysis. 
As such, the HCFA attempts to provide a more parsimonious account for the inter-
correlations among lower-order factors (Brown, 2015).  
 
Robust maximum likelihood (RML) estimation was employed to estimate all models, 
unless stated otherwise. We used a number of fit indices to evaluate21 model fit, 
including SBχ2 (Satorra & Bentler, 1988), CFI, RMSEA (and its 90% confidence 
intervals), and SRMR. Our analyses were conducted with Lisrel 9.2 (Jöreskog & 
Sörbom, 2015). 
 
Data Preparation for HCFA 
Before we conducted the higher-order confirmatory factor analysis, we addressed a 
number of statistical issues. 
Item-to-Sample Size Ratio. Our complete measure had 64 individual items. We 
decided not to conduct HCFA of the measurement model on item-level data in this 
study because the number of parameters to be estimated in a model with 64 
observed variables – one for each item – would have led to inadequate statistical 
power (MacCallum, Browne, & Sugawara, 1996; Wolf, Harrington, Clark, & Miller, 
2013). The issue would also have applied for separate analysis within each of our 
two subsamples. As such, we shortened the scales to allow for sufficient power and 
ensure appropriate model identification – issues that were important for the 
subsequent hierarchical model analyses. To abbreviate the scales, we considered the 
issues associated with shortening scales (e.g., Chongming Yang, Nay, & Hoyle, 
                                                     
21 As recommended by Berne and Stewart (2006), the following minimum cut-offs were applied to 
infer acceptable model fit: SBχ2 (Satorra & Bentler, 1988) with p >.05; CFI > .95; RMSEA < .08; and 
SRMR < .08. 
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2010). We decided to create four indicator variables for each first-order latent 
variable by using parcels of items within each scale as manifest variables. We used 
the procedures outlined by Little, Cunningham, Shahar, and Widaman (2002) when 
creating parcels and explain our parcelling strategy in detail in Appendix A. Using 
parcels in CFA has distinct advantages22. Not only do they allow retaining 
measurement information from many items, but in most conditions, less biased 
parameter estimates are encountered when parcels are used (Hair, Black, Babin, & 
Anderson, 2010).  
Model Specification. The hierarchical CFA model (see Fig 3.3) hypothesizes23 for 
both managers and psychology students the following: (a) a dispositional reasoning 
structure is best represented by a three-factor second-order model comprising of a 
single higher-order factor of dispositional reasoning and three lower order factors of 
induction, extrapolation, and contextualization; (b) each observed variable (i.e., 
parcel) would have a non-zero loading on the lower order factor it was intended to 
measure and zero loadings on other factors (i.e., zero cross-loadings); (c) covariation 
among the three lower-order factors would be explained by the higher-order factor 
of dispositional reasoning; (d) measurement error terms would be uncorrelated; and 
(e) factor disturbances would be uncorrelated. 
Model Identification. A further statistical issue, latent variable scaling, was 
addressed before the Higher-order Confirmatory Factor Analysis was conducted. To 
identify a hierarchical CFA model, it must have at least three first-order factors, and 
the latter should have at least two indicators each (Kline, 2011). The hierarchical 
model (M3) (see Figure 3.3) that we hypothesized, satisfies both these requirements: 
Our model has three first-order factors and five indicator variables for each first-
order factor. However, the second-order portion of the model has additional 
identification requirements as it must be identified in itself. For instance, a solution 
that specifies a single second-order factor over three first-order factors is just-
identified (Brown, 2015). As such, the residuals of induction and extrapolation were 
constrained to be equal in order to achieve identification at the higher-order level of 
the model. To accomplish this, we used a procedure outlined by Byrne (2011), 
explained more fully in the results section. 
Latent Variable Scaling. In addition to adequate model identification, it was 
necessary to scale the second-order factor of dispositional reasoning in the model. 
The second-order factor has no observed measures and must be provided a 
metric (Brown, 2015). This is accomplished either through fixing any one of the 
direct effects of dispositional reasoning on the first-order factors, or to fix the 
variance of dispositional reasoning to 1.0 (i.e. standardize it). In a single-sample 
                                                     
22 However, it should be cautioned that combining items into parcels is a controversial issue as it may 
artificially enhance the reliability estimates of scores from the measure (Hair et al., 2012). 
23 In line with Byrne and Stewart (2006). 
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analysis, either method of scaling is appropriate (Kline, 2011). As the latter approach 
leaves all three direct effects of dispositional reasoning on the first-order factors as 
free parameters – these factor intercorrelations each have substantive importance in 
the present study – we scaled the dispositional reasoning factor by fixing its variance 
to 1.0. Because the indicator variables are now endogenous variables, their residual 
variances (disturbances) were estimated using the psi matrix (as opposed to 
estimation of factor variances, using the phi matrix). As such, our analysis specified 
that psi is a diagonal matrix; that is, freely estimate residual variances and fix all off-
diagonal relationships-residual covariances to zero (Brown, 2015). 
Higher-order CFA Procedure 
After completing the data preparation, we followed the general sequence of higher-
order confirmatory factor analysis (HCFA) proposed by (Brown, 2015): (1) develop a 
‘well-behaved’ first-order CFA solution, in other words, one that fits well and is 
conceptually valid; (2) examine the magnitude and pattern of correlations among 
factors in the first-order model; and (3) fit the second-order model, based on 
conceptual and empirical grounds. These steps are described, along with the results, 
in the results section. 
Measurement Invariance (MI) 
Finally, we also conducted measurement invariance (Millsap, 2011) analysis of the 
best fitting factor model between managers and psychology student samples. If the 
issue of measurement equivalence is not addressed, between-group comparisons of 
test scores may be misleading, because we would not be sure if observed group 
differences are ‘real’ or confounded with differences in the structure of the 
constructs and/or functioning of the measurement scales (Cheung, 2008). In order to 
establish the measurement invariance of the first-order models of the factor structure 
underlying our measure of dispositional reasoning between managers and 
psychology students, we followed general guidelines for testing measurement 
invariance (MI) proposed by a number of authors (e.g., Brown, 2015; Millsap, 2011; 
Raykov, Marcoulides, & Li, 2012; Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). Our strategy involved 
an assessment of measurement invariance of the first-order model (M2) of 
dispositional reasoning hypothesized as three components (induction, extrapolation, 
and contextualization). 
To assess invariance of the hierarchical model, we relied on guidelines 
proposed by Byrne and Stewart (2006), as well as others (Chen, Sousa, & West, 2005; 
Cheung, 2008). Our testing strategy involved a number of hierarchical steps. To test 
MI, we compared the fit of a series of more constrained models unconstrained model 
with the fit of the equivalence constraints with the Likelihood Ratio (LR) test 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). The LR test involves a comparison of the χ2-values of the 
unconstrained and constrained models. A statistically significant increase in χ2 as a 
result of constraining a specific set of parameters was used as a criterion for rejecting 
measurement invariance. 
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3.3 Results 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Figure 3.4 and Table 3.1 portrays the mean dispositional reasoning scores (overall, 
and by component) for managers and psychology students. Results from an 
independent samples t test indicated that psychology students (M = .76, SD = .10, N = 
161) scored relatively higher on overall dispositional reasoning than managers (M = 
.45, SD = .14, N = 161), t(287.8) = -22.2, p < .001, two-tailed. The difference of .31 scale 
points was large (scale range: 0 to 100%; d = 2.55, large effect size r = .79), and the 
95% confidence interval around the difference between the group means was 
relatively precise (33.7 to 28.2). For the sake of brevity, the mean comparisons for 
component scores are not reported, however. They too were all statistically 
significant, p < .001. Table 3.2 reports the intercorrelation (uncorrected for 
unreliability) between the dispositional reasoning component scores between the 
two subsamples. As background to the CFA model evaluation, the item parcel 
means are also reported in Table 3.3 for each group. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Comparison of mean scores (%) for dispositional reasoning and its components 
(induction, extrapolation, and contextualization) between managers and psychology students. 
The y-axis is interpreted as follows: 0% = no correct answers and 100% = all items correct. 
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Table 3.2  
    Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations for the Managers and Psychology-students Samples 
     Variables Descriptives 1 2 3 4 
 
M (SD) Correlations for managers (n = 160) 
1. Induction .37 (.18) - 
   
2. Extrapolation .47 (.16) .56** - 
  
3. Contextualization .51 (.19)  .47** .44** - 
 
4. Total DR .44 (.15) .83** .80**   .80** - 
 
 Correlations for psychology-students (n = 161) 
1. Induction .74 (.16) - 
   
2. Extrapolation .77 (.10) .53** - 
  
3. Contextualization .77 (.13)  .53** .36** - 
 
4. Total DR .76 (.10) .87** .74**   .79** - 
Note. Total N = 321. DR = Dispositional reasoning total scores. 
* p < .05; ** p < .01 (two-tailed). 
 
 
Table 3.3 
Descriptive Statistics for Item Parcels for the Managers and Psychology-students Samples 
     Item Parcels  Managers (N = 160) Students (N = 161) 
 
M (SD) M (SD) 
1. Induction 1 .54 (.24) .76 (.18) 
2. Induction 2 .31 (.26) .77 (.24) 
3. Induction 3 .33 (.27) .78 (.22) 
4. Induction 4 .31 (.30) .75 (.24) 
5. Induction 5 .35 (.26) .63 (.27) 
6. Extrapolation 1 .44 (.22) .67 (.19) 
7. Extrapolation 2 .38 (.21) .73 (.17) 
8. Extrapolation 3 .53 (.25) .82 (.17) 
9. Extrapolation 4 .56 (.25) .82 (.18) 
10. Extrapolation 5 .44 (.27) .80 (.22) 
11. Contextualization 1 .51 (.27) .80 (.19) 
12. Contextualization 2 .53 (.25) .71 (.22) 
13. Contextualization 3 .38 (.25) .71 (.21) 
14. Contextualization 4 .50 (.29) .79 (.21) 
15. Contextualization 5 .63 (.31) .86 (.18) 
Note. Total N = 321. Scores are average difficulty (p) values across items in each item 
parcel and, therefore, range from 0 (the mean score on items contained in the parcel was 
0) to 1.00 (the mean score of participants to items contained in the parcel was 1). 
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Measurement Properties 
Reliability 
We analysed the internal consistency reliability of scores from the dispositional 
reasoning measure for the combined sample and separately for each subsample. 
Table 3.4 reports the internal consistency coefficients (Alpha coefficient) and item-
analysis statistics for the overall dispositional reasoning measure, as well as for the 
separate subcomponent measures (induction, extrapolation, and contextualization). 
In the combined sample, the reliability of scores for the overall measure was 
excellent (α = .93) and also good for the component measures (.82 < α < .86). Table 3.4 
further shows that, between the two samples that we studied, internal consistency 
was generally higher for managers as compared to the psychology student sample. 
The lower reliabilities for students may be due to substantial restriction of range in 
their dispositional reasoning scores. For example, on the extrapolation measure, 
psychology students had lower mean item variance (.14 vs .21) and scale variance 
(5.46 vs 13.09) as compared to the manager sample. Restriction of range in scores, or 
a so-called ‘floor-and-ceiling’ effect, is well-known to suppress internal consistency 
reliability, especially when item difficulties vary considerably (Nunnally & 
Bernstein, 1994). Furthermore, Cronbach’s alpha may be a misestimator of the scale 
reliability if a multiple item measure when items are not essentially parallel (Raykov, 
2012). As such, we believe that the internal consistency reliability of the revised 
dispositional reasoning measure may be underestimated in our existing data sample. 
 
Unidimensionality 
Prior to the HCFA, we fit three measurement models for dispositional reasoning on 
item-level data (for 64 individual items) first in order to establish overall 
dimensionality in the combined sample, as unidimensionality is an assumption 
underlying CFA (Kline, 2012). Robust diagonally weighted least squares (RDWLS) 
estimation was employed to estimate all models at item level as the data were not 
multivariate normal. Results revealed satisfactory evidence of unidimensionality 
within each subscale. 
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Assessment of Models 
General Factor Model (M1) 
Model assessment was conducted by testing a series of confirmatory factor analytic 
models. The results of these tests are reported in Table 3.5 for the combined sample. 
Table 3.6 reports the results separately for managers and psychology students. The 
general factor model (M1) of dispositional was assessed by a first-order confirmatory 
factor analysis based on data from the combined sample. The analysis used fifteen 
item parcels created to represent sets of items of the revised interpersonal judgment 
inventory (De Kock, et al., 2015). The hypothesized model is presented in Figure 3.1 
where circles represent latent variables, and rectangles represent measured 
variables. In this figure, a one-factor model of dispositional reasoning is portrayed. 
The item parcels serve as indicators of the general dispositional reasoning factor. The 
general factor model (M1) was tested and the fit was acceptable, χ2(90, N = 321) = 
191.50, p < .001, Satorra-Bentler χ2 (90, N = 321) = 180.99, p < .001, Robust CFI = .96, 
TLI = .95, RMSEA = .06, 90% CI: [0.05; 0.07], although the relative large chi-square 
statistic suggested the need for further model improvement. 
Three-Component Model (M2) 
Next, we proposed a three-component factor model of dispositional reasoning, with 
trait induction, trait extrapolation and trait induction as separate components (see 
Figure 3.2). The three factors were hypothesized to co-vary with one another and the 
respective item parcels created from each of the subscale items serve as indicators of 
the respective factors. A three-component model showed relatively good fit, χ2 (87, 
N = 321) = 117.60, p = .016, Satorra-Bentler χ2 (87, N = 321) = 113.29, p < .05, Robust CFI 
= .99, TLI = .98, RMSEA = .03, 90% CI: [0.015; 0.048]. All fifteen item parcels (three 
first-order latent variables with five item parcels each) were significant indicators of 
their respective latent factors. We inspected the results of the phi matrix providing 
the correlations among the latent variables, or factors. Consistent with our 
expectation, all factors were significantly interrelated (range of zs = 6.76 – 10.48). 
Factor intercorrelations (amongst the various subdimensions of the dispositional 
reasoning components, M2) were generally large (.84 < φ < .95) when disattennuated 
for measurement error. As such, the pattern of correlations speaks to the feasibility 
of the suggested second-order model, which posited that trait induction, trait 
extrapolation and trait contextualization are more specific dimensions of broad 
underlying dispositional reasoning. 
Hierarchical Factor Model (M3) 
Finally, a hierarchical (2nd-order) factor model of dispositional reasoning – this 
model proposes a general component, influencing the three specific components of 
induction, extrapolation, and contextualization – was proposed. The hierarchical 
model was tested and support was found as the model showed good fit, χ2 (87, N = 
321) = 117.60, p = .016, Satorra-Bentler χ2 (87, N = 321) = 113.29, p < .05, Robust CFI = 
.99, TLI = .98, RMSEA = .03, 90% CI: [0.015; 0.048]. As is evident, the goodness of fit 
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of the hierarchical model is the same as the three-component first-order model (M2) 
in which factors are allowed to co-vary freely. This is so because a solution that 
specifies a single second-order factor over three first-order factors is just-identified 
(Brown, 2015). Brown recommends that it is not appropriate to statistically compare 
M3 with M2: only when the higher-order model is over-identified, can the nested χ2 
be used to determine whether the specification in M3 produces a significant 
degradation in fit relative to the first-order solution. However, as the higher-order 
solution does not result in a decrease in model fit, it may be concluded that the 
model provides a good account for the correlations among the first-order factors. 
Despite being just-identified, the magnitude and statistical significance of the factor 
loadings in the higher-order part of the model may be meaningfully interpreted 
(Brown, 2015). In the completely standardized estimates from the solution, each of 
the first-order factors loads strongly on the second-order dispositional reasoning 
factor: induction (γ = .98) and extrapolation (γ = .96) loaded more strongly than 
contextualization (γ = .88). As such, dispositional reasoning as a higher-order factor 
accounted for substantial proportions of variance24 in the individual components: 
induction 96% (1 - .04), extrapolation 91.5% (1- .085), and contextualization 77.1% (1 - 
.229). 
HCFA Model Modification. To provide estimates for a model that would be over-
identified, we modified the second-order model (M3) using a procedure outlined by 
(Byrne, 2011). In this procedure, value constraints were placed on both the variance 
of the second-order factors and the disturbance terms associated with the Induction 
and Extrapolation factors. In reviewing the goodness-of-fit statistics it was evident 
that imposing of constraints to this parameter resulted in substantial degradation of 
fit with respect to SBχ2 (without equality constraint, SBχ2 = 113.183, p = .031; with 
equality constraint, SBχ2 = 157.898, p = .000), the noncentrality parameter (30.603 vs 
77.295), as well as the ECVI (.572 vs .711). The modified model reflecting the equality 
constraint (imposed to achieve identification of the higher-order portion of the 
model) was re-estimated and the results are reported in Table 3.5 (as M4). 
                                                     
24 The estimates in the psi matrix indicate the proportion of variance in the lower-order factors that is 
not explained by the second-order factor (Brown, 2015). As such, they are calculated as the difference 
between unity (1) and the completely standardized disturbances. 
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Model Comparison 
We compared the baseline model (general factor model, M1) with the comparison 
models. A chi-square difference test indicated that the nested model (M2) showed 
significantly poorer fit25 compared to the baseline (M1) model, Satorra-Bentler 
χ2diff(3, N = 321) = 45.033, p < .001. Therefore, the three-component model of 
dispositional reasoning fits significantly better than a general-factor model. As the fit 
for the hierarchical model (M3) are the same as those for M2, the same conclusion 
may be reached, that is, a higher-order model with dispositional reasoning as a 
general factor influencing induction, extrapolation, and contextualization, explains 
variance in test scores better than a general factor model that disregards a 
componential structure. The model fit strategy outlined above (for testing M1, M2, 
and M3) was repeated in each separate subsample and the results are reported in 
Table 3.6. 
 
Measurement Invariance 
To compare the factor structure and latent means of dispositional reasoning between 
managers and psychology students, we conducted measurement invariance analysis. 
The results of testing various forms of measurement invariance for the first-order 
constructs are reported in Table 3.7.26 First, a baseline model was established in each 
group, followed by tests of equivalence across groups at each of several increasingly 
stringent levels of invariance. 
 
First-order (M2) Invariance 
Preliminary analyses. It is preferable to conduct multiple-groups CFA with 
relatively balanced sample sizes, as in the present study (managers: N = 160; 
students: N = 161). Prior to the CFAs, the data were screened to ensure their 
suitability for the ML estimator (i.e., normality, absence of multivariate outliers). The 
test for multivariate normality held in the manager sample (χ2 = .702, p = .70), but not 
in the student group (χ2 = 50.546, p < .001), nor when the two samples were 
combined (χ2 = 36.00, p < .001). As a result, the Robust ML estimator was used in 
estimation of all models and, therefore, all analyses are based on the Satorra-Bentler 
scaled statistic (SBχ2; Satorra & Bentler, 1988). In line with the recommendations of 
Byrne and Stewart (2006) we rely on SBχ2, as well as on CFI, the root mean square 
error of approximation (RMSEA), and SRMR to evaluate27 all models. The first item 
parcel within each subscale was used as a marker indicator to define the metric of 
the latent variable. 
                                                     
25 This figure was calculated using a macro (available from Bryant & Satorra, 2013) discussed in 
Bryant and Satorra (2012). 
26 The analytic strategy and reporting standard generally follows Brown (2015). 
27 The evaluation criteria we apply for each fit index are outlined in Byrne and Stewart (2006). Values 
that adhere to the following cut-offs indicate significant reduction in fit when comparing two nested 
models: (1) if corrected ΔSBχ2/Δdf shows statistical significance; (2) ΔCFI >.01; and (3) the root mean 
square error of approximation (RMSEA) > .08.  
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Testing for Baseline Models. As the estimation of baseline models involves no 
between-group constraints, the data were analysed separately for each group. Prior 
to conducting the multiple-groups CFA, we ensured that the suggested three-factor 
model is acceptable in both groups. As shown in Table 3.7, in both managers and 
psychology students in this data set, overall fit statistics for the three-factor solution 
are consistent with good model fit. On both groups, all freely estimated factor 
loadings are statistically significant (all ps < .01). 
Testing for Configural Invariance. Configural invariance represents the 
observance of the same number of factors and factor loading pattern across groups – 
no parameter equality constraints are imposed28. As the baseline models are now 
fitted simultaneously in a multigroup evaluation, the criterion for configural 
invariance is that goodness-of-fit (GOF) should indicate a well-fitting model. The fit 
of the configural model provides the baseline against which all subsequent more 
constrained invariance models are compared. As such, we conducted the 
simultaneous analysis of equal form. As shown in Table 3.7, this solution provides 
an acceptable fit to the data. This solution serves as the baseline model for 
subsequent tests of measurement invariance and population heterogeneity. 
Testing for Factor Loading Invariance. In this step, equality constraints are 
imposed for all freely estimated first-order factor loadings, except for three items 
fixed to 1.00 for the purposes of latent variable scaling. Invariance for this step holds 
if GOF is adequate and if there is minimal degradation in fit from the configural 
model. The analysis evaluates whether factor loadings (unstandardized) of the DR 
component indicators are equivalent in managers and psychology students. In our 
data, the equal factor loadings models had an overall good fit to the data, although it 
significantly degraded fit relative to the equal form solution, χ2diff(12) = 39.60, 
p < .001. As this value is statistically significant, it suggests that the constraints of 
equal factor loadings in the restricted model do not hold, that is, the two models are 
not equivalent across the manager and psychology student groups (Byrne & Stewart, 
2006). Because the constraint of equal factor loadings significantly degrades the fit of 
the solution, it can be concluded that the indicators do not evidence comparable 
relationships to the latent constructs of dispositional reasoning components in 
managers and psychology-students (Brown, 2015). As such, a unit change in the 
underlying latent variable is not associated with statistically equivalent change in the 
observed measures (item parcels) in both groups. A failure to demonstrate metric 
invariance (i.e., factor loadings are not equivalent across the two groups) was 
sufficient evidence to terminate the evaluation of further constraints. The results of 
further tests are reported in Table 3.7, however. 
                                                     
28 For this model, as with subsequent tests in our invariance analysis where equality constraints are 
imposed on particular parameters, data for the two groups are analysed simultaneously in a file 
combining data for both groups to obtain estimates. 
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3.4 Discussion 
 
Main findings 
In recent empirical studies (e.g., Christiansen, et al., 2005; Powell & Goffin, 2009) 
dispositional reasoning emerged as an important predictor of judgment accuracy, 
but its internal composition is still unclear. Does it have components, or is it better 
understood as a single global construct? Or would a hierarchical model be a better 
representation of the dispositional reasoning factor structure? In response to a need 
to shed light on the possible componential nature of dispositional reasoning, the 
present study investigated its components using confirmatory factor analysis. 
Specifically, competing factor structure models were compared to identify the best 
fitting model from a general factor model (M1), three-component model (M2) and a 
hierarchical model (M3). The stability of the factor structure was also assessed in two 
different samples of assessors (managers and psychology students). 
Although previous studies of dispositional reasoning as a predictor of rating 
outcomes have treated it as a single broad ability, our analyses show that it is better 
understood as having three specific ability components – induction, extrapolation, 
and contextualization. Component-level analyses were not possible when using 
earlier versions of the Interpersonal Judgment Inventory (Christiansen et al., 2005) 
because the subcomponents could not be reliably measured. This drawback has 
hampered further research on the role that specific facets of dispositional reasoning 
may play in rating outcomes such as accuracy. 
The results of the present study showed that the internal composition of 
dispositional reasoning follows in the footsteps of intelligence constructs (Carroll, 
1993, 2003) because the study findings supported a general dispositional reasoning 
factor, at a higher stratum, that appears to drive three specific facets at a lower 
stratum. As it is common to observe ‘positive manifold’ (Horn & Cattell, 1966) 
among measures of ability, especially between those that fall within the same 
conceptual domain, the hierarchical structure we observed for dispositional 
reasoning mimics findings from the intelligence literature where a g-factor underlies 
more specific abilities. However, it is too early to categorize dispositional reasoning 
as an ability from our results alone – other tests are required strict conceptual and 
correlational criteria for a classic intelligence (for example, see the classical criteria 
for an intelligence measure suggested by Mayer, et al., 1999). 
The superiority of both a three-component and hierarchical factor model of 
dispositional reasoning relative to a single global-factor approach seems to extend to 
different assessor-types. In both of the samples tested here, results showed better fit 
for componential- and stratum-models than for undifferentiated models. 
Dispositional reasoning scores demonstrated a hierarchical structure, ordered in two 
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strata (one general, and the other specific) in both managers and psychology 
students. A relatively common factor structure for dispositional reasoning in both 
samples is interesting because earlier studies have shown accuracy differences 
between these groups. For example, Lievens (2001) showed that managers provided 
significantly more accurate ratings than students, although managers distinguished 
less between the dimensions being rated. Their relatively lower ability to distinguish 
between dimensions may have been because of lower levels of dispositional 
reasoning overall, and not because their dispositional reasoning is constituted in a 
different way than psychology students, for arguments’ sake. 
However, our invariance tests showed that measurement invariance was not 
evident for the first-order model of dispositional reasoning between managers and 
students. If measurement invariance cannot be established, then the finding of a 
between-group mean difference in dispositional reasoning scores cannot be 
unambiguously interpreted as it is unclear whether score differences are due to true 
dispositional reasoning differences, or to different psychometric responses to the 
scale items (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002). Results showed a lack of metric invariance, 
that is, the factor loadings were not equivalent between managers and students. As 
the relationship between the observed variables (item responses) and the latent traits 
specified in the measurement model were not equally strong across the groups 
(Kline, 2011), it implies that differences may exist between managers and psychology 
students in how the dispositional reasoning components are manifested. 
Nevertheless, metric equivalence is required in order to make meaningful between- 
group comparisons of scores on the dispositional reasoning measure and, therefore, 
we urge for more research into the origins of item response differences between 
managers and psychology students. 
Limitations 
The present study had a few limitations that must be acknowledged. First, by 
grouping assessors into two relatively course categories (managers vs students) it 
may obscure other individual differences within these groups, such as gender and 
ethnicity. As our respondents were drawn from only a few organizations in a single 
country, more research is needed to see how stable the reported factor solutions for 
dispositional reasoning are to other settings and nationalities. While acknowledging 
the need for replications and investigations of generalizability, there is yet no 
compelling reason to suspect that factor structures may differ. 
Second, respondents were tested in various settings and not at the same time. 
This was necessary because, by virtue of their vocation, managers are not easy to 
access in large numbers. As such, data collection was accomplished by accumulation 
to achieve sufficient sizes that would allow the CFA analyses. While our ‘snowball’ 
sampling strategy has limitations, we limited participation to individuals that 
typically receive training to conduct ratings in organizations. 
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Finally, the modest sample sizes used in the present study prohibited fitting 
some using item-level data and, instead, item parcels were used as indicator 
variables. We acknowledge the limitations with parcelling as a strategy (Little, et al., 
2002) and tried to counter this limitation by fitting the measurement models first at 
the item level, albeit only in the larger combined sample. The effect of different 
parcelling strategies on the study’s final results were tested and found negligible. 
Implications for Theory 
In addition to theoretical implications already outlined, our study may unlock better 
tests of judgment theories. For example, Gilbert’s (1989) model of social inference 
holds that, after observed behavior is categorized and characterized, an important 
correction stage follows, where the initial dispositional inference is adjusted, given 
the situational constraints on behavior expression. This theory implies that different 
components of dispositional reasoning may be utilized at different judgment stages. 
Our evidence in support of components, and the possibility to measure them well, 
may encourage researchers to seek to understand which of these, and how, relate to 
judgment outcomes. 
The present investigation has also shed some light on assessor-type effects on 
dispositional reasoning. Although results have shown that the general factor 
structure underlying dispositional reasoning may be relatively similar between 
assessor types (managers and students in the present case), other results pointed to 
potential differences. The descriptive statistics in our study showed that psychology 
students outperformed the managers that we tested by a substantial margin on the 
measure of dispositional reasoning. We speculate that, as compared to managers, 
psychology students may have better developed schemas that relate to 
understanding traits, behaviors, and situations, by virtue of their specialization area 
(i.e., the behavioral sciences). However, these results require further replication 
before a conclusion is warranted. More work is needed not only to determine if, and 
how, various assessor types differ in terms of dispositional reasoning and its 
components, but also, how these differences may ultimately affect rating quality. 
Implications for Practice 
We found general support for the internal construct validity of the revised 
dispositional reasoning measure (De Kock et al., 2015) in samples drawn from 
different populations of raters. As results showed that the components can be 
reliably and validly measured, practitioners are encouraged to consider using the 
brief subscales in their assessor training and selection programmes. However, more 
work in the form of criterion-related validity evidence is needed before we can 
recommend the measures for rater selection and training. Future studies could also 
explore the effect of shortening the component measures to make them more 
convenient to use. 
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By extension, the study findings open up new possibilities to conduct 
predictive studies (of judgment accuracy as criterion) using dispositional reasoning 
at a componential level. Support for both componential and hierarchical models of 
constructs suggest that they may be used as predictors of criteria at either lower- or 
higher levels of abstraction (Hair, et al., 2010). As such, human resource practitioners 
may use either overall dispositional reasoning scores, or component-level scores, 
depending on pragmatic considerations. If only a brief and general measure is 
required, items may be selected at random as long as sufficient measurement 
properties can be maintained (for example, using Spearman’s prophecy formula, 
Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). Alternatively, component measures may be used 
individually (i.e. in a ‘stand-alone’ fashion) in their current form, or shortened where 
they exhibit high reliability of scores in particular sample types. We urge caution, 
however, that users should not be surprized to find lower internal consistencies in 
highly homogenous samples that are range-restricted (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
The present study explored the theoretical factor structure of dispositional reasoning 
– a promising predictor of judgment outcomes such as accuracy. Whereas earlier 
studies treated it as broad ability construct, we showed that dispositional reasoning 
is better represented by a componential model, one which contains three facets, 
namely trait induction, trait extrapolation and trait contextualization. Furthermore, 
broad dispositional reasoning may act as a higher-stratum ability that affects 
performance on its facets at a lower stratum, in line with stratum theories of 
intelligence. Finally, our study findings suggest that different assessor types (for 
example, managers and psychology students) may be relatively similar in how the 
overall factor structure of dispositional reasoning is configured. However, 
dispositional reasoning and its components may not manifest in the same way 
between managers and psychology students, as we failed to find evidence of metric 
invariance. In our study, the similarity between managers and students did not 
extend to overall levels of dispositional reasoning, however – psychology students 
appear to have much better developed knowledge structures pertaining to 
behaviors, traits, and situations, as compared to the managers that we tested. We 
hope to see more work on the additional research avenues opened up by our study 
findings.  
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Appendix A: Parcelling Strategy 
Dimensionality Considerations 
An appropriate parcelling strategy should be identified given the dimensionality of 
the factor structure underlying a set of item scores. Exploratory factor analysis29 of 
our item-level data (using Principal Axis Factoring, with Oblimin rotation, 
considered appropriate for our data, as suggested by Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013) 
indicated possible multidimensionality within all three first-order factors, namely 
for induction, extrapolation, and contextualization. However, we also had to 
consider the possibility that multidimensionality within each component of 
dispositional reasoning may be due to statistical artefacts. For example, multiple 
dimensions may also be artificially created when items vary in terms of their 
difficulty levels. Even if various items measure the same construct, the resulting 
correlation coefficients between these items may be low if the response thresholds 
vary much (Lord & Novick, 1968). As a result, techniques that are based on 
correlations, such as factor analysis, may cause artefacts in the form of spurious 
‘difficulty factors’ with little if any psychological meaning (Bernstein & Teng, 1989; 
Reise, Waller, & Comrey, 2000). Stated otherwise, it is possible that items with 
similar distributions may tend to form factors irrespective of their item content. The 
p-values of the 64 items in our combined dispositional reasoning measure varied 
(Mp = .61; SDp = 17; Minp = .20; Maxp = .93). 
Although some authors (e.g., Bandalos & Finney, 2001) argue that parcelling 
should be reserved for conditions of uni-dimensionality, Little and colleagues (2002) 
suggest two specific strategies for parcelling items when item scores indicate a 
multidimensional factor structure. First, an internal consistency approach creates 
parcels that use the facets observed as grouping criteria. In this approach, items 
contained within a facet are clustered to form a combined item parcel, yielding 
internally consistent facets as manifest indicators of the higher stratum construct and 
keeping the multidimensional nature of the construct explicit. Second, the domain-
representative approach is a method that creates parcels by joining items from 
different facets into combined item clusters. For example, a parcel would contain 
items from each facets identified through dimensionality analysis. So, each parcel 
reflects all of the facets present within a set of items – this solution accounts for the 
multidimensionality inherent in a set of items. The domain representation approach 
has shown to be superior in some studies (e.g., Kishton & Widaman, 1994). Finally, a 
random item assignment strategy may be used. We decided to utilize random item 
assignment as a parcelling strategy, as it recognizes the possibility that difficulty 
factors may cause spurious dimensions within each component of dispositional 
reasoning. We also ran the analyses using the two other parcelling strategies – the 
choice of parcelling strategy had no substantive effect on the final results.
                                                     
29 Due to space constraints, we do not report these results, although they are available from the first 
author upon request. 
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Chapter 4 
An in-depth look at dispositional reasoning and 
interviewer judgment accuracy30 
 
 
Dispositional reasoning is defined as general reasoning about traits, behaviors and 
situations. Although earlier accuracy studies found that it predicted interview judgment 
accuracy, they did not distinguish between its underlying components (i.e. trait induction, 
trait extrapolation, and trait contextualization). This drawback has hampered insight into 
the nature of this construct. Therefore, we use a componential approach to test whether it 
adheres to classic criteria for an intelligence. Results from 146 managerial interviewers who 
observed videotaped interviewees showed the dispositional reasoning components had 
positive manifold and predicted interview accuracy. Moreover, they demonstrated 
discriminant validity with personality and incremental validity over cognitive ability in 
predicting interview accuracy. Together, findings suggest that dispositional reasoning 
broadly adheres to the classic criteria for an intelligence. 
  
                                                     
30 This chapter has been published as: 
De Kock, F. S., Lievens, F., & Born, M. Ph. (2015). An in-depth look at dispositional 
reasoning and interviewer accuracy. Human Performance, 28, 1-23. doi: 
10.1080/08959285.2015.1021046 
An earlier version of the study in this chapter was also presented at the 28th 
International Congress of Applied Psychology‚ Paris‚ France, July 2014. 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
The characteristics of the 'good judge' have intrigued researchers and practitioners 
for a long time (Adams, 1927; Cronbach, 1955; Funder, 2012). An understanding of 
the constructs that influence accuracy could help us to select and train the most 
effective interviewers, assessors, and raters. Although a contemporary review of 
interview literature (Dipboye, et al., 2012) concludes that good judges1 have, for 
example, higher general cognitive ability, the perennial search continues for other 
characteristics that might help identify accurate judges. 
In recent years, the focus of individual differences research has shifted toward 
exploring specific abilities related to being a good judge in personnel selection (for 
example, see Letzring, 2008; McLarney-Vesotski, et al., 2011; Powell, 2008). On the 
basis of theories that suggest that judges’ interpretation of behaviors, traits, and 
situations are intertwined (e.g., Trope, 1986), Christiansen, Wolcott-Burnam, 
Janovics, Burns, and Quirk (2005) introduced dispositional reasoning and defined it 
as complex knowledge of traits, behaviors, and situations’ potential to elicit traits 
into manifest behaviors. According to the dispositional reasoning framework, 
judgment accuracy may depend on three components, labelled here as trait induction 
(the ability to know how traits manifest themselves in behavior), trait extrapolation 
(an understanding of how traits and their behavioral manifestations naturally co-
vary), and trait contextualization (the ability to identify situations that are relevant to 
different traits) (see Figure 4.1). 
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Figure 4.1. Understanding the components of dispositional reasoning: trait induction, trait 
extrapolation and trait contextualization. 
 
According to Christiansen et al. (2005), the dispositional reasoning components are 
“declarative knowledge structures” (p. 126) that enable behavioral information 
processing. To test this notion, they asked students (N = 122) to watch videotaped 
segments of individuals responding to employment interview questions. Students 
judged the personality of the video interviewees and rated acquaintances who later 
completed self-report personality inventories. Overall, dispositional reasoning was 
the best predictor of interview accuracy (r = .42), among a set of rater individual 
differences. A follow-up study (Powell & Goffin, 2009) partially replicated these 
findings in a training context. In sum, these findings suggest that dispositional 
reasoning seems to facilitate interviewer accuracy. 
However, the role of its subcomponents in accuracy is unclear. Prior studies 
did not consider its underlying components, as they could not measure them 
reliably. Instead, they collapsed the components into a single, broad measure. As a 
result, we know little about the componential nature of dispositional reasoning and 
how these components individually may facilitate interviewer accuracy. 
In the present study, we test fine-grained hypotheses about the relation 
between the subcomponents of dispositional reasoning, other individual 
differences, and judgment accuracy. To this end, we develop a revised measure of 
dispositional reasoning – one with reliable components – and test whether the 
components to the criteria for classic intelligence measures. 
It is important to determine whether dispositional reasoning represents an 
intelligence for both practical and theoretical reasons. In addition to expanding our 
insight into the specific rater constructs (see Jones & Born, 2008) that affect accuracy, 
it may also hold practical benefits. For example, the success of rater selection and 
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rater training may depend upon a valid model of the specific interviewer constructs 
that drive accuracy. In addition, if dispositional reasoning were further 
distinguishable into specific components, rather than a single, broad construct, it 
implies that we should target the specific components in interviewer training and 
selection. 
4.2 Study Background 
 
Criteria for an Intelligence 
For it to be considered an intelligence, a specific mental ability must meet several 
criteria (Carroll, 1993; Flanagan, et al., 1997; Mayer, et al., 1999). First, a conceptual2 
criterion applies: The proposed intelligence should be operationalized as a set of 
mental abilities (that focuses on a specific concept, e.g. general memory and 
learning, Carroll, 1993), rather than preferences, interests or inclinations. Second, a 
correlational criterion holds that the abilities should form a related set, and be 
related to other intelligences. Although the intelligence measures must be related, 
they should still show unique variance, i.e. be empirically distinct. To this 
correlational criterion, we add the requirement that it should also predict related 
external criteria (for example, interviewer accuracy, in our study). 
Positive Manifold 
It is common to observe positive manifold (Horn & Cattell, 1966) among measures 
of ability, especially between those that fall within the same conceptual domain. 
There is considerable conceptual overlap among the dispositional reasoning 
components, because we need all three to utilize behavior cues effectively when 
constructing a mental picture of the interviewee (Christiansen et al., 2005). 
Information about traits, behaviors, and situational contexts are linked because they 
all represent trait relevant information (Kihlstrom & Hastie, 1997). 
This conceptual overlap between the components should also manifest itself in 
empirical overlap. In the intellectual ability literature, for example, special 
intelligences (or narrow abilities) tend to co-vary with conceptually related abilities 
(Carroll, 1993). In a widely published study by McGrew, Werder, and Woodcock 
(1991) (as presented in Carroll, 2003) the mean correlation between sixteen narrow 
abilities was .37, indicating medium to large3 positive manifold effects among 
narrow abilities. 
In addition to showing internal positive manifold, the narrow dispositional 
reasoning components should also load moderately on external measures of general 
mental ability, which is typical of the relationship between narrow and general 
abilities (Neisser et al., 1996). We also expect similar effects between dispositional 
reasoning and general mental ability at the component level. Thus, 
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Hypothesis 1: The components of dispositional reasoning will show positive 
manifold internally, i.e. they will moderately (r > .30) relate to each other, as 
well as externally, that is, they will moderately (r > .30) relate to a measure of 
general mental ability. 
Predicting Accuracy from Dispositional Reasoning Components 
Trait induction and interviewer accuracy. Trait induction refers to the ability to 
know how traits manifest themselves in behaviors. An example of a person who has 
high trait induction would be someone who knows that an acquaintance who is 
talkative (i.e. observed behavior) is also most likely to be an extrovert (i.e. 
underlying trait) (Goldberg, 1992). In contrast, managers who have low trait 
induction are unlikely to infer that a person who continuously checks up on other 
colleagues is being neurotic. A judge with high trait induction ability can therefore 
infer accurately which trait underlies (or drives) others’ manifest behaviors (see 
Figure 4.1). 
The theoretical origins of trait induction lie in trait theory. Trait theorists (e.g., 
Allport, 1937) view traits as habitual patterns of behavior, thought, and emotion 
which are relatively stable over time and influence behavior. On the basis of factor-
analytic evidence, we know that particular clusters of behaviors reliably co-vary to 
form underlying traits (Cattell, 1965; Eysenck, 1970; McCrae & Costa, 1997). High 
levels of trait induction imply more accurate schemas of how behaviors actually 
cluster around traits. 
In the past, various instruments were used to measure trait induction (see 
Cantor & Mischel, 1979; Hampson, John, & Goldberg, 1986; Klein, Loftus, Trafton, & 
Fuhrman, 1992; Maass, Colombo, Colombo, & Sherman, 2001). One popular 
measure, the behavior-trait knowledge subtest of the Interpersonal Judgment 
Inventory (Christiansen et al., 2005), consists of items that require the respondent to 
match a list of behaviors to corresponding Big Five general personality traits. The 
correct responses for each item were generated from large-scale empirical evidence 
of actual behavior-trait links (e.g., Goldberg, 1992). 
There are many reasons to expect that trait induction would predict judgment 
accuracy. People generally try to form mental representations of others (Kihlstrom 
& Hastie, 1997) and, in doing so, two processes are used: (1) behavioral 
identification, where behavior is evaluated in terms of relevant categories; and (2) 
dispositional inference, where behavior information is integrated with situational 
information (Trope, 1986). In the initial identification stage, behaviors act as cues for 
inferring underlying or latent characteristics of the target. Judges encode these 
behaviors in terms of trait concepts when reading others’ actions (Wyer & Srull, 
2014). Ultimately, interviewers who make correct behavior-trait inferences would 
therefore form a more accurate overall impression of the interviewee. Considering 
these arguments, we posit: 
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Hypothesis 2a: Trait induction will moderately (r > .30) relate to interviewer 
accuracy. 
Trait extrapolation and interviewer accuracy. Trait extrapolation can be defined 
as the understanding of how traits and their behavioral manifestations naturally co-
vary. For example, someone who can extrapolate from one trait to another would 
know that people who are honest are generally also reliable (Goldberg, 1992). When 
an interviewer infers that an applicant exhibits one trait (e.g. honest), she 
extrapolates the existence of the other (e.g. reliable) by drawing on a personal 
understanding of how traits tend to co-vary. So, by understanding the general 
covariation between traits, he or she is able to fill-in missing information to form a 
more coherent person impression of the applicant. 
The theoretical frameworks that inform trait extrapolation have a long history 
in personality literature (e.g., see Asch, 1946; Jackson, 1972). Generally, the notion of 
individual differences in understanding true (objectively determined) trait 
covariation is a fundamental premise of implicit personality theory (IPT, Jackson, 
Chan, & Stricker, 1979; Schneider, 1973). This theory posits that people use naïve, 
common sense IPTs to form impressions (Bruner & Tagiuri, 1954). As such, an IPT is 
a set of perceived or expected relations among personality traits, which may or may 
not be true or accurate (Van der Kloot & Kroonenberg, 1982; Wiggins & Blackburn, 
1976). 
Trait extrapolation has been measured by various methods and instruments 
(for an early review, see Schneider, 1973). Christiansen et al. (2005) presented 
subjects with items describing hypothetical persons and asked them to select, from 
additional trait or behavior descriptors, the most appropriate option. The correct 
answer was derived from empirical studies of the covariation of traits and 
behaviors. 
In interviews, trait extrapolation is likely to affect judgment accuracy. 
Interviewers are often constrained by limited behavioral information (e.g. 30-minute 
interactions with interviewees) from which to extract trait and person impressions. 
When forming impressions of others from limited information, judges most likely 
rely on heuristic mechanisms such as trait extrapolation to fill-in missing aspects of 
the person impression. Accurate interviewers are likely to have more accurate IPTs 
– they can correctly extrapolate between traits. Like completing a puzzle, they 
correctly infer missing pieces of the target’s profile, resulting in a more coherent, 
accurate person impression. 
Empirical evidence supports this view. Not only are IPTs active in judgments 
of personality (Ebbesen & Allen, 1979; Wiggins & Blackburn, 1976) and performance 
(Krzystofiak, Cardy, & Newman, 1988), they also seem to affect judgment accuracy 
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(e.g., Hauenstein & Alexander, 1991; Kishor, 1995). Considering these arguments, 
we posit: 
Hypothesis 2b: Trait extrapolation will be moderately (r > .30) related to 
interviewer accuracy. 
Trait contextualization and interviewer accuracy. Besides trait induction and trait 
extrapolation, dispositional reasoning also involves judgments about situations. 
Research shows that it may be more likely for a specific trait to be expressed (or 
elicited) in certain situational contexts (Tett & Guterman, 2000). As such, people 
consider relevant situational information when trying to understand others’ 
behavior and the dispositions they imply (Funder & Ozer, 1983; Shoda, Mischel, & 
Wright, 1989). Trait contextualization refers to the ability to identify situations that 
are relevant to different traits. Judges with high levels of trait contextualization have 
insight into which situations are likely to see a trait expressed. For example, 
extroversion is more likely to manifest itself in a situation where a target is 
surrounded by other people, as opposed to one where she is alone. 
Trait contextualization has its theoretical origins in the interactionist 
perspectives on personality (Kihlstrom, 2013; Mischel & Shoda, 1995) where 
behavior is considered a function of the interaction between the person and the 
environment. Trait activation theory (Tett & Guterman, 2000) assumes that traits are 
expressed (or ‘activated’) only in certain situations. Situations, therefore, either 
inhibit or entice trait expression – a notion receiving increasing research support 
(e.g., Robinson, 2009). 
Few measures of trait contextualization exist. Tett and Guterman (2000) 
developed ten trait relevant scenarios written to be relevant to each of five traits 
measured by the revised Jackson Personality Inventory (Jackson, 1994), namely risk-
taking, complexity, empathy, sociability, and organization. Two scenarios were 
assembled to provide opportunities to express a targeted trait in each of five life 
domains of college students, namely school, shopping, home, travel, and work. The 
researchers determined actual trait relevance for each situation-trait pair by using 
the mean trait-relevance ratings of 26 judges (identified from a pool of 123 judges, 
using scores on an independent adjective sorting task). 
There are compelling reasons to expect good judges to have high trait 
contextualization ability. Gilbert’s (1989) model of social inference holds that, after 
observed behavior is categorized and characterized, an important correction stage 
follows, where the initial dispositional inference is adjusted, given the situational 
constraints on behavior expression. If an interviewer fails to incorporate situational 
information correctly into a final dispositional inference, it may lead to an 
inaccurate judgment. For example, an interviewer who concludes that an applicant 
is a highly anxious person, without accounting for the stressful context of a panel 
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interview, would make inaccurate inferences about the candidate’s neuroticism. 
Thus,  
Hypothesis 2c: Trait contextualization will moderately (r > .30) relate to 
interviewer accuracy. 
Discriminant Validity with Personality 
In order to show discriminant validity (Campbell & Fiske, 1959) the components of 
dispositional reasoning should be empirically unrelated to constructs with which 
they share little or no conceptual relationship. A key outstanding issue is how 
judges’ dispositional reasoning corresponds to their personality traits. 
In light of our hypothesis that dispositional reasoning components are a set of 
mental abilities, they are positioned in a different conceptual domain than the 
personality domain. Personality refers to predispositions to respond to stimuli in a 
certain way (John, Robins, et al., 2008). As such, personality involves a strong 
behavioral tendency focus (Mayer, et al., 1999). Conversely, dispositional reasoning 
has a strong cognitive focus, squarely rooted in information processing about traits, 
behavior and situations. Hence, dispositional reasoning should also be relatively 
independent from personality trait measures  
To our knowledge, only one study has investigated the relationship between 
judges’ dispositional reasoning and personality: Christiansen et al. (2005) found that 
only openness to experience showed moderate effects with dispositional reasoning 
(r = .34, p < .05). Other traits showed trivial or no effects, implying that dispositional 
reasoning and personality constructs were relatively distinct from one another. 
Therefore, we expect: 
Hypothesis 3: The three components of dispositional reasoning will be 
unrelated (i.e. there will be trivial to no effects) to Big Five personality 
measures. 
Incremental Validity of Dispositional Reasoning 
A final criterion for an intelligence measure is that it must show empirical 
distinctness from general cognitive ability and provide incremental validity (in 
predicting relevant outcomes). Failing this, it would imply that such a measure is 
most likely to form part of general intelligence (Carroll, 2003). By illustration, if the 
components of dispositional reasoning show very high (e.g. > .80) correlations with 
measures of general mental ability and, at the same time, fail to explain unique 
variance in predicting accuracy, one may conclude they essentially are ‘just g’ 
measures (Mayer et al., 1999). 
We expect dispositional reasoning to increment general intelligence in 
predicting accuracy, for two reasons. First, dispositional reasoning and general 
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mental ability may be empirically distinct (e.g. r = .43; Christiansen et al., 2005) from 
one another. So, dispositional reasoning represents a related, but different set of 
abilities than general mental ability. This partial overlap between the constructs may 
increase the likelihood of finding incremental validity evidence in predicting 
accuracy. Second, intelligence measures explain only a part of the variance in 
judgment accuracy measures. In prior studies, intelligence measures showed only 
small-to-medium effects with interviewer accuracy (r = .25, p < .01; Christiansen et 
al., 2005). Thus, 
Hypothesis 4: The set of dispositional reasoning components will explain 
additional variance in judgment accuracy not already explained by raters’ 
general cognitive ability (g). We expect this effect to be more than small 
(>.10). 
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4.3 Method 
Participants 
We recruited participants (police managers) undergoing a seven-week managerial 
training course required for promotion purposes. To increase the external validity of 
our study results, we ensured that all study participants were employed and had 
prior (at least five years) comparable work experience as managers. There were 146 
managers in the sample (24.6% females and 75.4% males). In terms of race, the 
sample comprised of 71.2% Black African, 17.3% White, 9.4% Mixed Race and 2.2% 
Asian participants. The mean age of managers was 43.7 (SD = 5.36) years. The 
majority of the officers’ rank was Captain (57.6%), while the rest were Warrant 
Officers (35.3%) and Lieutenants (7.2%). These officers represent the most likely 
interviewers in typical organizations, as they fall between lower-level first-line 
supervisors and senior management. Some (37.9%) had post-secondary school 
qualifications (vs 62.1% with only a senior secondary school certificate). The 
prevalent first languages amongst these officers were Afrikaans (26.4%), IsiZulu 
(13.8%), Sesotho (12.6%) and English (11.5%), although English was the official 
workplace language of the participating organization in South Africa. As such, no 
one reported difficulty understanding spoken or written English. 
The data collection was completed in a single session at the end of 2011. After 
introducing the research as part of interviewer training, we explained the rating 
procedure and materials. Next, we showed five video-recorded interview segments 
to the group of participants, using a large video projector screen and audio 
equipment. The first video candidate was employed as a practice run, followed by a 
discussion of the ratings and final clarification of questions that remained about the 
rating procedure. Following each of the remaining four video segments, managers 
independently completed the interview dimension rating sheets. Finally, they filled 
in the individual difference measures before being debriefed and thanked for their 
participation. 
 
Materials 
Development of interview videos and materials 
We decided to use videotaped segments of interviewee performance as stimuli as it 
allowed for the presentation of similar stimuli to all participants. We video-recorded 
semi-structured interviews of five graduate students recruited to take part in “an 
interview that would help them prepare for the job application process”. The 
interview format was a competency-based, situational interview (Latham, Saari, 
Pursell, & Campion, 1980). The interview questions were designed to tap two 
specific dimensions, communication and people management. These dimensions were 
selected given their widespread use in interviews (Huffcutt, et al., 2001) and they 
were considered applicable (i.e. derived from job-analysis) to the fictional position 
(‘junior management position’) for which they were applying. We used eight 
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questions that took the form of “What would you do if...” questions, typical in 
situational interviews. For example, to measure communication, we used items such 
as “How would you handle a situation where your work colleagues ignore your 
ideas and input?” A brief rating guide was provided for each question to anchor 
possible responses to scale points. For example, for the item above, a score of ‘1’ 
would be assigned to responses such as “I stop giving ideas and input”. 
Interviewee’s responses to each question were rated on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = 
poor response, 7 = excellent response). In the actual interviews that were recorded, an 
expert interviewer asked applicants to respond to the same questions, presented in 
the same order to all interviewees. The final video segments were shortened to a 
viewing time of 5 min each. 
 
Video Interviewee True Scores 
A ‘true score’ represents the mean of an infinite number of scores across parallel 
measures of a test. In line with earlier recommendations for true score estimation 
(for a review, see Sulsky & Balzer, 1988) our accuracy criterion combined ratings 
from multiple subject matter experts (SMEs). We asked a panel of seven expert 
judges (SMEs) – comprising of qualified industrial psychologists (with at least a 
Master’s degree in IO Psychology) and professors in IO Psychology – to rate the 
video-taped applicants on the two interview dimensions. To minimize possible 
demographic effects, we balanced the targets and expert raters in terms of gender 
and ethnicity. Using the Borman (1977) procedure, we gave all expert raters the 
opportunity to view the video-recorded applicants as many times as they wanted 
before completing the structured interview rating sheet. Mean interjudge agreement 
between SMEs for judging both dimensions across targets was strong (LeBreton & 
Senter, 2008) overall, ICCtot(2, k) = .86, and also for separate dimensions, 
communication = .91, people management = .81. To obtain overall true score estimates 
for each interviewee, we averaged the ratings made by the respective SMEs. 
 
Criterion Measure 
Accuracy scores served as dependent variable. Consistent with the two earlier 
dispositional reasoning studies (Christiansen et al., 2005; Powell & Goffin, 2009) we 
computed an accuracy score for each participant by calculating within-person 
profile correlations (i.e. between the profile inferred by the rater and the accuracy 
criterion profile of the target) (see Borman, 1977) at the dimension level, with an r-
to-Fisher’s-z transformation. This method assesses the congruence (see Funder & 
Colvin, 1997) between the complete set of judgments made by a judge and the 
target. 
Using the procedures of Sulsky and Balzer (1988) we also calculated all four 
Cronbach accuracy measures (Cronbach, 1955): (a) elevation, the overall tendency to 
rate dimensions too high or low; (b) differential elevation, the accuracy with which a 
rater can differentiate among targets, when averaging all traits; (c) stereotype 
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accuracy, the accuracy of relative distinctions produced among average trait levels, 
when averaged across targets; and (d) differential accuracy, the interviewer’s 
sensitivity to target differences in patterns of traits. 
 
Predictor measures 
General cognitive ability. All participants completed the Wonderlic Personnel 
Test – Revised (WPT-R) at the beginning of the testing session. The Wonderlic 
Personnel Test is widely used to measure general cognitive ability (Wonderlic 
Personnel Test, 2002). It is a 50-item, timed test (12 minutes), with items that include 
word comparisons, disarranged sentences, number comparisons, analysis of 
geometric figures and problems requiring mathematical and logical solutions. It 
assesses mathematical, verbal, logical reasoning, and spatial ability, from which a 
measure of general mental ability is created. The Wonderlic has good predictive 
validities for a wide range of criteria (Wonderlic, 1998) and reliability estimates4 
generally vary between .82 and .95 (Wonderlic Personnel Test, 2002). 
Dispositional reasoning. To measure the dispositional reasoning components, 
we revised the Interpersonal Judgment Inventory (IJI) of Christiansen et al. (2005). 
The original version consisted of 45 multiple-choice items that assessed a person’s 
knowledge about personality and how it is related to behavior and situations. In 
their sample, the overall measure showed an internal consistency reliability estimate 
of .82. 
We revised the IJI for three reasons. First, earlier studies (e.g., Christiansen, et 
al., 2005; Powell & Goffin, 2009) used only an overall score, for example, by 
combining scores from all items. However, a component-level measure with longer 
and reliable subtests was necessary to test our hypotheses. The second reason we 
revised the IJI stemmed from the fact that the original items contained content 
written for a student sample. As a result, some items were unsuitable for a sample 
of working adults. For example, in one item, participants had to choose a trait which 
was most relevant to situations like “After a morning exam, you overhear some 
classmates you've met only briefly talking about going to lunch at a nearby 
restaurant”. To address this limitation, we deleted some items, rewrote others, and 
constructed new items with a work context in the item description. 
The last reason why revision was needed was because we anticipated that non-
university respondents (i.e. with lower educational levels) may have difficulty to 
comprehend some item stems, response options, and questionnaire instructions. 
Potentially problematic items (e.g. “exhibit condescending behavior”) were 
identified in a pilot study and replaced with terms that were easier to understand 
(e.g. “be arrogant and ‘high-and-mighty’ in their behavior”). 
We used the same procedure described in Christiansen et al. (2005) to draft a 
final set of 86 pilot items. That is, an expert panel (consisting of six university 
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professors, with backgrounds ranging from industrial, organizational, social, and 
personality psychology, as well as linguistics) wrote additional items for each 
subscale. These items were revised for clarity and piloted in a sample of assessors 
(N = 19) undergoing rater training for a large scale assessment project. Some items 
were deleted or reworded based on item analysis. Here, we deleted items not 
adhering to cut-offs5 for item variability (e.g. SD < .10), item difficulty (p < .15 or p 
>.85), and discrimination indices (d < .10). We also tagged poor items on the basis of 
distractor analysis (no or few distractor endorsements) and pilot sample feedback. 
The final set of three measures consisted of 66 items. 
Trait induction. The first subset of 20 items measured behavior-trait 
inferences. After describing the Big Five personality traits, the measure presented a 
list of adjectives from Goldberg’s (1992) factor markers. The task was to identify the 
traits (e.g. conscientiousness) that best matched the marker adjectives (e.g. 
thorough) that were provided. An example item can be found in the Appendix. 
Trait extrapolation. The trait extrapolation measure (23 items) assessed a 
respondent’s understanding of how traits co-occur. Items described a fictional 
person and required respondents to select which of four descriptions was most (or 
least) likely also true of the person. An example item can be found in the Appendix. 
Trait contextualization. The last set of 23 items measured understanding of 
trait–situation relevance. This measure was originally based on empirical results 
from Tett and Guterman (2000). Originally, Christiansen et al. (2005) keyed per item 
one response option as being the most consistent with empirical evidence, 
theoretical relationships, and expert judgment. One subset of items presented a trait 
description, e.g. ‘risk-taking’ by listing examples of behaviors associated to high and 
low scorers on the measure. Next, respondents had to choose which of five 
situations listed would most likely elicit the relevant behavior. An example item can 
be found in the Appendix. The second subset of items reversed the direction of 
inference, i.e. they described a situation and respondents had to identify the trait 
most likely to be observed in trait-relevant behavior. 
In our sample, we computed the CFA-derived construct reliabilities (Brown, 
2015; Raykov, 2012) of the final measures and these were acceptable (induction = .77; 
extrapolation = .81; contextualization = .76). 
Personality 
A 20-item short form of the International Personality Item Pool (IPIP) Big-Five factor 
markers (Goldberg, 1992) – developed and validated across five studies by 
Donnellan, Baird, Lucas, and Oswald (2006) and later factor analytic studies (e.g., 
Cooper, Smillie, & Corr, 2010) – was used to measure interviewers’ personality. 
Participants rated how well each of the items described themselves on a 5-point 
scale (very inaccurate to very accurate) (Goldberg, 2005). In our sample, the mean 
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inter-item correlations for each scale were comparable to those in earlier published 
studies (Donnellan, et al., 2006). 
4.4 Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.1 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations of the study 
variables. The mean score of the revised dispositional reasoning measure, scored as 
a percentage score, was M = 46.37 (SD = 13.38). Our results indicate that participants 
experienced moderate difficulty to reason about traits, behaviors, and situations. 
Also, the standard deviation of the dispositional reasoning measure scores supports 
the notion of individual differences. Descriptive statistics for other measures were 
relatively comparable to those in earlier studies, although the general mental ability 
scores of managers in the present sample (M = 12.46; SD = 4.4) were lower than 
those published in earlier studies using university student samples. 
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Tests of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1 proposed that the dispositional reasoning components would show 
positive manifold internally, i.e. they would moderately (r > .30) relate to each other, 
as well as externally, that is, they would moderately (r > .30) relate to a measure of 
general mental ability. The correlations (see Table 4.1) among the components 
internally revealed medium to large (.41 < r < .51) (all p < .01) effects (Cohen, 1988). 
Externally, they also demonstrated large effects on general mental ability (.61, trait 
contextualization; .52, trait induction; .47, trait extrapolation; all p < .01). Confidence 
intervals generally contained the hypothesized effect ranges, min r = .41, 95% CI: 
[.27, .54], max r = .61 [.50, .70]. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was supported. The effect 
sizes were even larger than anticipated. 
Although the components are conceptually related (positive manifold) they 
should also be empirically distinct from one another. Therefore, as suggested by an 
anonymous reviewer, we compared (a) a baseline model (model M1) in which the 
correlations between dispositional reasoning are freely estimated; and (b) a nested 
comparison model (model M0) in which the correlations are constrained to be unity. 
Cognitive ability was included in both models. We used the correlations as input for 
the analysis and found poor fit of the nested model, χ2 (3, N = 142) = 86.078, p < .01, 
RMSEA = .44 (90% CI: .36; .52). A chi-square difference test indicated that the nested 
model (M0, specifying the relationship between dispositional reasoning facets as 
perfectly correlated) showed significantly poorer fit, compared to the baseline (M1) 
model, χ2diff(3, N = 142) = 86.078, p < .001. Therefore, the evidence suggests that the 
components are empirically distinct from one another. 
Whereas Hypothesis 1 focused on the positive manifold (‘related-set’) criterion 
for a classic intelligence measure, Hypothesis 2 proposed that trait induction 
(Hypothesis 2a), trait extrapolation (Hypothesis 2b), and trait contextualization 
(Hypothesis 2c) would predict interview judgment accuracy, all with moderate (r > 
.30) effects. As shown in Table 4.1, trait extrapolation (.33, p < .001, 95% CI: [.18, .47]) 
and trait contextualization (.26, p = .002, [.10, .41]) showed moderate effects on 
accuracy, but trait induction (.14, p = .11, [-.02, .30]) had only a trivial effect. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 2 was partially supported as one effect size was weaker than 
hypothesized. 
Hypothesis 3 stated that the three components of dispositional reasoning 
would show discriminant validity with Big Five personality measures. Table 4.1 
shows that only three (out of fifteen) bivariate relationships between these facets 
showed small to medium effects, while the others showed trivial to no effects. 
Judges who were more extraverted had lower induction (r = -.25, p = .007, 95% CI: [-
.40, -.09]) and contextualization scores (r = -.27, p = .005, [-.41, -.11]), while agreeable 
judges showed better extrapolation (r = .23, p = .013, [.07, .38]). In sum, there is 
evidence regarding discriminant validity of the components with personality 
measures. Therefore, our results generally supported Hypothesis 3. 
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Hypothesis 4 posited that individual differences in dispositional reasoning 
components would increment the validity of general mental ability to predict 
accuracy. Table 4.2 summarizes the results of the hierarchical regression analyses. In 
Step 1, the general mental ability score was entered. In Step 2, we entered trait 
induction, trait extrapolation, and trait contextualization as a set. Consistent with 
our hypothesis, results revealed a significant increment in the ability to explain 
accuracy (ΔR2 = .09, p = .004) when trait induction, trait extrapolation, and trait 
contextualization were added in Step 2. So, the addition of dispositional reasoning 
components to the equation with general mental ability resulted in a statistically 
significant increment in R2. In addition, the small to medium effect size3 (Cohen’s 
f2=.11) that we observed, supports Hypothesis 4. 
In addition to the analyses that tested our hypotheses, we also conducted 
relative weights analysis (Tonidandel & LeBreton, 2011; Woehr & Arthur, 2003) to 
examine which of the three components of dispositional reasoning was most 
important in determining interview accuracy. As shown in Table 4.2, the relative 
weights analysis showed that extrapolation (58.54%) and contextualization (26.76%) 
exerted the strongest influence in predicting accuracy, followed by induction 
(4.74%). 
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Table 4.2 
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses of Interviewer Rating Accuracya (Borman’s Differential 
Accuracy) on General Mental Ability and Dispositional Reasoning Components 
Predictor  Step 1  Step 2 
          β     β RWraw [95%CI] RW%b 
Step 1      
General mental ability           .22*                 .00         .01 [.003, .046] 9.96% 
Step 2      
Induction                -.09        .01 [.000, .011] 4.74% 
Extrapolation                 .31**        .08* [.025, .164] 58.54% 
Contextualization                 .18      .04 [.004, .113] 26.76% 
Total R2           .05*                .14**  100.00% 
ΔR2           .05*                .09**   
Note. N = 142. Induction = judges’ ability to infer traits from behavior cues; Extrapolation = 
understanding of how traits naturally co-vary; Contextualization = to know how situations affect trait 
expression; RW = relative weight. 
aAccuracy scores are Fisher transformed (r to z) profile correlations between participants’ ratings at 
dimension level and subject matter expert true score estimates. 
bRelative weights are not raw weights, but rescaled to express the % contribution of each predictor to 
overall R2. Confidence intervals around the raw weights were calculated using the bias corrected 
accelerated method for generating the bootstrapped confidence intervals. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
Additional Analyses 
In addition to our test of the hypotheses using the correlational accuracy measure 
(Borman, 1977), an anonymous reviewer suggested that we also report the results 
using the Cronbach (1955) accuracy measures as dependent variables. Higher 
Cronbach scores denote lower accuracy and, hence, negative correlations with our 
correlational accuracy measure would reflect agreement among the indices. There 
was only a trivial positive relationship between our correlational measure of 
accuracy and Cronbach’s Differential Accuracy, r = - .11, p = .185. The Borman 
correlational accuracy index showed small to medium positive effects with the 
remaining Cronbach components, including elevation accuracy (-.28), differential 
elevation (-.23), and stereotype accuracy (-.21). While these effects are not negligible, 
weak correlations among operational definitions of accuracy are not uncommon 
(Becker & Cardy, 1986). 
Differential accuracy is the most closely related counterpart to the Borman 
measure (Sulsky & Balzer, 1988). In our study, trait extrapolation (-.04) was a weak 
predictor of differential accuracy (whereas it was one of the best predictors of the 
correlational index, .33). In combination, the predictors (general mental ability and 
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the dispositional reasoning components) explained less of the variance in the 
differential accuracy criterion (R2 = .04; see Table 4.3) than in the correlational 
accuracy measure (R2 = .14; see Table 4.2). Also, the dispositional reasoning 
components did not show incremental validity (∆R2 = .02) over general mental ability 
when the differential accuracy measure was used. 
Table 4.3 
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses of Interviewer Rating Accuracya (Cronbach Differential 
Accuracy) on General Mental Ability and Dispositional Reasoning Components 
Predictor Step 1  Step 2 
          β    β RWraw [95%CI] RW%b 
Step 1      
General mental ability -.12                -.01 .01 [.000, .026] 16.68% 
Step 2      
Induction                -.06 .01 [.000, .024] 14.02% 
Extrapolation                 .06       .00 [.000, .003] 3.88% 
Contextualization                -.18        .02*[.001, .095] 65.43% 
Total R2          .01                .04  100.00% 
ΔR2          .01                .02   
Note. N = 142. Induction = judges’ ability to infer traits from behavior cues; Extrapolation = 
understanding of how traits naturally co-vary; Contextualization = to know how situations affect trait 
expression; RW = relative weight. 
aAccuracy scores are Cronbach Differential Accuracy scores using participants’ ratings at dimension 
level and subject matter expert true score estimates. 
bRelative weights are not raw weights, but rescaled to express the % contribution of each predictor to 
overall R2. Confidence intervals around the raw weights were calculated using the bias corrected 
accelerated method for generating the bootstrapped confidence intervals. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
4.5 Discussion 
Main conclusions 
In personnel selection, there has been a longstanding interest in what makes a good 
judge. Even though empirical research suggests that judges differ in rating accuracy, 
the reasons why are not yet clear. The present study posited that rating accuracy is 
partly dependent on specific facets of judges’ dispositional reasoning. By taking an 
in-depth look at the dispositional reasoning construct, we were able to determine 
whether or not its components - induction, extrapolation, and contextualization - 
would act as classic intelligence measures in predicting interview judgment 
accuracy. We tested the components against strict conceptual and correlational 
criteria for a classic intelligence (Mayer, et al., 1999). Although the important role of 
multiple components in accuracy has been suggested by earlier judgment theories 
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(e.g., Gilbert, 1989), to the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to test the 
componential view of dispositional reasoning. In doing so, we added to the current 
understanding of what makes the ‘good judge’ (Funder, 2012). 
The first main conclusion is that the dispositional reasoning components 
generally correspond to intelligence measures. That is, they broadly adhered to the 
conceptual criteria and the correlational criteria we tested. For example, the 
dispositional reasoning components converged with one another and with general 
mental ability (i.e. positive manifold). As in previous studies (e.g., Christiansen, et 
al., 2005) broad dispositional reasoning also predicted accuracy, but we extend this 
research to show that managers who were better at extrapolation and 
contextualization, specifically, were more accurate. In addition, the components of 
dispositional reasoning generally showed discriminant validity with personality 
constructs. Our finding that the dispositional reasoning components also showed 
incremental validity in explaining accuracy, beyond cognitive ability, is novel. In 
short, these results provide evidence for a nomological network with dispositional 
reasoning positioned as an intelligence, namely as a specific mental ability that good 
judges employ to process behavioral, social, and situational information. 
Our second main conclusion relates to the predictive validity of the 
components of dispositional reasoning. Earlier, it was found that broad dispositional 
reasoning can explain variance in judgment accuracy (e.g., Christiansen et al., 2005). 
Actually, our in-depth study of the construct suggests that dispositional reasoning is 
better understood as a cluster of abilities that each may be linked to accuracy. 
Apparently, two of the facets are required to achieve accurate judgments, namely 
extrapolation and contextualization. It seems that induction is less important in 
interview judgment accuracy, perhaps because the high-structure interviews we 
used actually facilitated the linking of dimension cues to specific interview 
dimensions. Taken together, we show that not only is general mental ability and 
broad dispositional reasoning related to accurate judgment of interviewees 
(Christiansen, et al., 2005), but the ability to deal with trait- and situation information 
specifically is also important. 
Our results point out that judgment accuracy may depend more upon 
understanding how traits co-vary (extrapolation), and how situations affect trait 
expression (contextualization), than knowing which traits are signalled by 
behavioral cues (induction). The relative weights analysis confirmed that, amongst 
the components, extrapolation and contextualization exerted the strongest influence 
in predicting accuracy, in that order. To put it another way, when faced with the task 
of interviewing another person, interviewers apparently differ in their ability to 
understand trait constellations and situation-relevant information. In short, those 
individual differences in people’s dispositional reasoning matter as they help to 
explain why some interviewers produce better ratings than others. 
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By including multiple operationalisations of accuracy (e.g. Borman’s 
correlational accuracy measure, as well as the Cronbach components), we could also 
determine the stability of the effects we observed across different across measures. 
Overall, we found the ‘same story’ emerging from the results, albeit ‘with different 
tales’. Predictor effect patterns were relatively similar, but smaller, when using the 
Cronbach elevation accuracy and differential accuracy measures, than when relying 
on the Borman index. Our results also showed that general mental ability and 
dispositional reasoning do not seem to adequately explain interviewers’ ability to 
differentiate among targets (averaged across traits, i.e. differential elevation), nor 
interviewers’ ability to make relative distinctions among average trait levels, when 
averaged across targets (i.e. stereotype accuracy). We encourage further research 
along these lines. 
Limitations 
First, some generalizability issues should be noted. We sampled a group of 
participants who worked for the same employer. Care should be taken about 
overgeneralizing the findings from a single organization. Future research could also 
investigate the extent to which our results generalize to other industries. Our study 
also relied on a specific type of judge, that is, managerial interviewers. We decided 
on this approach to extend the generalizability of dispositional reasoning studies to 
non-student samples. Yet, it would be interesting to know whether the results would 
generalize to other types of judges, for example, psychologists. Despite this 
limitation, it may be argued that using actual managers as interviewers, who 
routinely conduct interviews, bolstered the realism of the present research. 
Second, our research design did not use actual life interviewees, but rather 
videotaped interviewees for reasons of experimental control. By using standardized 
video-taped stimuli in a controlled testing venue, we were able to tease apart the role 
of dispositional reasoning in judgment accuracy – an objective that remains difficult 
in field studies (where high control of extraneous factors is not possible). By using 
the same stimulus materials, we could hold performance constant and minimize 
error variance related to using real interviewees. Using standard stimuli also 
allowed us to determine true scores for these performances, which would have been 
impossible in a true field setting. We tried to mitigate the loss of fidelity by creating 
realistic conditions for the interviewees. All the interviewees were currently looking 
for jobs and used the interview exercise to prepare for real selection situations. 
Additionally, most participants stated that they perceived the interviews as fairly 
realistic. However, future studies should explore the degree to which judges’ 
dispositional reasoning components are able to explain individual differences in the 
accuracy of judges interviewing real interviewees. 
Implications for Theory and Future Research 
Our study has implications for issues that may be important for theory building and 
research on individual differences in accuracy. At the broadest level, findings lend 
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support to mainstream theories of judgment accuracy that suggest that judges can be 
important moderators of accuracy (Funder, 1995, 2012). More specifically, accuracy 
stems in part from individual differences in their ability to utilize behavioral cues (as 
predicted by Funder, 1999). While Christiansen and colleagues (2005) illustrated that 
broad dispositional reasoning explains differences in accuracy – a finding we 
replicate here – we were able to offer a more fine-grained representation of how the 
specific facets of dispositional reasoning may play a role in producing high-fidelity 
impressions of the interviewee. According to our relative weights analysis, 
especially trait extrapolation and contextualization of behavioral information are 
important in producing accuracy. 
In addition to showing support for existing judgment theories, the evidence for 
an intelligence-view of dispositional reasoning opens up interesting avenues for 
more theory building. For one, what is the nomological network surrounding 
dispositional reasoning? We see conceptual overlaps in the construct domains of 
dispositional reasoning and others that people use to understand people that 
surround them. Consider the conceptually related constructs of emotional 
intelligence and social intelligence. Although these individual differences may vary 
in focus (understanding emotions and social characteristics, respectively) from 
dispositional reasoning (understanding behavior and traits), they may share a 
common process of inductive reasoning, where judges infer underlying general 
characteristics from observable behavior. In light of the need to knit together a 
tapestry of individual differences in interpersonal judgment (for a discussion, see 
Lievens & Chan, 2010), we call for more studies that test the relationships between 
dispositional reasoning and social and emotional intelligence. These studies could 
also try to disentangle the constructs’ relative importance in determining accuracy, 
especially in different judgment tasks. 
Second, our finding that dispositional reasoning may be an intelligence raises 
questions about the malleability of the dispositional reasoning components. If it is an 
intelligence how does it develop, if at all? Classic intelligences are known to develop 
with age (Mayer et al., 1999), but we could not test this age-criterion in our 
investigation. Studies that show how dispositional reasoning develops with age 
would provide further insight into its intelligence-basis. Related to this idea, one 
might wonder whether it is possible to improve judges’ dispositional reasoning with 
short-term training interventions. The answer would most likely hinge on the 
underlying nature of the construct. Is it closer to an innate ability (e.g. fluid 
intelligence) or more likely to respond to environmental exposure (e.g. crystallized 
intelligence)? Intelligences are likely to develop with age (Mayer, et al., 1999), 
especially if they are of the crystallized nature (Horn & Cattell, 1966) rather than 
fluid. This change probably occurs through experience and exposure to 
environmental stimuli (Bickley, Keith, & Wolfle, 1995). However, a recent study 
(Powell & Goffin, 2009) failed to observe changes in behavior-trait knowledge (i.e. 
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the induction component) when brief personality-knowledge based instruction was 
given to undergraduate students. Perhaps dispositional reasoning consists of fluid 
and crystallized components, similar to social intelligence (Lee, Wong, Day, 
Maxwell, & Thorpe, 2000). To be more effective in developing dispositional 
reasoning, we should explore other strategies that consider how accuracy develops 
(see Fiske & Macrae, 2012). In short, future work could help position the 
dispositional reasoning construct in a domain of individual differences by exploring 
how it develops. 
Third, we have questions about the role of the rating context in our results. For 
example, would the components relate differentially to accuracy criteria, given 
differences in the judgment context? In our study, we used a high structure rating 
condition, where situations were held constant. When standardized rating materials, 
instructions, and criteria are provided (typical in high-structure interviews) judges 
are encouraged to use normative theories to interpret behavior, rather than personal, 
idiosyncratic theories (Uggerslev & Sulsky, 2008). As such, our judges were not 
required to draw on their implicit personality theories to form impressions of 
interviewees. When rating materials specify which interview dimensions are implied 
by certain behaviors, the role of the induction component could be diminished. Also, 
standardisation of the context limits situational variability, which is also likely to 
lower the need for a judge to draw on their contextualization ability. In sum, aspects 
of the rating context may be important boundary conditions for the relative 
importance of dispositional reasoning components in judgment accuracy. We call for 
more research that explores how situations may moderate which components of 
dispositional reasoning influence judgment accuracy. 
 
Implications for Practice 
Given that the effects we observed for the predictive and incremental validity of the 
dispositional reasoning components were small to moderate, we expect these to 
translate to practically significant outcomes for the workplace application. In fact, a 
number of practical implications for interviewer screening and training follow from 
our results. In terms of interviewer screening, companies might consider using 
candidates’ scores on various dimensions of dispositional reasoning as part of a 
selection battery for potential interviewers or assessors. Our results showed that 
dispositional reasoning components add substantive variance in the prediction of 
judgment accuracy. So, dispositional reasoning scores are job-related and can be 
used in making selection decisions about interviewers. In addition, with a relatively 
short administration time, companies seem then better able to screen interviewers 
for likely judgment accuracy than from using no tests at all, or relying on measures 
of g. 
However, prior to implementing our suggestion to use this assessment 
instrument as a simple and efficient to use tool, further research is needed. For 
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instance, in our study, we asked managers to rate interviewees. We do not know 
whether the dispositional reasoning-accuracy link exists with non-managerial 
judges, such as psychologists, trained assessment centre assessors, and others. We 
also do not know how these judges differ from one another on dispositional 
reasoning. Literature suggests that accuracy differences exist between different types 
of judges (Sagie & Magnezy, 1997), but we do not have a clear picture as to why they 
differ. Hence, a fruitful avenue for future research would be to examine individual 
differences in dispositional reasoning components and accuracy between different 
types of judges. 
Another potentially useful training approach lies in interventions that focus on 
each component. Currently, most rater training is based on frame-of-reference (FOR) 
training – the empirical meta-analytic evidence also supports the effectiveness of 
FOR (Roch, et al., 2012; Woehr & Huffcutt, 1994). However, FOR does not typically 
entail the contextualization and extrapolation components, but generally only the 
induction component. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
This study endorsed a componential view on dispositional reasoning and examined 
its role in interviewer judgment accuracy. No earlier studies have evaluated the role 
of dispositional reasoning at this level of granularity. Evidence suggests that, given 
our tests against strict criteria, dispositional reasoning exhibits some of the 
characteristics of an intelligence measure. We conclude from our findings that 
dispositional reasoning components are unlikely to be ‘just g’ measures.  
Rather, they may represent specific intelligences in the social-cognitive domain 
that allow better use of behavior information in interviews. Moreover, it may have 
distinguishable subcomponents that could constitute pieces of the puzzle in 
understanding what makes the good judge in personnel selection interviews. In our 
study we found that, compared to poor judges of interview dimensions, accurate 
judges had better developed abilities to extrapolate and contextualize trait-related 
information. While the jury is still out on the role of dispositional reasoning 
components in other judgment contexts, for example, assessment centres and 
performance rating contexts, we hope this research will trigger further research on 
related issues.  
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Appendix: Example Items from the Revised Interpersonal Judgment Inventory (RIJI) 
Trait induction 
Circle the letter that corresponds most to the trait you think is represented by the 
word: 
 Trait 
 
Behavior 
Emotional 
stability 
Extraversion Openness Agreeableness Conscientious-
ness 
Sloppy     X 
Irritable X     
 
Trait extrapolation 
For example, one item depicted ‘John’ as “John's co-workers all describe him as 
efficient, thorough, and persistent. MOST likely John also:”. Next, respondents had 
to choose the best answer from the following four options: 
A.   feels the need to be around lot of people 
B.   has a great deal of sympathy for those less fortunate 
C.   doesn't often give in to his impulses 
D.   enjoys fantasising and daydreaming 
Clearly, only option (C), ‘doesn’t often give in to his impulses’ relates to the focal 
trait (conscientiousness) in the original person description. 
Trait contextualization 
For example, one item stated “Which of the following situations is most 
relevant to the trait of sociability?” Then, respondents had to select the most 
appropriate answer from three options (correct answer in bold): 
A.  A team member upon whom you rely allows her unanswered emails to 
 accumulate and frustrate your co-workers in the process 
B.  You notice that the time has just turned 1pm (which is your lunch time) 
 and you see a few of your colleagues walking to the tea room 
C. You see that you colleague has been working non-stop since the morning  
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Footnotes 
 1In this paper, we use the term ‘judges’, ‘raters’, ‘assessors’ and ‘interviewers’ 
interchangeably. 
 2Note that we assess the conceptual criterion, in other words, theoretical 
interrelatedness of the three components of dispositional reasoning, in our 
discussion of positive manifold. 
 3We used Cohen’s (1988) guidelines to interpret effect sizes for Pearson 
correlations, i.e. small (.10), medium (.30) and large (.50) effects. However, to 
interpret effect sizes for incremental validity, we used Cohen’s (1988) guidelines for 
hierarchical regression f 2 as small (.02), medium (.15) and large (.35) effects. 
4We calculated internal consistency reliability of the Wonderlic measure as 
.75, but acknowledge it is not appropriate for speeded measures (Nunnally & 
Bernstein, 1994). 
5Because our pilot sample was small, we applied liberal cut-offs in the item 
analysis that would flag only those items that clearly fell short of our requirements 
for further consideration. 
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Chapter 5 
Does it take one to know one? Interviewer personality, chronically 
accessible traits, and trait judgment accuracy31 
 
 
The present study explores the relationship between interviewers’ personality and their 
chronically accessible traits as predictors of trait-specific accuracy criteria. Earlier studies 
found relatively poor or inconsistent support for personality as a predictor of trait judgment 
accuracy. The present research has two objectives. First, it uses trait-specific accuracy 
criteria, as opposed to trait-generic accuracy criterion measures, allowing us to test whether 
interviewers’ personality traits can predict trait judgment accuracy for specific 
corresponding traits (hypothesis 1), in other words, to determine “does it take one to know 
one?” The second objective is to establish whether interviewers’ chronically accessible traits 
facilitate accuracy for those specific traits (hypothesis 2). We tested these ideas in two 
separate studies. In Study 1, college students (N = 183) completed a personality measure and 
rated the personalities of five hypothetical interview applicants depicted in vignettes 
constructed to mimic ‘realistic’ personalities. In Study 2, a field sample (N = 223) of 
interviewers completed the same measures, as well as a chronic accessibility measure. 
Results did not support the first hypothesis, as interviewers possessing elevated levels of a 
trait did not show trait expertise on the same trait. Related to the second hypothesis, 
accessibility for openness to experience and extroversion predicted judgment accuracy for the 
same traits. In turn, interviewer openness to experience and agreeableness predicted chronic 
accessibility for these traits. In sum, our results suggest that ‘it may not take one to know 
one’ in interview personality judgments. Moreover, chronically accessible personality traits 
may deserve a second look in studies of the good judge in personnel selection.  
                                                     
31 This chapter is in preparation for publication review as: 
De Kock, F. S., Born, M. Ph., Lievens, F., Gierdien, Z., & Sait, Z. (2015). Does it take 
one to know one? Interviewer personality, chronically accessible traits, and trait judgment 
accuracy. Manuscript in preparation. 
Earlier versions of the two studies reported in this chapter were completed as 
Masters dissertations (conducted by the last two authors, under supervision of the 
first author) at the University of Cape Town, South Africa in 2013 and 2014. 
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Personality judgments are increasing in importance in personnel selection as they 
not only underlie ratings used in selection devices such as interviews (Huffcutt, et 
al., 2001; Lievens, et al., 2001; Van Dam, 2003), but also hold many potential benefits 
over self-report measures of personality. These so-called ‘observer ratings’ (such as 
those by work colleagues or supervisors) can be more predictive of criteria (e.g. 
academic performance and job performance) and incremental to self-ratings 
(Connelly & Ones, 2010; Zimmerman, et al., 2010), while also demonstrating show 
good inter-rater reliability (e.g., corrected meta-analytic estimates of .46 - .62 for Big 
Five traits; Connolly, et al., 2007). It seems that those around us have ‘clearer lenses’ 
for viewing our personality traits (Connelly & Hulsheger, 2012) than we are able to 
ourselves. As such, observer ratings of personality in interviews are likely to be 
more construct-valid than self-report personality measures. 
For these reasons, it is important to understand the factors that affect the 
accuracy of observer ratings of personality, such as interviewer characteristics. 
Although interviewer cognitive factors (Christiansen, et al., 2005; De Kock, et al., 
2015) appear to be consistent predictors of personality trait judgment accuracy, 
interviewer personality traits show relatively inconsistent, poor, and often 
counterintuitive relationships (e.g., Borman, 1979; Borman & Hallam, 1991; 
Christiansen, et al., 2005; Hjelle, 1969; Lippa & Dietz, 2000; Powell & Goffin, 2009; 
Vogt & Colvin, 2003). The reasons for these findings are counterintuitive as they 
suggest that interviewer personality plays little to no role in person perception in 
organizations. However, personality is the predisposition to respond to stimuli in a 
certain way (John, Robins, et al., 2008) and it affects most areas of functioning, 
including social functioning and social judgment in the workplace (e.g., Tziner, et 
al., 2008). 
Earlier studies on the relationship between interviewer personality traits and 
personality trait judgment accuracy have two major drawbacks. First, they often 
used trait-generic accuracy criteria that measure how well an interviewer is able to 
infer a complete personality profile, and try to predict this criterion from the 
interviewer’s individual personality traits (as demonstrated in Figure 5.1). 
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Figure 5.1. Predicting a trait-generic accuracy criterion, as done in earlier 
judgment accuracy research – Interviewer personality traits and trait profile 
judgment accuracy. E: Extraversion; A: Agreeableness; C: Conscientiousness; 
O: Openness; N: Neuroticism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Study conceptual framework: Predicting trait-specific 
accuracy – Interviewer personality traits, trait chronic accessibility, 
and trait judgment accuracy. E: Extraversion; A: Agreeableness; C: 
Conscientiousness; O: Openness; N: Neuroticism. 
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A relatively unexplored avenue in individual difference research is the notion 
that personality trait judgment accuracy may be trait-specific, rather than trait-
generic. As predicted by Funder (1995), it is now an established finding that traits 
differ in their judgability – accuracy scores for judging Big Five traits vary 
predictably (Allik, Realo, Mõttus, & Kuppens, 2010; Connolly, et al., 2007; Funder & 
Dobroth, 1987) often with lower accuracy for those traits that would best predict 
later job success (for example, conscientiousness, r = .16, n.s., and emotional 
stability, .17, n.s.; Barrick, et al., 2000). Given these findings, we know little about 
how interviewers’ traits may predict trait-specific, or trait-level judgment accuracy 
(see Figure 5.2). 
The second drawback of earlier studies was neglecting to offer an explanatory 
social-cognitive mechanism through which interviewer personality traits may affect 
their ability to judge others’ traits. A growing line of research suggests that the self 
may be a basis for social cognitive schemas when forming impressions of others 
(Dunning & Cohen, 1992; Dunning & McElwee, 1995). We do not yet know whether 
interviewers’ person perception processes and expertise for rating specific traits are 
related to their own personalities. For example, is it possible that extraverts would 
be better at rating extroversion? In other words, ‘does it take one to know one?’ in 
personality trait judgments? Interviewers may become trait experts because they are 
so familiar with their own traits, that is, they may show higher accuracy for judging 
traits that correspond with their own. 
A plausible rival explanation may be that interviewers’ own traits are more 
salient in their perceptual schemas. Drawing on construct accessibility theory 
(Higgins, 2012), we determine whether interviewers’ chronically accessible traits, 
defined as the degree to which individuals differ in the readiness with which each 
construct is utilized in information processing of behavioral stimulus input 
(Higgins, et al., 1982, p. 45), predict their personality trait judgment accuracy. 
Moreover, would a more parsimonious account where chronic accessibility 
mediates (partially) the effect of an interviewers’ personality trait on judging the 
corresponding trait in others be supported? To our knowledge, no earlier studies 
have tested these ideas empirically. 
The present study 
The present research has two objectives. First, it seeks to establish whether 
interviewers' personality traits can predict trait-specific judgment accuracy for 
conceptually aligned traits. The second objective is to determine whether 
chronically accessible may predict trait-specific accuracy for corresponding traits, 
both as direct effects, as well as mediators of, personality traits. To test these ideas, 
two empirical studies were conducted. In Study 1, we asked college students to infer 
from behavioral descriptors the personality profiles of hypothetical interview 
applicants. Students also provided self-reports of their own personalities, allowing 
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us to determine whether students’ trait-specific judgment accuracy can be predicted 
from their own personality traits. In Study 2, we replicated the first investigation, 
but in a field setting. We asked interviewers in a large company to complete the 
same measures as in Study 1. But this time, we also determined their chronically 
accessible traits. We tested the prediction of trait-level judgment accuracy from 
interviewers’ personality traits and their chronically accessible traits. Our analyses 
therefore reveal the potential incremental prediction of overall accuracy from 
interviewers’ chronically accessible traits. Together, these studies aim to advance 
current understanding of the role of interviewer personality and personality trait 
construct accessibility as individual differences in trait judgment accuracy. 
 
5.2 Study Background 
 
Interviewer personality traits and judgment accuracy: Theory and prior research 
Realistic Accuracy Model (RAM) 
The process through which interviewer personality traits may facilitate judgment 
accuracy is explained by Funder’s Realistic Accuracy Model (RAM) (Funder, 1995, 
1999). Based on earlier models of perception (Brunswik, 1956), RAM proposes that 
the path to judgment accuracy involves a number of interdependent steps. The 
behavior displayed by a target serves as a cue and must (a) be relevant to the trait 
being judged, (b) available to the judge, (c) detected by the judge, and finally (d) 
correctly utilized to form an eventual personality trait impression. Only when all 
four steps have effectively been achieved, can a perceiver correctly judge another 
person’s personality (Funder, 2012). 
By implication, the RAM processes may or may not work effectively – the 
degree to which personality judgments are accurate is moderated by a number of 
key factors: good targets, good traits, good information, and finally, good judges. 
Good targets are simply highly judgable people – their behavior is relevant to their 
underlying personalities and they may be more transparent than poor targets. Good 
traits (e.g. expressiveness) are more visible than others (e.g. deceptiveness) and 
therefore, are more easily judged. Good information is a function of both quantity 
(e.g. a one-hour interview provides more trait cues than a speed-dating interview) 
and quality (e.g. when a person is relaxed and responds to good interview 
questions, higher quality cue information results). Finally, good judges are better able 
to detect and use behavior cues to form an accurate personality trait inference. 
In the present study, our interest falls mainly on the individual difference 
characteristics of the good judge; more specifically: how do their personality traits 
and chronically accessible personality traits predict their judgment accuracy? 
Judges’ personalities may regulate their social functioning in the workplace, 
including aspects of interpersonal judgment (e.g., Tziner, et al., 2008). RAM suggests 
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that these specific individual differences may either enhance, or detract from, 
interviewers’ ability to engage the respective processes required for accuracy, 
especially those related to cue detection and cue utilization (Funder, 1999). Next, we 
report on prior empirical research and outline their key limitation: a reliance on 
trait-generic accuracy criterion measures. 
 
Research Findings 
Over the last few decades many researchers (e.g., Borman, 1979; Borman & Hallam, 
1991; Christiansen, et al., 2005; Hjelle, 1969; Lippa & Dietz, 2000; Powell & Goffin, 
2009; Vogt & Colvin, 2003) have been interested in whether or not certain traits 
predict overall trait judgment accuracy. In other words, these studies have tried to 
determine whether, for example, rater extraversion tends to predict accuracy, or not. 
Conceptually, many arguments32 have been advanced to link raters’ 
personality traits to personality judgment accuracy (e.g., see Christiansen, et al., 
2005). For example, agreeable individuals show more concern for others’ feelings 
(Digman, 1990) and should, therefore, be more attuned to other individuals. 
Extraverts are known to seek out social interactions (Costa & McCrae, 1992) and, 
because of this increased social exposure, are likely to have more opportunity to 
hone their interpersonal judgments through practice and feedback. But due to their 
higher tendency to be focused on the self (Goldberg, 1992), extroverts may be less 
likely to detect behavioral cues signalling others’ traits. Conscientiousness manifests 
in greater detail orientation (Goldberg, 1992) and, therefore, conscientious judges 
are likely to be more attentive in cue detection and show greater consistency in cue 
utilization, resulting in more accurate trait inferences. Persons higher in openness to 
experience are more inquiring and frequently enjoy working with abstract ideas or 
concepts (Goldberg, 1992), more likely to actively develop mental representations of 
other’s traits and behavior (Kihlstrom & Hastie, 1997), seek patterns of consistencies 
and inconsistencies, and form and test hypotheses about behavior (Kruglanski & 
Ajzen, 1983) – all arguments in support of a predictive link between openness and 
personality judgment accuracy. In addition, openness tends to correlate with need 
for cognition, cognitive ability, and social intelligence – these characteristics have 
been linked to higher accuracy (Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997; Palmer & Feldman, 
2005; Shafer, 1999). So, conceptually, there are numerous ways in which personality 
traits could potentially affect trait judgment accuracy. 
The empirical evidence seems to suggest otherwise (see Appendix A). In 
contrast to their conceptual links with accuracy, observers’ personality traits and 
judgment accuracy measures tend to correlate poorly (e.g. 0 < r < .20, uncorrected) 
and, where they do show notable effects, results are generally inconsistent between 
studies (e.g., Borman, 1979; Borman & Hallam, 1991; Christiansen, et al., 2005; 
                                                     
32 For a comprehensive review of these arguments, see Chapter 2 of the present dissertation. We 
summarize the most pertinent ideas here. 
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Hjelle, 1969; Lippa & Dietz, 2000; Powell & Goffin, 2009; Vogt & Colvin, 2003). In 
fact, an evaluation of empirical findings (see Chapter 2 of this dissertation) shows 
that no personality trait seems to emerge as a consistent predictor of judges’ trait 
judgment accuracy. The bulk of evidence suggests that personality traits matter little 
in how accurate interviewers are able to produce impressions of others in personnel 
selection. There also are some traits that may also be detrimental to judgment 
accuracy, for example aggression (Borman, 1979), being domineering and vindictive 
(e.g., medium effects, Letzring, 2008), and neuroticism (Gibson, 2006). And 
counterintuitively, perhaps: judges that are less sociable may be more accurate than 
sociable individuals (e.g., Ambady, et al., 1995) – these authors suggested that 
personally and socially vulnerable individuals may be better at decoding nonverbal 
behavior (p. 526). 
Taken together, a considerable gap exists between the conceptual and 
empirical bases for personality trait-judgment accuracy linkages33. On the one hand, 
clear reasons exist why most personality traits could enhance processes known to 
affect accuracy (cue detection and cue utilization; Funder, 1999). On the other hand, 
empirical evidence suggests otherwise. Following Occam’s razor, the simplest 
explanation for the apparent disconnect is that personality is just not important to 
evaluate personality accurately, but more research is needed to rule out plausible 
rival hypotheses. 
 
Trait-specific judgment accuracy 
The stream of prior research on personality trait predictors of accuracy (e.g., 
Christiansen, et al., 2005; Powell & Goffin, 2009) has generally used judgment 
accuracy criteria that were not trait-specific. Instead, they have considered how an 
interviewer, for example, can evaluate interviewees accurately across a set of 
personality traits (considered together). Accuracy criterion measures like these can 
be described as trait-generic, that is, they are computed across target traits. The 
implicit assumption in these studies is that trait judgment accuracy generalizes 
across traits (i.e. people find all traits equally hard to judge) and, therefore, a single 
overall accuracy criterion may be determined at the personality-profile level. 
However, it is now an established finding in empirical literature that traits do, 
in fact, differ in the degree to which they can be readily judged accurately (e.g., 
Allik, Realo, Mõttus, & Kuppens, 2010). In fact, in an earlier review of 32 studies, 
consensus between ratings of different observers looking at the same target person 
was higher for ratings of extraversion34 (Kenny, et al., 1994). Also, in a recent study 
where students had to judge others’ personalities from targets’ essays, impressions 
                                                     
33 For these reasons, we do not hypothesize any main effects between interviewers’ personality traits 
and overall trait judgment accuracy. 
34 It must be noted that studies do not always agree on the relative difficulty of judging various Big 
Five traits. 
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of Openness to Experience were most accurate (Borkenau, et al., 2015). Such 
findings would manifest as mean differences in trait judgment accuracy scores for 
different traits, across a set of interviewers. This growing body of evidence 
corroborates Funder’s (1999) hypothesis that ‘good traits’ are moderators of 
accuracy. 
A further assumption of earlier investigations that used trait-generic accuracy 
criterion measures is that interviewers’ individual accuracy profiles across a set of 
traits being judged are linear, and not differentiated. That is, an interviewer tends to 
be high, medium, or low in accuracy on all traits she is judging, or stated differently, 
she would show the same accuracy score for different traits judged. However, this 
assumption is yet to be tested. As traits are not equally well judged (both across, 
and within, interviewers) it makes sense to consider trait-specific-measures of 
judgment accuracy, instead of trait-generic measures. 
Interviewer Personality Traits and Trait Judgment Accuracy 
Trait-specific measures of judgment accuracy allow us to raise new questions about 
the role of interviewer personality traits in determining rating accuracy outcomes. 
For instance, would interviewer extraversion predict higher trait judgment accuracy 
for judging extroversion than for other traits (see Figure 5.2)? Stated differently, is 
there any substance to the adage that ‘it takes one to know one’? As far as we know, 
our study is the first to explore various personality traits’ as potential correlates of 
judgment accuracy criteria at the trait-specific level (for corresponding traits, that 
is). This notion is different from the ‘similar-to-me’-effect (Rand & Wexley, 1975) 
where interviewers may form more positive impressions of demographically similar 
interviewees. 
Interviewers may judge others’ personality traits on the basis of their own 
personality traits as the self may be an important basis from which interviewers 
form impressions of others (Alicke, Dunning, & Krueger, 2005; Markus, Smith, & 
Moreland, 1985). For example, they may activate their own behaviors as norms 
when evaluating others: Dunning and Cohen (1992) found that 71% of participants 
reported comparing a target’s observed behavior with their own behavior when 
forming judgments of targets – evidence that judgments of others’ behavior was 
"egocentrically related to the participants’ (judges’) own behavior" (p. 213). This 
may occur through social projection (Krueger, 2007) which is a judgmental heuristic 
that allows people to make fast and relatively accurate judgments of others. In 
addition, contrast effects may occur when observers judge the behavior of others 
relative to their own, primarily to affirm their own self-worth (Beauregard & 
Dunning, 1998). 
The effect of the self on judgments of others may go even deeper: Research 
shows that not only do observers form idiosyncratic definitions of traits and abilities 
(Dunning & Cohen, 1992; Dunning & McElwee, 1995) when judging others, they 
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may also assume that traits correlate in the population in the same way as they do in 
the self (or 'egocentric pattern projection'; Critcher & Dunning, 2009; Critcher, 
Dunning, & Rom, 2015). In other words, observers may project their implicit 
personality theories (IPT) on others. Finally, it seems that people may also build 
causal theories of how traits cause other traits in ourselves and then project these to 
targets when evaluating them (Critcher, et al., 2015). 
We expect to find that interviewers are better at rating traits they hold 
themselves, as their familiarity with self-traits may enhance cue detection and cue 
utilization. This kind of trait interactions, that is, between an interviewer’s traits and 
her ability to judge a specific trait in others, is called expertise in RAM. To illustrate 
trait expertise, an interviewer who is highly conscientious would often plan his 
schedule carefully (Goldberg, 1992) and, therefore, be able to detect and interpret 
this kind of behavior, i.e. other conscientiousness-cues, in interviewees’ verbal 
responses to questions. Their enhanced cue detection and utilization ability would 
therefore lead to higher trait judgment accuracy (Funder, 1999). In sum, we posit: 
Hypothesis 1: Interviewers’ personality trait levels will be positively correlated 
with trait judgment accuracy for corresponding traits, for extraversion (H1a), 
agreeableness (H1b), conscientiousness (H1c), openness to experience (H1d), 
and emotional stability (H1e)35. 
 
Chronically Accessible Traits, Personality, and Trait Judgment Accuracy 
Personality traits not only regulate observers’ social behavior, but they may also 
influence the perceptual lenses through which they view the social world. Already 
half a century ago Kelly (1955) stated that personal construct systems are “a kind of 
scanning pattern which a person continually projects upon his world. As he sweeps 
back and forth across his perceptual field he picks up blips of meaning” (p. 145). As 
such, some personal constructs may be employed more readily because of 
individual differences in the subjective meaning of social events (Mischel, 1973) and 
these become more salient in social perception. Construct chronic accessibility is 
defined as the degree to which individuals differ in the readiness with which each 
construct is utilized in information processing of behavioral stimulus input 
(Higgins, et al., 1982, p. 45). As people tend to encode others’ behavior in terms of 
personality trait concepts (Wyer & Srull, 2014) some personality traits may become 
more accessible than others, that is, people show individual differences in 
accessibility for different constructs (Higgins, et al., 1982). From this perspective, 
some judges may be described as chronics or non-chronics for a particular trait. For 
example, a manager who tends to use mostly extroverted-related descriptors for 
                                                     
35 We formulate hypotheses for all Big Five traits, regardless of the findings that show that some traits 
are easier to judge than others. This decision is based on our observation that studies do not seem to 
agree on which traits are considered ‘good traits’. 
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applicants (for example, “…she was very outgoing” and “this candidate tended to 
initiate conversations during the exercise”) would be described as an ‘extroversion-
chronic’. 
Our conceptual model (see Figure 5.2) suggests a link between interviewers’ 
personalities and their chronically accessible traits. Interviewers’ chronically 
accessible constructs may partly stem from our own personality types36 if the self is 
a basis from which people form impressions of others (Alicke, et al., 2005; Markus, 
et al., 1985). If true, it would manifest when neurotic interviewers, for example, also 
tend to have neuroticism as chronically accessible traits. In sum, we expect: 
Hypothesis 2: Interviewers’ personality trait levels will be positively correlated 
with personality trait chronic accessibility for corresponding traits, for 
extraversion (H2a), agreeableness (H2b), conscientiousness (H2c), openness 
to experience (H2d), and emotional stability (H2e). 
Chronic trait accessibility affects our social information processing as observed 
stimulus information that is related to an interviewer’s accessible constructs would 
be more readily encoded, processed and retained than information that is related to 
inaccessible constructs (Higgins, 2012; Srull & Wyer, 1979; Wyer & Srull, 2014). 
Practically, it means that cues that are exhibited by applicants may be more readily 
remembered when they are related to the observer’s chronically accessible traits. 
Also, “subjects make quicker judgments about a stranger along dimensions that are 
highly self-relevant (i.e. highly accessible) than along dimensions that are only 
moderately self-relevant”(Higgins, et al., 1982, p. 45). Construct accessibility is most 
likely a form of procedural memory (Smith & Branscombe, 1988). 
When an interviewer has extremely high accessibility for a given trait (e.g. 
conscientiousness) then their ability to detect and use cues related to the same trait 
(e.g. going the extra mile in a work task, or being very lazy) may be higher. 
According to the Realistic Accuracy Model (RAM; Funder, 1999) better cue detection 
and use should result in higher trait-specific judgment accuracy for the same trait 
(e.g. higher conscientiousness judgment accuracy). Further, Wyer and Srull’s 
‘storage bin’ model suggests that schemas are used in impression formation (Wyer 
& Srull, 2014) and, when called upon to interpret behavior cues, people will access 
the most salient mental programs that lie at the very top of their storage bins 
(Uleman & Bargh, 1989). As such, an interviewer who is a conscientiousness-chronic 
(in other words, such an interviewer tends to think of others in terms of 
conscientiousness-related terms) may be better at correctly detecting and using cues 
related to conscientiousness (e.g. ‘this person is always late for meetings’; Goldberg, 
                                                     
36 Note that this argument is not analogous to the concept of social projection, which refers to the 
judgmental heuristic that manifests in the tendency to expect similarities between oneself and others 
(Robbins & Krueger, 2005). 
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1992) as information related to this schema is more accessible. In turn, it should also 
result in higher accuracy for rating conscientiousness. 
Empirical research in performance ratings shows that, first, raters may differ in 
the degree to which performance-related dimensions are accessible for use, and 
second, dimensional performance evaluations will also be more accurate when the 
corresponding performance appraisal dimensions are accessible (Woehr, 1992). No 
earlier studies have considered the role of accessibility for individual personality 
traits and trait specific judgment accuracy, however. Therefore, we posit: 
Hypothesis 3: Interviewers’ trait accessibility for each trait will be positively 
correlated with accuracy at judging corresponding traits, including 
extraversion (H3a), agreeableness (H3b), conscientiousness (H3c), openness 
to experience (H3d), and emotional stability (H3e). 
Although we expect that accessibility for a trait would enhance judgment 
accuracy for the same trait, it should not extend to other Big Five traits where there is 
no conceptual alignment. In this line of argument, for example, higher accessibility 
for neuroticism would not enhance the detection and utilization of cues related to 
other personality traits (e.g. extraversion). As such, we expect an independence of 
trait accessibility and accuracy for judging non-corresponding traits. Put differently, 
accessibility for one trait should not be related to accuracy on other traits. 
Given the arguments outlined above, our conceptual model posits chronic 
accessibility as a mediator of the influence of a trait on its corresponding trait 
judgment accuracy. Chronically accessible traits are more salient in interviewers’ 
perceptual mechanisms and, therefore, may be considered the ‘vehicle’ through 
which interviewees’ behavior cues are better detected and utilized. However, we 
think this mediating effect would be partial. Thus, 
Hypothesis 4: Interviewers’ trait accessibility will partially mediate the effect 
of judges’ traits on the corresponding trait-level accuracy, for extraversion 
(H4a), agreeableness (H4b), conscientiousness (H4c), openness to experience 
(H4d), and emotional stability (H4e). 
Incremental validity of personality trait chronic accessibility 
We are also interested in seeing whether or not chronically accessible traits can 
predict accuracy when controlling for the rater’s personality traits. Such a finding 
would further support the potential importance of accessible traits as individual 
differences that may explain trait judgment accuracy: 
Hypothesis 5: Individual differences in interviewers’ chronic accessibility for 
the Big Five traits would increment the validity of their traits to predict trait 
judgment accuracy. 
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5.3 Study 1 Method 
Participants 
The last author recruited 186 college students in an introductory psychology course 
to complete the measures after tutorial group meetings in 2013. Of these, 83.6% were 
female and 16.3% were male. Participants reported their race as White (54.1%), 
Black, (18%), Mixed Race (14.8%), Indian (4.9%), or Chinese (2.6%). A small 
percentage (4.4 %) preferred not to indicate their race, or indicated it as ‘other’ 
(2.2%). They were between 18 and 29 years old (M = 19.5 yrs, SD = 1.7 yrs). Students 
were from various faculties, including Social Sciences (35%), Science (32.8%), Arts 
(8.2%), Social Work (6%), and Commerce (2.76%). Some (15.3%) chose not to 
indicate their study directions. English was the official language of instruction at the 
South African university. 
Procedure 
The questionnaire administrators (course tutors) were briefed prior to the data 
collection. After concluding their tutorial group meetings, they introduced the 
research as a study of the relationship between assessor personality and trait 
judgment accuracy. Study participation was voluntary and participants were 
informed of their rights (to withdraw, anonymity, and confidentiality). Participation 
was incentivized by a prize draw (of roughly $30). Participants could choose to 
disclose their e-mail address in order to be contactable for awarding of the prize. 
Finally, they independently rated the five hypothetical candidates depicted in the 
experimental vignettes (discussed next) and filled in the individual difference 
measures (e.g. personality) and demographics measure before being debriefed and 
thanked for their participation. Most participants completed the measures in less 
than 30 minutes. 
 
Materials 
Applicant Vignettes 
We decided to use written descriptions of five hypothetical applicants’ personalities 
as stimuli in the rating task in our study. These vignettes were developed using 
guidelines for experimental vignette methodology (EVM) by Aguinis and Bradley 
(2014). Appendix D provides a detailed description of the development, pilot 
testing, and manipulation check of the experimental vignettes. Each vignette 
contained a profile of a mock interview target revealing behavioral cue descriptors 
related to traits of the Big Five personality dimensions to varying degrees. An 
example of one applicant (‘Person A’) can be found in Appendix B along with the 
underlying profile for this applicant. The applicant was described in a paragraph (of 
about ten sentences in length) containing behavior descriptors (key words and 
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phrases). For example, Person C37 was described as ‘At work, C is particularly 
detail-oriented and always strives for perfection. C loves order and regularity.’ Also, 
‘However, C isn’t necessarily comfortable amongst strangers and avoids excessive 
attention.’ Where appropriate, vignettes contained intensity descriptors, such as 
‘always’, ‘often’, ‘occasionally’, ‘sometimes’, and ‘hardly’ to denote the extent to 
which the target exhibited a particular personality dimension. To balance the full 
spectrum of target personalities in the stimuli, the five targets were designed to each 
have a single ‘dominant’ trait, for example, Person A was neuroticism-dominant 
(‘5’) and also low (‘1’) on agreeableness. Instead of designing random profiles, we 
relied on empirical evidence (e.g., meta-analytic evidence of Big Five trait 
intercorrelations; Goldberg et al., 2006) to avoid unrealistic personality profiles. 
The judgment task consisted of two steps. First, participants were given a list 
of Big Five traits and descriptions of each trait (See Appendix B) in the form of 
adjectives, which they had to study. For example, ‘Conscientiousness’ was described 
as: ‘Those high in conscientiousness are strong-willed and determined. They are 
also well-organized and have high aspiration levels. Those low in conscientiousness 
tend to procrastinate, may be unreliable, and are not very methodical.’ Next, they 
were given the set of five target descriptions, with instructions to ‘form an 
impression of each person’s personality within the workplace context’. Students 
with no prior work experience38 were asked to ‘think of these behaviors in any 
study- or task-related role and not in a personal context’. For each target, they were 
given a list of all five traits, and asked to indicate the level of personality trait 
exhibited on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 = low indication of trait; 5 = strong indication of 
trait). They could refer back to the personality descriptions if they wanted to. We 
decided not to provide a position (job) description within the rating task as 
respondents’ implicit trait policies (Motowidlo, Hooper, & Jackson, 2006) and 
idiosyncratic theories of performance (Hauenstein & Alexander, 1991) may have 
adversely affected our results; we wanted participants to focus on inferring the 
personality profiles of targets (i.e. a diagnostic judgment, instead of a predictive 
judgment) without a position in mind, as their implicit ideas about which 
personality traits may be relevant to the position may have been a confound in our 
study, if left uncontrolled. 
Criterion Measures 
Accuracy scores served as dependent variable in our study. Consistent with recent 
trait judgment accuracy studies (Christiansen, et al., 2005; De Kock, et al., 2015; 
Powell & Goffin, 2009) we computed an accuracy score for each participant, derived 
                                                     
37 ‘C’ was used as a non-descript designator for each target as we were concerned that providing a 
name that provides gender or ethnicity cues may affect respondents’ evaluations (Letzring, 2010). 
38 We did not ask respondents to report their prior work experience, but anecdotal evidence suggests 
that most students in this particular course have some degree of casual or formal work experience, 
albeit temporary positions as ‘vacation work’.  
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from within-person profile correlations (in other words, between the profile inferred 
by the rater and the accuracy criterion profile of the target) (see Borman, 1977) at the 
dimension level, with an r-to-Fisher’s-z transformation. This method assesses the 
congruence (see Funder & Colvin, 1997) between the complete set of judgments 
made by an interviewer and the target’s accuracy criterion profile. An example of a 
hypothetical personality profile is listed at the end of Appendix A. The development 
and evaluation of the accuracy criterion profile are explained in Appendix D. 
We used accuracy scores at two different levels: A trait-specific judgment 
accuracy score was calculated as the correlation between interviewers’ ratings for a 
trait (across targets) and the pre-determined ‘true scores’ for the same trait, whereas 
a trait-generic (profile) judgment accuracy criterion was calculated as the correlation 
between interviewers’ ratings for all traits (across targets) and ‘true scores’ for all 
traits. 
Predictor Measures 
Personality. All participants completed the 44-item Big Five Inventory (BFI) 
(John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991; John, Naumann, & Soto, 2008). Participants had to 
indicate agreement with the statements on a 5-point Likert-type scale (strongly 
disagree to strongly agree. An example of an item was “Is relaxed, handles stress 
well.” Earlier studies (John, et al., 1991; John, Naumann, et al., 2008) reported 
satisfactory reliability, convergent validity and discriminant validity. 
Demographic Measure. In addition, participants completed a basic demographic 
measure, including gender, race, first language, study direction/faculty, age, etc. 
Participants were asked to indicate their informed consent for voluntary 
participation in the study by ticking a box on the questionnaire cover sheet. A 
category ‘prefer not to answer’ was added to the gender and race items, as required 
by the relevant university ethics protocol. 
 
5.4 Study 2 Method 
Participants 
Our second study used 22339 respondents from a large organization in the financial 
services sector in South Africa. Data for this study were collected in 2014 by the 
fourth author, who was an HR practitioner within the organization at the time. Of 
these, 62.3% were female and 35.4% were male, with the remainder (2.2%) not 
indicating their gender. Participants reported their race as White (46.6%), Mixed 
Race (27.8%), Black (11.2%), Indian (9.4%), other (.4%), or did not specify (4.4%). The 
participants’ ages in years ranged from 21 to 65 (M = 38.16 yrs; SD = 9.4 yrs). 
                                                     
39 Of 551 participants that opened the survey link, only 223 participants (40.5%) completed the full set 
of measures; judging from case demographic information, no obvious withdrawal pattern was 
evident and, therefore, incomplete responses were deleted from further analysis. 
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Although English was the official workplace language, the first language was 
reported as English (52.9%), Afrikaans (33.2%), Xhosa (6.7%), other (4.9%), or not 
specified (2.2%). Participants were relatively well-educated (postgraduate degree: 
38.1%; graduate degree: 36.8%; high school matriculation certificate: 22.9%; not 
reported: 2.2%) and represented staff at all organizational levels (junior 
management/staff: 57%; middle management: 28.3%; senior management: 11.7%; 
top management: .9%; not specified: 2.2%). A large portion of the participants 
(54.3%) often completed performance appraisals of others and a substantial number 
(22%) often conducted job interviews.  
Procedure 
An e-mail invitation to participate in the survey was distributed to all staff in the 
organization. The invitation included a cover letter that explained the nature and 
aim of the study. After accessing the web-link to our online survey platform 
(Qualtrics Development Company, 2015) participants were informed of their rights 
(voluntary participation, right to withdraw, confidentiality, anonymity) and asked 
to indicate their informed consent. Participation was incentivized by a prize draw 
(shopping voucher to the value of approx. $50). Participants could choose to 
disclose their e-mail address in order to be contactable for awarding of the prize. 
Finally, they completed the survey measures before rating the five hypothetical 
candidates depicted in the experimental vignettes (described in Materials). 
Anecdotal evidence40 suggests that most respondents completed the measure during 
work time at their place of work. 
Materials 
Study 2 used the same materials as Study 1 – BFI and demographic measure – with 
the addition of a measure of chronic accessibility. 
Chronic Accessibility. We elicited respondents’ accessible traits with a free-
response measure of accessible constructs (Higgins, et al., 1982). The full measure is 
presented in Appendix C. Respondents were requested to describe five ‘persons’: (a) 
a type of person they sought out, (b) a type of person they avoided, (c) a type of 
person they liked, (d) a type of person they disliked, and (e) a type of person they 
frequently encountered. Respondents could free-recall and write down (up to nine) 
characteristics that best described each person. These descriptors were coded into 
Big Five trait category terms and scored using a variation of Higgins’ (1982) output 
primacy operationalisation to yield a trait accessibility score for each trait. 
To code participants’ responses, the last two authors exported trait descriptors 
provided for each ‘person’ into an Excel spreadsheet. They compiled a database of 
Big Five personality descriptor terms from published empirical research (e.g., 
                                                     
40 We inspected the survey login data on Qualtrics that reported login time and geographic location 
as determined by IP addresses. Results showed that 96.4% of respondents logged on for the survey 
before 6pm. Also, as the study invitation was sent in an email to participants’ work email addresses, 
they often completed the measure within their work environment. 
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Goldberg, 1990, and others; Hofstee, de Raad, & Goldberg, 1992; John, 1990; Saucier 
& Goldberg, 1996) which would serve as an objective coding scheme for trait 
descriptors. The coders, two separate master’s students in I-O Psychology, coded 
participants’ trait descriptors into a single Big Five trait category by referencing 
words against the coding scheme spreadsheet. The two individuals coded the first 
15% of trait terms together in order to establish a common process and interpretive 
standard. As a large number (5390) of trait terms had to be coded, the coders 
randomly split the remaining trait descriptors among themselves and 
independently coded these. Where exact matches for terms in the coding 
spreadsheet were not found, synonyms and antonyms were sourced from a 
Thesaurus. Failing subsequent further matches using alternative terms for a yet 
unmatched descriptor, coding was discussed between coders in relation to the 
original trait definition (and its sub-facets) until consensus was reached. Some 
descriptor terms could not be coded into the Big Five typology, for example physical 
characteristics (e.g. ‘old people’), roles (‘my boss’), and categories of people (‘soccer 
players’) – these were coded as missing values. Overall, 5 390 trait descriptors were 
coded into the Big Five traits. The average number of trait descriptors given by each 
respondent was 20.91 (SD = 7.91). At most, they could list a maximum of 45 
descriptors (five ‘persons’ to be described and nine descriptors for each). The 
various hypothetical persons received a varying proportion of overall descriptors 
provided, ‘liked’= 24.7%, ‘disliked’ = 20.6%, ‘frequently encountered’ = 17.3%, 
‘avoided’ = 17.2%, and ‘sought out’ = 20.1%. 
After coding the individual descriptors into personality traits, we derived a 
respondent’s chronic accessibility score for each trait. To this end, we relied on an 
operational definition of chronic accessibility based on output primacy (Higgins, et 
al., 1982), that is, one that reflects a given trait’s order of appearance (i.e. the first 
trait that comes to mind when describing a person). Practically, a person’s accessible 
traits were only those they listed first in response to the five ‘persons’ to be 
described. Although some studies have demonstrated the construct validity of this 
operationalisation (Bargh, Bond, Lombardi, & Tota, 1986; Bargh & Thein, 1985; 
Higgins, et al., 1982) it results in a dichotomisation where each trait is described as 
accessible or not. In our view, a more nuanced operationalisation is needed where 
traits’ accessibility can be described on a continuum of low to high, which would be 
more consistent with our understanding of trait accessibility as the relative salience 
of various traits in interviewer’s perceptual schemas. As such, we also determined 
the frequency41 that a trait was indicated first (i.e. output primacy) but across the 
five ‘persons’ described. For example, a respondent that listed agreeableness-related 
descriptors (e.g. ‘a warm person’) for all five persons would receive a score of 5, 
whereas the original Higgins (1982) operationalisation would yield an accessibility 
                                                     
41 Despite our reservations about the original output primacy scoring approach, we calculated scores 
for each participant using both operationalisations. The correlation was high (mean r = .80 across Big 
Five traits, uncorrected for unreliability, nor range restriction). 
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score of ‘1’ (i.e. agreeableness-accessible). In contrast, for example, the original 
Higgins’ operationalisation would not reflect the relative differences in accessibility 
for two respondents, one listing ‘agreeableness’ first for two of the ‘persons’, and 
another, who lists agreeableness first for all five of the ‘persons’. 
 
5.5 Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.1 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations of the variables 
for Study 1. Table 5.2 presents the same information for Study 2. Figures 5.3 and 5.4 
present the central tendency and variability, respectively, for trait accessibility and 
trait judgment accuracy for each trait, as found in Study 2.  
In both studies, our results indicate that participants found it easier to judge 
conscientiousness (Mean Fisher’s z accuracy scores42 Mstudy 1 = 1.10 ;Mstudy 2 = 1.00), 
agreeableness (Mstudy 1 = 1.06; Mstudy 2 = .96), and neuroticism (Mstudy 1 = .96; Mstudy 2 = 
.88) from the vignettes than they did for openness (Mstudy 1 = .85; Mstudy 2 = .77) and 
extroversion (Mstudy 1 = .79; Mstudy 2 = .76), in that order, across the five target persons 
being rated on a response scale from 1 = low indication of trait to 5 = strong 
indication of trait). These means are illustrated graphically in Figure 5.3. Earlier 
studies reported relatively small differences in observer agreement for judging 
different Big Five traits (for a review of various studies on this issue, and important 
note on statistical artefacts, see Allik et al., 2010). Also, the standard deviation of the 
accuracy scores (see Figure 5.4) for the different traits suggests sizeable individual 
differences (.48 < Mean Fisher rz < 1.34). 
In study 2, our results indicate that participants showed comparatively higher 
accessibility (see Figure 5.3) for agreeableness (M = 2.35) and extroversion (M = 1.01), 
across the five targets being rated, and had the lowest accessibility for openness 
(M = .35). So, it seems like managers and professional staff (in our sample) showed a 
tendency to use behavior descriptors associated with how agreeable others are (or 
are not), rather than using descriptors associated with how open to experience 
others are (or are not). Considering the variability in trait accessibility (see Figure 
5.4), exactly the same pattern emerged, that is, the sample was most heterogeneous 
in their accessibility for agreeableness (SD = 1.46), than for example, openness to 
experience (SD = .67), which showed the least variability of the accessibility scores. 
It is also noteworthy that, per definition, the intercorrelation between trait 
accessibility scores for the various Big Five traits are mostly negative (-.38 < r < .03; 
see Table 5.2). 
  
                                                     
42 These accuracy score means are Fisher-transformed profile correlations (rz,) between judges’ 
ratings for a trait, across five targets, and ‘true’ scores. 
132  Chapter 5 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Central tendency (Mean) scores for trait judgment accuracy (Mean Fisher’s rz) 
and trait chronic accessibility (Mean proportional frequency of descriptors) by trait of 
managers/staff (in Study 2). 
 
 
Figure 5.4. Variability (Standard Deviation) of trait judgment accuracy scores (SD of 
Fisher’s rz) and trait chronic accessibility (Mean proportional frequency of descriptors) 
by trait of managers/staff (in Study 2).
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Tests of Hypotheses 
H1: Interviewer personality traits and trait-level judgment accuracy 
Hypothesis 1 proposed that interviewers’ trait levels will be positively correlated 
with trait-level judgment accuracy for corresponding traits. The correlations between 
interviewers’ traits and accuracy for judging the corresponding traits revealed 
generally trivial to small effects (Cohen, 1988). For example, in Study 1 (see Table 
5.1), these were non- significant and negligible for agreeableness (.04), 
conscientiousness (-.05), neuroticism (.01), and openness (.10) (all p > .05). The single 
exception was extroversion, which showed a small-to-medium effect, but it was in 
fact associated with lower extroversion accuracy (r = -.21, p < .01). Similarly, in Study 
2 (see Table 5.2), no traits correlated significantly with accuracy for the same trait 
(.04 < r < .09) (all p > .05). Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was not supported. 
H2: Interviewer personality traits and chronic accessibility for corresponding traits 
Hypothesis 2 proposed that interviewers’ personality trait levels would be positively 
correlated with trait accessibility for corresponding traits. As shown in Table 5.2, 
openness (.34, p < .01) and agreeableness (.14, p < .05) showed small-to-moderate 
effects on accessibility for the same trait, but the effects for conscientiousness 
(.08, p = .24), neuroticism (-.03, p = .68), and extroversion (-.13, p = .07) were negligible 
to small. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 was partially supported. 
H3: Trait chronic accessibility and trait-level judgment accuracy 
Hypothesis 3 stated that interviewers’ trait accessibility will be positively correlated 
with trait-level judgment accuracy for corresponding traits. Table 5.2 shows that the 
findings partly confirmed Hypothesis 2. Interviewers who had openness (r = .21, p < 
.01) and extroversion (r = .19, p < .01) as accessible traits had higher accuracy for the 
same trait but not for other traits. Effects for other personality traits did not reach 
significance, for example neuroticism (r = .11, p = .13), agreeableness (r = -.01, p = .85), 
and conscientiousness (r = -.13, p = .08). In sum, evidence regarding the links 
between a trait’s accessibility and its trait judgment accuracy is divided. Therefore, 
our results partially supported Hypothesis 3. We also expected that interviewers’ 
trait chronic accessibility would not be positively correlated with trait-level 
judgment accuracy for non-corresponding traits. Table 5.2 shows support for this 
idea: almost none of the off-diagonal correlations between accessibility and accuracy 
for a trait reached statistical significance, with the exception of one (extraversion 
chronic accessibility and neuroticism trait judgment accuracy; a small effect: r = .16). 
H4: Mediating effects of trait chronic accessibility 
Hypotheses 4 proposed that interviewers’ trait accessibility will partially mediate the 
effect of their traits on the corresponding trait-level accuracy criteria, for 
extraversion (H4a), agreeableness (H4b), conscientiousness (H4c), openness to 
experience (H4d), and emotional stability (H4e). Table 5.3 summarizes the results of the 
mediation analyses. In order to test the hypothesis that trait chronic accessibility 
would mediate the relationship between a trait and accuracy for judging the 
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corresponding trait, we conducted mediation analysis (Baron & Kenny, 1986) with 
standard regression techniques and calculated the normal theory (i.e. Sobel, 1982) 
test for the total and specific indirect effect. In addition, we also calculated 
percentile-based, bias-corrected, and bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrap 
confidence intervals for the indirect effects using resampling (Preacher & Hayes, 
2008). A SPSS macro and script (Hayes, 2014; Preacher & Hayes, 2004) were used 
that generated 95% bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrap confidence intervals for 
all indirect effects and contrasts of indirect effects using z = 1000 bootstrap samples. 
The results showed that the total indirect effect of personality traits on trait-
specific accuracy through chronic accessibility was not significant for all traits. There 
was a significant indirect effect of openness on openness judgment accuracy through 
openness accessibility, b = .107, Bootstrap estimate BCa CI [.040, .195]. As the 
confidence interval does not include zero, it means that this is likely to be a genuine 
effect, that is, openness accessibility is a mediator of the relationship between 
openness and openness judgment accuracy. However, this represents a small effect 
size, κ2 = .08, 95% BCa CI [.030, .146]. The mediation results for the remainder of the 
personality traits are reported in Table 5.3. None of these trait accessibility scores 
were significant mediators of their corresponding traits on trait judgment accuracy. 
 
Table 5.3 
Results of Mediation Analysis of the Indirect Effect of Interviewers’ Personality Traits on Trait-specific 
Judgment Accuracya through Trait Chronic Accessibilityb 
Predictor Estimates              Effect Size 
β SE 95% 
BCa CI 
 κ2 and 
95% BCa CI 
Agreeableness -.003 .017 [-.042;  .026]  .002 [.000; .008] 
Extraversion -.017 .011 [-.046; -.002]  .026 [.004; .065] 
Conscientiousness -.013 .014 [-.061;  .002]  .012 [.000; .051] 
Neuroticism -.008 .019 [-.066;  .019]  .003 [.000; .020] 
Openness .107 .041 [ .040;  .195]  .080 [.030; .146] 
Note. N = 191 (listwise). β = Estimate of indirect effect. SE = bootstrap estimate of standard 
error. BCa CI = Bias-corrected and accelerated confidence interval (95%). κ2 [CI] = Preacher 
and Kelly (2011) Kappa-squared. aAccuracy scores are Fisher transformed (r to z) profile 
correlations between participants’ ratings of targets‘ overall personality profiles and subject 
matter expert true score estimates. bChronic accessibility was assessed using a variant of 
Higgins et al.’s (1982) method. Our frequency-scoring approach is interpreted such that 
higher scores denote higher personality trait chronic accessibility. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
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H5: Incremental validity of trait chronic accessibility 
Hypothesis 5 posited that interviewers’ chronic accessibility for the Big Five traits 
would increment the validity of their traits to predict trait-specific accuracy for 
corresponding traits. In Step 1, the Big Five trait measure score was entered. In Step 
2, we entered the corresponding trait chronic accessibility measure score. 
Inconsistent with our hypothesis, when trait accessibility measures were added in 
Step 2 for each trait, results revealed statistically insignificant increments in the 
ability to explain trait-specific judgment accuracy for agreeableness (ΔR2 = .00, p = 
.76), conscientiousness (ΔR2 = .01, p = .14), neuroticism (ΔR2 = .01, p = .13), and 
openness (ΔR2 = .00, p = .51). In contrast, the incremental validity for extraversion 
(ΔR2 = .04, p = .01) accessibility was significant with a small incremental effect size43 
(Cohen’s f2=.04). So, the addition of chronic accessibility to the equation with 
personality traits generally resulted in statistically insignificant increments in R2, 
with the exception of extraversion. These trivial effect sizes that we observed for the 
incremental effect of trait accessibility did not support Hypothesis 5 for most traits. 
Additional Analyses 
Interviewer Personality Traits and Overall Trait-Generic Judgment Accuracy 
We also used the trait-generic measure44 of judgment accuracy as criterion and 
correlated these with interviewers’ self-reported personality trait scores. Tables 5.1 
and 5.2 report the correlations for Study 1 and 2, respectively. Personality traits of 
the interviewers were generally unrelated (-.16 < r < .11) (all p > .05, except for 
extroversion in Study 1) to overall trait judgment accuracy. In Study 1, extroversion 
was in fact associated with lower overall trait-generic judgment accuracy (r = -.16, p < 
.05). 
Incremental Validity Analyses for Trait-Generic Accuracy 
In addition the trait-specific incremental validity analyses, we were also interested to 
see whether interviewers’ chronically accessible traits would predict a trait-generic 
accuracy criterion and increment personality traits in doing so. Out of all five trait 
accessibility scores, only extroversion accessibility predicted the trait profile 
judgment accuracy criterion (r = .19, p < .01; Study 2, Table 5.2).  
Table 5.4 summarizes the results of the hierarchical regression analyses. In Step 
1, the Big Five trait scores were entered. In Step 2, we entered chronic accessibility 
measures as a set. Results revealed a significant increment in the ability to explain 
trait profile judgment accuracy (ΔR2 = .08, p = .006) when trait accessibility measures 
were added in Step 2. So, the addition of chronic accessibility to the equation with 
                                                     
43 The effect size for hierarchical multiple regression (Cohen, 1988) calculated as f2B = (R2AB-R2A)/(1-
R2AB), where R2A is the variance accounted for by the set of personality trait independent variables A, 
and R2AB is the combined variance accounted for by A and the additional set of accessibility variables 
for each trait B. To interpret effect sizes for incremental validity we used Cohen’s (1988) guidelines for 
hierarchical regression f 2 as small (.02), medium (.15) and large (.35) effects. 
44 Operationalized as a linear composite (mean) of accuracy scores across all Big Five target traits. 
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personality traits resulted in a statistically significant increment in R2 when 
predicting an interviewers’ accuracy for judging a profile of traits (small to medium 
effect size3; Cohen’s f2=.09). 
Table 5.4  
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses of Interviewers’ Overall (Profile) Judgment Accuracya on 
Personality of the Interviewers and Chronic Accessibility of the Interviewers 
Predictor     Step 1       Step 2 
        β                       t     β t 
Step 1      
Agreeableness -.16 -1.79  -.17 -1.93 
Extraversion  -.05         -0.68  -.02 -0.26 
Conscientiousness .02           0.21  .05 0.60 
Neuroticism -.03           -0.34  -.03 -0.32 
Openness .13        1.61            .11 1.41 
Step 2      
Agreeableness accessibilityb             .26* 2.31 
Extraversion accessibility              .33** 3.42 
Conscientiousness accessibility               .04 0.48 
Neuroticism accessibility              .24** 2.89 
Openness accessibility              .15 1.74 
Total R2 .04              .12**  
ΔR2 .04              .08**  
Note. N = 191 (listwise). The effective sample size was reduced due to some participants that did not 
provide a sufficient number of trait descriptors to calculate a personality trait chronic accessibility 
score. 
aAccuracy scores are Fisher transformed (r to z) profile correlations between participants’ ratings of 
targets‘ overall personality profiles and subject matter expert true score estimates. bChronic 
accessibility was assessed using a variant of Higgins et al.’s (1982) method. Our frequency-scoring 
approach is interpreted such that higher scores denote higher personality trait chronic accessibility. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
  
Interviewer personality, chronic accessibility and trait judgment accuracy 139 
 
 
 
 
5.6 Discussion 
Main conclusions 
The present study attempted to further the search for characteristics of the ‘good 
judge’ of personality in personnel selection. More specifically, it investigated the role 
of the interviewers’ personality traits and chronically accessible traits in personality 
trait judgment accuracy. A major departure from earlier work that relied on trait-
generic accuracy criteria was that we studied individual difference predictors of trait 
judgment accuracy at the level of individual target traits, or trait-specific accuracy 
criteria. This enabled a test of how interviewer traits may predict trait judgment 
accuracy of the corresponding traits of targets. Our study also introduced 
chronically accessible traits (Higgins, 2012) as potential explanatory mechanisms to 
explain why it may “take one to know one” in personality judgment. 
At the most basic level, our findings are in line with earlier studies (e.g., 
Borman, 1979; Borman & Hallam, 1991; Christiansen, et al., 2005; Hjelle, 1969; Lippa 
& Dietz, 2000; Powell & Goffin, 2009; Vogt & Colvin, 2003) that found little evidence 
for interviewer personality traits as correlates of personality judgment accuracy. 
However, our two studies provide early support for the possibility that this may 
extend to trait-specific accuracy criteria. We expected that our study participants 
would be more accurate at judging traits they shared with targets, but in both 
studies this was not the case (i.e. all trivial to zero effects, Cohen, 1988) suggesting 
that it is possible that being elevated on a trait may not necessarily make one more 
adept at judging it. 
Further, our research drew on construct accessibility theory (Higgins, 2012) and 
hypothesized that interviewers’ chronically accessible personality traits may predict 
corresponding trait-specific accuracy criteria. As trait chronic accessibility represents 
the degree to which interviewers differ in the readiness with which each trait is 
utilized in behavioral information processing (Higgins, et al., 1982) it would make 
sense that trait information that is salient in the interviewers’ perceptual schema 
would enhance the detection and use of cues related to traits that are accessible to 
the interviewer. Our hypothesis received partial support, as openness to experience 
and extraversion accessibility predicted trait judgment accuracy for the same traits. 
This finding did not extend to the remaining Big Five traits – accessibility for 
agreeableness, conscientiousness, and neuroticism did not predict accuracy for 
corresponding traits. In sum, trait construct accessibility may contribute to 
interpreting cues for the same trait, but much more research is needed before a firm 
conclusion may be reached. In our results, accessibility for openness to experience 
and extraversion may have featured more strongly than others in our results as they 
may be ‘good traits’ (Funder, 2012) that are more visible and therefore easier to 
judge (Funder & Dobroth, 1987). 
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Further, accessibility for some traits (e.g. openness and agreeableness) 
appeared to ‘spill over’ from the interviewers own corresponding personality traits: 
interviewers high on agreeableness also tended to describe others in agreeableness-
related terms. Taken together, our finding supports the view that the self may hold 
potential clues for how we judge others (Dunning & McElwee, 1995; Motowidlo, et 
al., 2006). As far as we know, this is a novel finding that may suggest a possible link 
between observers’ personalities and the social-cognitive schemas they employ. 
Whether trait accessibility tells us more about interviewer’s judgment accuracy, 
than knowing about their personality alone, is still an open question. Our trait-level 
analyses showed that interviewers’ chronically accessible traits did not increment 
personality traits in predicting trait-specific accuracy, running counter to the idea 
that salient social-cognitive information (due to higher accessibility for a trait; 
Higgins, 1982), when separated from the interviewers’ personality, may enhance cue 
detection and utilization for the same trait. In addition, our mediation analysis 
showed that accessibility only interviewer openness mediated the effect of openness 
on accuracy for judging the same trait (i.e. openness to experience). For other traits, 
accessibility did not act as a mediator. More work is needed to explore the strength 
of these findings before conclusions may be drawn about them. 
Limitations 
Our study had some limitations relating to generalizability issues. We used stimuli 
that were not real people and, therefore, the generalizability of our results to field 
settings must be established. Overall, the benefits of using experimental vignette 
methodology (EVM; Aguinis & Bradley, 2014) outweighed its limitations. For 
example, using standard stimulus cues, with pre-determined true score estimates on 
the trait dimensions, allowed the determination of accuracy scores for a large group 
of respondents – this would have been very difficult to achieve in a field setting 
where standardized performance information cannot readily be presented to all 
interviewers. 
Other advantages to EVM in our study involved standardisation and control: 
By presenting the same stimulus materials to all respondents we could hold trait-
related information constant and minimize error variance related to using real 
interviewees. We tried to enhance the realism of the study in a number of ways. For 
example, the vignettes contained profiles that were constructed from empirical meta-
analytic estimates of how personality traits are correlated in the real world. They 
also contained behavior cues that have been empirically linked to each Big Five trait. 
The resulting vignettes were manipulation-checked for realism and judgability. Our 
second study also used field-sample respondents who routinely conduct job 
interview ratings and they completed our measures in their work environment. 
However, future studies should also try to replicate our study in contexts closer to 
the field setting, for example, using video-based stimuli of interviewee behavior. 
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Implications for Theory and Future Research 
Our studies presented here may have implications for theory and future research. 
Although the ‘good judge’ may be an important moderator45 of accuracy (Funder, 
1995, 2012) our results suggest that personality-related characteristics of interviewers 
are less relevant to accuracy outcomes than their cognitive counterparts, such as 
cognitive ability and dispositional reasoning (cf. Christiansen, et al., 2005). The effect 
sizes for cognitive predictors of accuracy are generally moderate-to-large (See our 
review in Chapter 2) whereas the two studies presented here revealed that, in line 
with the earlier work summarized in Appendix A, interviewer personality traits had 
trivial-to-zero effects (Cohen, 1988) when we used both trait-generic and trait-
specific accuracy measures.  
Our results add to the growing evidence that the empirical basis for personality 
as a characteristic of the ‘good judge’ is not strong. We are not sure if these findings 
would extend to narrow trait-predictors of accuracy, though. For example, in some 
other contexts (e.g., predicting academic criteria; De Vries, De Vries, & Born, 2011) 
narrow traits were better predictors of criteria than broad traits. 
Another interesting avenue for research is to determine how accessible 
constructs relate to the cognitive predictors of trait judgment accuracy outcomes, 
such as trait induction (De Kock, et al., 2015), defined as the ability to infer the traits 
that underlie behavior cues? For example, would an interviewer with low 
accessibility for neuroticism (i.e. neuroticism is not salient in their perceptual field) 
also struggle to detect and use appropriately the behavior cues related to 
neuroticism that an interviewee emits during an interview (i.e. low trait induction 
for neuroticism)? 
Implications for Practice 
Given our findings it would be too early to make recommendations for practice, 
pending further research. However, practitioners may consider using the chronic 
accessibility measure in interviewer training to highlight their accessible traits and 
potential blind spots for inaccessible traits when interpreting others’ behavior. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
This study explored the role of interviewers’ personality and chronically accessible 
traits in the accuracy of their judgments of others’ specific personality traits. Results 
from our trait-specific approach found that it does not necessarily “take one to know 
one” in personality judgments. That is, interviewers’ own personality traits did not 
seem to affect their ability to effectively judge corresponding traits. Further, 
                                                     
45 According to RAM, ‘good judges’ are moderators of accuracy in addition to ‘good targets’, ‘good 
traits’, and ‘good information’ (Funder, 2012). 
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interviewers’ chronically accessible traits for selected traits (for example, 
extraversion and openness in the present study) may be useful predictors of trait-
specific judgment accuracy. As such, they deserve a closer look in studies of the 
good judge of personality traits in personnel selection. 
  
In
te
rv
ie
w
er
 p
er
so
na
lit
y,
 c
hr
on
ic
 a
cc
es
sib
ili
ty
 a
nd
 tr
ai
t j
ud
gm
en
t a
cc
ur
ac
y 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
   
   
14
3 
 
 
 A
pp
en
di
x 
A
 
Re
se
ar
ch
 E
vi
de
nc
ea  
on
 In
di
vi
du
al
 D
iff
er
en
ce
s C
on
st
ru
ct
s P
re
di
ct
in
g 
Ju
dg
m
en
t A
cc
ur
ac
y 
in
 H
RM
 
A
ut
ho
r(
s)
 
N
 
C
lu
st
er
 
Pr
ed
ic
to
r 
Ef
fe
ct
 s
iz
eb
 
Bo
rm
an
 (1
97
9)
 
14
6 
Pe
rs
on
al
ity
 
A
gg
re
ss
io
n 
Sm
al
l 
Le
tz
ri
ng
 (2
00
8)
 
14
2 
Pe
rs
on
al
ity
 
Bi
g 
5 
Sm
al
l-t
o-
m
ed
iu
m
 
Le
tz
ri
ng
 (2
00
8)
 
13
8 
Pe
rs
on
al
ity
 
Bi
g 
5 
Sm
al
l-t
o-
m
ed
iu
m
 
Ja
no
vi
cs
 (2
00
3)
 
41
0 
Pe
rs
on
al
ity
 
Bi
g 
5 
N
ot
 a
va
il.
 (d
is
se
rt
at
io
n 
ab
st
ra
ct
) 
G
ib
so
n 
(2
00
6)
 
nr
 
Pe
rs
on
al
ity
 
Bi
g 
5 
N
ot
 a
va
il.
 (d
is
se
rt
at
io
n 
ab
st
ra
ct
) 
C
hr
is
tia
ns
en
 e
t a
l. 
(2
00
5)
 
12
2 
Pe
rs
on
al
ity
 
Bi
g 
5 
Sm
al
l-t
o-
m
ed
iu
m
 
Po
w
el
l (
20
08
) 
16
4 
Pe
rs
on
al
ity
 
Bi
g 
5 
V
ar
io
us
 (S
m
al
l-t
o-
m
ed
iu
m
) 
D
av
is
 (1
99
9)
 
82
 
Pe
rs
on
al
ity
 
C
on
sc
ie
nt
io
us
ne
ss
 
N
ot
 a
va
il.
 (d
is
se
rt
at
io
n 
ab
st
ra
ct
) 
Bo
rm
an
 (1
97
9)
 
14
6 
Pe
rs
on
al
ity
 
D
et
ai
l o
ri
en
ta
tio
n 
Sm
al
l-t
o-
m
ed
iu
m
 
Bo
rm
an
 e
t a
l. 
(1
99
1)
 
79
 
Pe
rs
on
al
ity
 
D
et
ai
l o
ri
en
ta
tio
n 
Sm
al
l 
Le
tz
ri
ng
 (2
00
8)
 
13
8 
Pe
rs
on
al
ity
 
In
te
rp
er
so
na
l p
ro
bl
em
s 
Sm
al
l-t
o-
m
ed
iu
m
 
Li
pp
a 
et
 a
l. 
(2
00
0)
 
10
9 
Pe
rs
on
al
ity
 
M
as
cu
lin
ity
/fe
m
in
in
ity
 
Sm
al
l 
Le
tz
ri
ng
 (2
00
8)
 
13
8 
Pe
rs
on
al
ity
 
N
ar
ci
ss
is
m
 
Sm
al
l-t
o-
m
ed
iu
m
 
D
av
is
 (1
99
9)
 
82
 
Pe
rs
on
al
ity
 
N
ee
d 
to
 e
va
lu
at
e 
N
ot
 a
va
il.
 (d
is
se
rt
at
io
n 
ab
st
ra
ct
) 
G
ib
so
n 
(2
00
6)
 
nr
 
Pe
rs
on
al
ity
 
N
ee
d 
to
 e
va
lu
at
e 
N
ot
 a
va
il.
 (d
is
se
rt
at
io
n 
ab
st
ra
ct
) 
Bo
rm
an
 e
t a
l. 
(1
99
1)
 
79
 
Pe
rs
on
al
ity
 
Pe
rs
on
al
 a
dj
us
tm
en
t 
Sm
al
l 
Li
pp
a 
et
 a
l. 
(2
00
0)
 
10
9 
Pe
rs
on
al
ity
 
Pe
rs
on
al
ity
 (B
ig
 5
) 
V
ar
io
us
 (U
p 
to
 s
m
al
l-t
o-
m
ed
iu
m
) 
V
og
t e
t a
l. 
(2
00
3)
 
10
2 
Pe
rs
on
al
ity
 
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
l c
om
m
un
io
n 
M
ed
iu
m
 
Le
tz
ri
ng
 (2
00
8)
 
13
8 
Pe
rs
on
al
ity
 
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
l w
el
l-b
ei
ng
 
V
ar
io
us
 (S
m
al
l-t
o-
m
ed
iu
m
) 
H
um
an
 e
t a
l. 
(2
01
1)
 
38
0 
Pe
rs
on
al
ity
 
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
l w
el
l-b
ei
ng
 a
nd
 a
dj
us
tm
en
t 
V
ar
io
us
 
Bo
rm
an
 (1
97
9)
 
14
6 
Pe
rs
on
al
ity
 
Se
lf-
co
nt
ro
l 
Sm
al
l-t
o-
m
ed
iu
m
 
Bo
rm
an
 e
t a
l. 
(1
99
1)
 
79
 
Pe
rs
on
al
ity
 
Se
lf-
co
nt
ro
l 
N
o/
ne
gl
ig
ib
le
 
Bo
rm
an
 (1
97
9)
 
14
6 
Pe
rs
on
al
ity
 
Se
lf-
m
on
ito
ri
ng
 
N
o/
ne
gl
ig
ib
le
 
D
av
is
 (1
99
9)
 
82
 
Pe
rs
on
al
ity
 
Se
lf-
m
on
ito
ri
ng
 
N
ot
 a
va
il.
 (d
is
se
rt
at
io
n 
ab
st
ra
ct
) 
14
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C
ha
pt
er
 5
 
A
ut
ho
r(
s)
 
N
 
C
lu
st
er
 
Pr
ed
ic
to
r 
Ef
fe
ct
 s
iz
eb
 
Bo
rm
an
 (1
97
9)
 
14
6 
Pe
rs
on
al
ity
 
So
ci
ab
ili
ty
 
N
o/
ne
gl
ig
ib
le
 
Bo
rm
an
 (1
97
9)
 
14
6 
Pe
rs
on
al
ity
 
To
le
ra
nc
e 
Sm
al
l 
Bo
rm
an
 (1
97
9)
 
14
6 
Pe
rs
on
al
ity
 
V
ar
io
us
 tr
ai
ts
 
V
ar
io
us
 (U
p 
to
 S
m
al
l-t
o-
m
ed
iu
m
) 
Le
tz
ri
ng
 (2
00
8)
 
13
8 
Pe
rs
on
al
ity
 
V
ar
io
us
 tr
ai
ts
 
Sm
al
l-t
o-
m
ed
iu
m
 
H
je
lle
 (1
96
9)
 
72
 
Pe
rs
on
al
ity
 
V
ar
io
us
 tr
ai
ts
 
V
ar
io
us
 (S
m
al
l-t
o-
la
rg
e)
 
A
m
ba
dy
 e
t a
l. 
(1
99
5)
 
90
 
Pe
rs
on
al
ity
 
V
ar
io
us
 tr
ai
ts
 
V
ar
io
us
 (S
m
al
l-t
o-
m
ed
iu
m
) 
A
da
m
s 
(1
92
7)
 
80
 
Pe
rs
on
al
ity
 
V
ar
io
us
 tr
ai
ts
 
Q
ue
st
io
na
bl
e 
m
et
ho
d 
Bo
rm
an
 (1
97
9)
 
14
6 
Pe
rs
on
al
ity
 
V
ar
io
us
 tr
ai
ts
 
V
ar
io
us
 (N
eg
lib
le
-to
-M
ed
iu
m
) 
N
ot
e. 
k 
= 
15
 re
po
rt
ed
 s
tu
di
es
. T
he
 a
ct
ua
l n
um
be
r o
f e
ff
ec
ts
 is
 m
uc
h 
la
rg
er
 a
s 
so
m
e 
st
ud
ie
s 
re
po
rt
ed
 o
nl
y 
se
le
ct
ed
 re
su
lts
 fr
om
 la
rg
e 
nu
m
be
rs
 o
f i
nd
iv
id
ua
l 
di
ff
er
en
ce
s 
te
st
ed
. a
Th
es
e 
st
ud
ie
s 
do
 n
ot
 in
cl
ud
e 
w
or
k 
co
nd
uc
te
d 
ou
ts
id
e 
of
 I-
O
 li
te
ra
tu
re
. b
W
e 
us
ed
 C
oh
en
’s
 (1
98
8)
 g
ui
de
lin
es
 to
 in
te
rp
re
t e
ff
ec
t s
iz
es
, i
.e
. 
no
/tr
iv
ia
l (
.0
0)
, s
m
al
l (
.1
0)
, m
ed
iu
m
 (.
30
) a
nd
 la
rg
e 
(.5
0)
 e
ff
ec
ts
. A
n 
ef
fe
ct
-s
iz
e 
in
te
rv
al
 o
f .
05
 a
ro
un
d 
th
es
e 
po
in
t e
st
im
at
es
 w
as
 a
pp
lie
d 
to
 c
lu
st
er
 e
ff
ec
t s
iz
es
 
in
to
 a
 d
es
cr
ip
tio
n 
of
 m
ag
ni
tu
de
. E
ff
ec
ts
 a
re
 p
os
iti
ve
 u
nl
es
s 
in
di
ca
te
d 
as
 n
eg
at
iv
e.
 c S
am
pl
e 
si
ze
 is
 n
ot
 re
po
rt
ed
 fo
r s
om
e 
st
ud
ie
s 
be
ca
us
e 
it 
w
as
 n
ot
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
(ty
pi
ca
lly
 w
he
n 
re
su
lts
 w
er
e 
dr
aw
n 
fr
om
 d
is
se
rt
at
io
n 
ab
st
ra
ct
s 
an
d 
th
e 
or
ig
in
al
 d
is
se
rt
at
io
n 
co
ul
d 
no
t b
e 
so
ur
ce
d)
. 
 
Interviewer personality, chronic accessibility and trait judgment accuracy             145 
 
 
 
Appendix B: Example Items from the Applicant Bio Rating Task 
'Reading' applicants' personalities 
Listed below are descriptions of five personality traits. Each description lists 
adjectives that describe people high and low on the trait. Please read each 
description carefully. You will use these descriptions in a subsequent rating 
activity.  
 
                                                                Behavior Description 
  Trait                                                 High (+)                                      Low (-)    
1. Agreeable 
 Altruistic 
 Humble  
 Trust people 
 Sceptical 
 Does not get involved with the 
problems of others 
2. Conscientious 
 Strong willed 
 Determined 
 Well-organized 
 Procrastinate 
 Unreliable 
 Not very methodical 
3. Extroversion 
 Likes people 
 Active 
 Warm 
 Reserved 
 Independent 
 Low need for thrills 
4. Open to experience 
 Open to new experiences 
 Curious 
 Imaginative 
 Appreciate art and beauty 
Find change difficult 
 Prefer to stick with the tried 
and true 
5. Neurotic 
 Anxious 
 Hostile 
 Self-conscious 
 Calm 
 Even-tempered 
 Handle themselves well in 
stressful situations 
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Instructions 
Next, we describe five interview applicants in terms of their personalities on each of the traits 
that were just described to you. Try your best to form an impression of each person’s 
personality within the workplace context. Please indicate the level of personality trait 
exhibited by each person by selecting a number from 1 to 5 (1 = low indication of trait; 5 = 
strong indication of trait). You may refer to the personality descriptions listed earlier. 
Person A 
 
Person A is not really interested in others and shows little concern for others’ 
problems. A also tends to insult people frequently. A doesn’t particularly like 
structure and only sometimes does things according to plan. At work, A wouldn’t 
necessarily be one to initiate conversations, but wouldn’t bottle up feelings either. 
This person sometimes comes up with workable ideas for doing things better, 
although doesn’t have a particularly good imagination. Person A is easily irritated 
and has frequent mood swings and often feels blue. A takes offence easily. 
 
Please rate Person A on each trait by making a selection in the appropriate circle: 
 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Agreeableness      
2. Conscientiousness      
3. Extroversion      
4. Openness to Experience      
5. Neuroticism      
 
 
Hypothetical Personality Profile (‘True Scores’) 
For interviewee Person A 
(the information below was not visible to participants) 
Person A – Neurotic Dominant 
Trait Level (1-5)  
Agreeableness 1 
Conscientiousness 2 
Extroversion  3 
Neuroticism 5 
Openness to Experience 3 
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Appendix C: Chronic Accessibility Measure (Higgins, 1982) 
 
People that You Know 
 
On this page describe five typical persons, using as many characteristics as you like 
to describe them. Use at least three word descriptions for each person. 
 
First, describe a person that you liked: 
………………………… ………………………… ………………………… 
………………………… ………………………… ………………………… 
………………………… ………………………… ………………………… 
Next, describe a person that you disliked: 
………………………… ………………………… ………………………… 
………………………… ………………………… ………………………… 
………………………… ………………………… ………………………… 
Next, describe a person that you frequently encountered: 
………………………… ………………………… ………………………… 
………………………… ………………………… ………………………… 
………………………… ………………………… ………………………… 
A type of person that you avoided: 
………………………… ………………………… ………………………… 
………………………… ………………………… ………………………… 
………………………… ………………………… ………………………… 
A type of person that you sought out (in other words, you looked for their 
company): 
………………………… ………………………… ………………………… 
………………………… ………………………… ………………………… 
………………………… ………………………… ………………………… 
  
148  Chapter 5 
Appendix D: Development of Applicant Vignettes and True Scores 
Vignette Development 
To design and develop the applicant vignettes that served as stimulus materials, we 
relied on best practice recommendations for Experimental Vignette Methodology 
(EVM), which consists of “presenting participants with carefully constructed and 
realistic scenarios to assess dependent variables… thereby enhancing experimental 
realism and also allowing researchers to manipulate and control independent 
variables, thereby simultaneously enhancing both internal and external validity” 
(Aguinis & Bradley, 2014, p. 351). EVM was considered suitable as EVM “allows 
researchers to include factors that are relevant to the research question while 
excluding those that might confound the results. This amount of control helps to test 
causal hypotheses that would otherwise be difficult.”(p. 357) Within EVM, we chose 
to use the ‘paper people approach’. In addition to being the most often used EVM 
approach, this method was is appropriate when the goal is to assess explicit 
responses and outcomes (Aguinis et al., 2014), such as rating accuracy in our study.  
Advantages of EVM. For our study purposes, there were various advantages of 
this method. First, a study that uses a fully-crossed design, where each participant 
views the same set of vignettes, can help the researcher to uncover the judgment 
processes and outcomes of an individual rater (Atzmüller & Steiner, 2010; Putka, Le, 
McCloy, & Diaz, 2008). Second, this approach allows for the presentation of the same 
stimuli to all participants and, therefore, helps control the potential confounding 
effect of irrelevant factors on judgments, such as interviewee race, gender, age, or 
attractiveness (Letzring, 2010; Sheppard, Goffin, Lewis, & Olson, 2011). To this end, 
we ensured that our target descriptions contained no reference to characteristics 
other than personality. For example, targets were referred to as ‘Person A’ and all 
descriptions contain neutral target descriptions related to personality only. Third, 
this method allowed us to control the level of immersion to maintain realism 
without introducing potential experimental ‘noise’ that accompanies video-stimuli. 
Finally, the use of text-based stimuli in accuracy studies has been associated with 
higher accuracy, compared to video- and live interpersonal interactions (Borkenau, 
et al., 2015). 
Targets’ Trait Profiles. We constructed a hypothetical personality profile for each 
target. For example, the trait profile for the applicant in the first vignette (‘Person A’) 
is described in Appendix B. In line with earlier studies (Byron, 2008) these profiles 
were developed with consideration of actual empirical correlations between 
personality traits (e.g., meta-analytic evidence of Big Five trait intercorrelations; 
Goldberg, et al., 2006) to ensure that the resulting profiles were realistic. An example 
of a profile for Target C is: agreeableness (4), conscientiousness (5), extraversion (3), 
neuroticism (or emotional stability) (2), and openness to experience (3). To ensure a 
balance of personality traits in the vignettes, each target was designed with a single 
dominant trait (e.g. Target A was neuroticism-dominant, or a ‘5’ on a scale of 1-5). 
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Finally, the next step was to populate each vignette stimulus with trait-related cues. 
For each applicant, we developed a descriptive paragraph (of about ten sentences in 
length) containing behavior descriptors (key words and phrases) from a database of 
Big Five descriptor terms that we compiled from published empirical research (e.g., 
Goldberg, 1990, and others; Hofstee, et al., 1992; John, 1990; Saucier & Goldberg, 
1996). For example, Person C46 was described as ‘At work, C is particularly detail-
oriented and always strives for perfection. C loves order and regularity.’ Also, 
‘However, C isn’t necessarily comfortable amongst strangers and avoids excessive 
attention.’ Where appropriate we inserted intensity descriptors (such as ‘always’, 
‘often’, ‘occasionally’, ‘sometimes’, and ‘hardly’) to denote the extent to which the 
target exhibited a particular personality dimension. 
Manipulation Check. It was important to establish whether the vignettes were 
adequate stimulus samples (Highhouse, 2009) of personality. In order to determine 
whether the hypothetical profiles were observable from the trait-cues that we 
inserted in each vignette we asked three professors in I-O psychology with 
knowledge of personality to rate them on each of the Big Five dimensions. Two-way, 
random effects intraclass correlations (ICC; Shrout & Fleiss, 1979) were conducted in 
order to ascertain the level of inter-rater reliability and agreement between subject 
matter experts’ ratings of the set of vignettes. As the ICC adjusts for chance 
agreement and systematic differences between raters it is often preferable to other 
indices of inter-rater reliability (Hoyt, 2010). Analysis of the agreement between 
professors’ ratings of the personality profiles showed acceptable (ICC = .75; 
Cicchetti, 1994) agreement that was higher than typical observer agreement for 
personality traits (see the following studies for reviews of observer agreement for 
personality trait judgments: Allik, Realo, Mõttus, Esko, et al., 2010; Allik, Realo, 
Mõttus, & Kuppens, 2010; Connelly & Ones, 2010; Mõttus, McCrae, Allik, & Realo, 
2014). As such, the vignettes were considered highly ‘judgeable’. To ensure that our 
applicant descriptions were realistic, we asked ten Masters students in IO-
psychology to provide realism ratings on a scale of 1 ‘totally unrealistic’ to 10 
‘completely realistic’. Across the five targets, the vignettes were rated as quite 
realistic (M = 8.8 out of 10, SD = 1.22). No realism ratings lower than 8 were received. 
                                                     
46 Alphabetic designators (e.g., ‘C’) were used as a non-descript labels for each target as we were 
concerned that providing a name that provides gender or ethnicity cues may affect respondents’ 
evaluations (Letzring, 2010). 
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Chapter 6 
Summary and discussion 
 
The current dissertation presents four studies investigating individual differences in the 
accuracy of judgments in subjective personnel selection measures. These individual 
differences are general mental ability, dispositional reasoning, Big Five personality traits, 
chronically accessible traits, and demographic factors. From the existing literature, little is 
known about why individual differences exist in judgment accuracy. In the study reported in 
the present dissertation, the characteristics of assessors were used as a vantage point to 
understand assessor accuracy. In this chapter, a concise summary of the main research 
findings is given, followed by a discussion to embed these findings in the literature. Finally, 
implications for practice and avenues for future research are carved out. 
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6.1 Summary of Main Findings 
In the introductory chapter, our main research question as a central theme for this 
dissertation was formulated as: 
To what extent do assessor constructs explain differences in their judgment 
accuracy in subjective rating measures used in personnel selection? 
In pursuit of answers to this question, four specific research questions (RQs) 
were raised that directed the studies presented in this dissertation. These related to 
the degree to which assessor constructs addressed in prior empirical literature (RQ1) 
and in the present study (RQ2-RQ4) are able to explain differences in assessors’ 
accuracy in judgments in personnel selection ratings. The broad collection of 
assessor constructs that were investigated in the respective studies in this 
dissertation are highlighted in Figure 6.1. 
Taken together, the research questions sought to determine whether there is 
empirical support for the theory-driven notion of the ‘good judge’ as a moderator of 
accuracy (see Figure 6.2), as predicted by the RAM (Funder, 1995, 1999, 2012). 
According to the RAM, it was proposed that so-called ‘good judges’ contribute to 
judgment accuracy (along with ‘good targets’, ‘good traits’, and ‘good information’). 
Judges are required to detect and use behavioral cues effectively in order to produce 
accurate judgments. Using the research questions as signposts, the main findings of 
the five studies are outlined next. 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Assessor individual differences framework and visualising the linkages between 
studies in the present dissertation. Adapted from Farr, J. L., & Tippins, N. T. (Eds.). (2010). 
Handbook of employee selection. New York, NY: Routledge. 
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Research Question 1: From a systematic review of the empirical HRM literature, 
which individual differences explain judgment accuracy in personnel selection, 
in other words, what is the profile of the good judge? 
As a starting point for subsequent empirical research, it was necessary to conduct a 
systematic review of the extant HRM literature base on individual differences in 
judgment accuracy. In Chapter 2, prior individual difference research was weighed 
to establish what we know, and do not yet know, about the profile of the good judge. 
To this end, empirical studies over more than 60 years were reviewed to identify, 
summarize, analyse and evaluate evidence in support of various individual 
differences thought to explain accuracy. In this review, the overall aim was to 
construct a profile of the ‘good judge’ and chart directions for future research on 
individual differences that may explain judgment accuracy. 
Our review showed that more is known about the ‘good judge’ than earlier 
thought (Funder, 1999; Guion, 1999). The review shows 126 individual effects 
reported in 48 works (published articles and unpublished dissertations and theses). 
The studies that met our inclusion criteria were conducted between 1953 and 2011. 
Of these, the majority were college studies (79.3%) with only a small proportion in 
field samples (14.9%) or mixed groups (5.8%). The mean sample size for the studies 
reviewed was approximately 166 participants (SD = 116; min = 44; max = 898). 
Apparently, the majority of studies were conducted in North America, although 
many studies did not reveal the location of the research. 
Our review results are summarized in Figure 6.2. Overall, empirical evidence 
suggests that cognitive factors appear to play a dominant and consistent role in 
judgment accuracy. For example, it appears that accurate assessors in HRM studies 
are not only more intelligent (i.e. they have higher general mental ability) but a few 
recent studies show they may also have higher dispositional reasoning. 
Dispositional reasoning is defined by Christiansen et al. [2005] as the complex 
understanding of others’ behaviors, traits, and situations’ potential to elicit traits into 
manifesting themselves. The effect sizes (uncorrected) for cognitive ability and 
dispositional reasoning predictors of judgment accuracy are in the moderate-to-large 
(Cohen, 1988) range. These findings support the view that cognitive ability enables 
cue utilization in the rating task encountered in personnel selection devices such as 
interviews. In contrast, the empirical research base suggests that accurate assessors 
do not necessarily share a prototypical personality type, that is, personality traits 
tended to be poor predictors (0 < r < .20; small effect size, Cohen, 1988) and 
inconsistent predictors of judgment accuracy. Our review showed that none of the 
broad Big Five traits were reliable predictors of accuracy outcomes in HRM studies. 
However, the review highlighted assessor constructs that hold potential for 
advancing understanding of individual differences in judgment accuracy. These 
constructs were addressed in subsequent empirical research studies – focal 
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constructs that were studied included dispositional reasoning (RQ2 and RQ3), as 
well as personality and chronically accessible personality traits (RQ4). 
 
Figure 6.2. A ‘Good Judge’ Model of Individual Differences in Judgment Accuracy. Solid arrows 
indicate relationships with empirical research support, whereas dotted arrows indicate 
relationships with limited/inconsistent research support. 
 
Research Question 2: How can dispositional reasoning be measured reliably and 
with measurement validity at the component level? 
In the aforementioned review chapter, it was determined that dispositional 
reasoning (Christiansen et al., 2005) may hold potential as a useful predictor of 
judgment accuracy in subjective rating methods. Dispositional reasoning was earlier 
defined as complex knowledge and understanding of traits, behaviors, and the 
potential of situations to manifest traits into behaviors (Christiansen et al., 2005). 
According to the dispositional reasoning framework (see Figure 6.3), interviewer 
judgment accuracy may depend on three components, namely trait induction (the 
ability to know how traits manifest themselves in behavior), trait extrapolation (an 
understanding of how traits and their behavioral manifestations naturally co-vary), 
and trait contextualization (the ability to identify situations that are relevant to 
different traits). 
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Figure 6.3. Understanding the components of dispositional reasoning: trait induction, trait 
extrapolation and trait contextualization. 
 
Although dispositional reasoning was initially conceptualized (Christiansen, et 
al. 2005) as a broad set of three theoretically distinguishable components (induction, 
extrapolation, and contextualization), insight into the suggested factor structure of 
dispositional reasoning has been hampered by a lack of reliable subscale scores to 
measure the components. As a result, earlier studies (e.g. Christiansen et al., 2005; 
Powell & Goffin, 2009) have not been able to test the internal validity of the 
component-view of dispositional reasoning. By implication, it was not possible to 
further investigate the individual components in new studies. 
In Chapter 3, the internal componential structure of dispositional reasoning 
was discussed. We addressed the need for a component-level measure of 
dispositional reasoning by developing47 the revised interpersonal judgment 
inventory (RIJI) (De Kock et al., 2015) to yield reliable component scores. The 
component measures were then administered to two samples drawn from different 
populations of assessors (managers, N = 160; psychology students, N = 161) in order 
to test competing models of underlying factor structure of dispositional reasoning 
scores. These groups represented parts of the pool of assessors who typically receive 
rater training in HRM (Krause & Thornton, 2009). After data collection, we 
compared a general factor model (M1), a three-component model (M2), as well as a 
second-order model (M3), which combines three components (at level 1) with a 
higher-order general dispositional reasoning factor (at level 2). These analyses were 
conducted to seek evidence of internal measurement validity of the revised measure. 
Furthermore, as the measure was administered to different assessor types, it was 
                                                     
47 The development of the measure is described in detail in Chapter 3. For logical reasons, the factor 
analytic study (Chapter 2) was conducted before the external validity study reported in Chapter 3. 
Trait 1
Behavior 1
Person
Trait 2 Trait 3
Behavior 2 Behavior 3 Behavior 4 Behavior 7Behavior 6Behavior 5 Behavior 8 Behavior 9
Extrapolation
Contextualization
Extrapolation
Situation Situation
Contextualization
156  Chapter 6 
 
possible to compare the factor structures underlying the dispositional reasoning 
measure in these groups.  
Results showed that the RIJI (De Kock et al., 2015) showed reliable and 
measurement valid scores in both samples that were tested. The confirmatory factor 
analysis supported the three-component theoretical structure proposed by 
Christiansen et al. (2005), but this model was not invariant between the manager and 
psychology student groups. Moreover, a hierarchical model of dispositional 
reasoning (with a higher-order general latent factor, influencing three lower-order 
specific components) showed good fit in the combined sample, did not fit 
significantly worse than a three-component model, showed acceptable fit in both 
manager and student samples, but showed only configural invariance between these 
groups. Together, these results show acceptable measurement properties of the 
dispositional reasoning measure in the populations that we sampled from, namely 
managers and psychology students. 
Research Question 3: Does dispositional reasoning meet the classic criteria for an 
intelligence measure, considering the relationship between interviewers’ 
dispositional reasoning components, general mental ability, personality, and 
their judgment accuracy for rating interview dimensions? 
The systematic review of empirical studies reported in Chapter 2 identified 
dispositional reasoning as a promising individual difference construct that might aid 
further attempts to explain judgment accuracy in personnel selection. In Chapter 4, 
we took an in-depth look at dispositional reasoning as a predictor of interview 
judgment accuracy. The present study departed from earlier dispositional reasoning 
research in two ways. First, it took a componential view of dispositional reasoning, 
that is, it explored the role of the subcomponents of trait induction, trait 
extrapolation and trait contextualization in predicting accuracy. To this end, we 
extensively revised an earlier measure of dispositional reasoning, the interpersonal 
judgment inventory (Christiansen, et al., 2005) to yield reliable subscale scores. The 
measure was administered, along with other individual difference measures, 
including general mental ability and personality traits, to a field sample (N = 146) of 
mid-level managers in a police services organization. At the same time, respondents 
completed measures of general mental ability and personality, as well as a judgment 
accuracy task consisting of rating high-structure videotaped interviews of eight 
applicants. 
By studying dispositional reasoning at the component level, it was possible to 
address two issues. First, we wanted to determine the nature of dispositional 
reasoning as a construct. The question that was raised and tested here was, “Is there 
enough evidence to support the view of dispositional reasoning as an intelligence, or 
not?” To address this question, we tested whether dispositional reasoning meets 
several conceptual and empirical criteria (Carroll, 1993; Flanagan, et al., 1997; Mayer, 
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et al., 1999). A corollary of this series of tests was that it also yielded evidence of 
construct validity issues by indicating the nomological placement of dispositional 
reasoning and its components (induction, extrapolation and contextualization) 
within an assessor individual differences framework. 
Results of this study suggested that the dispositional reasoning components 
generally correspond to the characteristics of an intelligence measure as they broadly 
adhered to the conceptual and correlation criteria that we tested. First, the 
components converged with one another and with general mental ability, reflecting 
evidence of positive manifold (Horn & Cattell, 1966). Second, the components also 
predicted (.14 < r < .33; uncorrected) our accuracy criterion, namely interview 
judgment accuracy. In addition, the components showed incremental validity (with 
small effect) (Cohen, 1988) to general mental ability in predicting accuracy, and 
offered evidence of discriminant validity with personality constructs. In short, these 
results provided evidence for a nomological network with dispositional reasoning 
positioned as a form of intelligence. That is, our results provide early support that 
dispositional reasoning may be a specific mental ability that good judges employ to 
process behavioral information in selection interviews. In the study reported here, 
managers who were better at extrapolation and contextualization specifically were 
more accurate judges of interview dimensions than those with inaccurate implicit 
personality theories (low extrapolation) and poor understanding of trait activation 
(low contextualization). The induction component seemed to be a less important 
contributor to interview judgment accuracy, suggesting that knowledge of which 
traits are indicated be particular behaviors may not play a major role in judgment 
accuracy in the high-structure interviews that we used. Further replication of these 
findings is necessary, however. 
Research question 4: Would judges’ personality traits and their chronically 
accessible traits predict trait-specific personality judgment accuracy? 
Our final research question departed from the cognitive-constructs theme of 
Chapters 3 and 4. In Chapter 5, attention shifted to assessors’ personality-related 
characteristics as predictors of their trait judgment accuracy. Our earlier review of 
individual difference predictors of accuracy (see Chapter 2) concluded that 
personality traits compared relatively poorly to cognitive factors in how well they 
explain variance in accuracy measures, despite their potential theoretical relevance 
to judgment tasks. We argued that poor support that personality traits have received 
as predictors of personality judgment accuracy may have resided in the fact that 
they generally used trait-generic accuracy criteria, with poor conceptual alignment 
between the judge’s respective personality traits and an accuracy criterion that is 
generic across traits. At the same time, emerging research (Allik, Realo, Mõttus, & 
Kuppens, 2010) indicates that traits differ in terms of how accurately they can be 
judged. Taken together, these arguments build the case for the use of trait-specific 
accuracy criterion measures. To address this section of the literature, Chapter 5 
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adopted a trait-level approach to accuracy: we calculated accuracy criterion 
measures separately for each of the Big Five personality traits that research 
participants had to judge. As emerging research findings suggest that the self may be 
an important basis from which judges form impressions of others (Alicke, et al., 
2005), we hypothesized that trait expertise for judging specific traits may emanate 
from the interviewer’s own traits, that is, by holding high levels of the trait being 
judged. Stated differently, perhaps assessors are better at judging traits they are 
elevated on, which would be the case when ‘it takes one to know one’. The RAM 
(Funder, 1999) supports this idea, as cue detection and cue utilization may be easier 
for traits with which interviewers are more familiar if these traits are part of their 
own personality profile. Drawing on construct accessibility theory (Higgins, 2012), 
we hypothesized that trait expertise may arise from the heightened salience of 
interviewers’ own traits in their perceptual filters, that is, through their chronically 
accessible traits. For instance, a person with conscientiousness as an accessible trait 
would tend to describe others more in conscientiousness-related descriptors than for 
other traits. To address this research question, a self-report inventory measure of 
personality was administered along with a personality judgment task in two 
separate studies (Study 1: students, N = 183; Study 2: managers, N = 223). In addition, 
respondents in our field sample (Study 2) completed an open-ended free-response 
measure of construct accessibility (Higgins, 1982), from which we could derive their 
accessible Big Five traits. To our knowledge, no earlier studies have investigated the 
relationship between interviewers’ chronically accessible traits, their own traits, and 
trait-level rating accuracy. 
The results of the final empirical study revealed that being elevated on a trait 
(for example, ‘being a very outgoing person’, indicative of extraversion) (Goldberg, 
1992) may not necessarily make one more adept at judging that trait. For example, 
extraverts in our studies were not better than introverts in detecting and using 
extroverted-related behavior cues in the target stimuli we presented to our 
participants. 
Furthermore, our results replicated those of earlier studies (e.g., Borman, 1979; 
Borman & Hallam, 1991; Christiansen, et al., 2005; Hjelle, 1969; Lippa & Dietz, 2000; 
Powell & Goffin, 2009; Vogt & Colvin, 2003) by finding that interviewers’ personality 
traits did not predict their personality trait judgment accuracy. Even when using 
trait-level accuracy measures in our study, we did not find an empirical link between 
assessor personality traits and accuracy. However, interviewers who were more 
likely to describe others in terms of openness to experience and extraversion were 
also more accurate at judging these traits in others, lending partial support to our 
hypothesis that trait chronic accessibility may predict trait judgment accuracy for 
certain traits.   
Summary and discussion  159 
 
 
 
6.2 Discussion, Practical Implications, and Future Research 
 
The main purpose of the present study was to extend the empirical literature about 
potential individual differences explaining assessor judgment accuracy in personnel 
selection. As subjective rating methods that utilize assessors (e.g. interviews or ACs) 
remain at the core of modern personnel selection programmes (Dipboye, et al., 2012; 
Ryan, et al., 1999) a closer look at assessor factors that explain rating accuracy 
outcomes was warranted. At the same time, calls for a better understanding of how 
assessor constructs (Jones & Born, 2008; Landy & Farr, 1980; Lievens, et al., 2009; 
Nathan & Alexander, 1985) may affect rating quality have been largely left 
unanswered. As such, the field of HRM still knows relatively little about what makes 
a good judge. If individual differences that consistently predict accuracy could be 
found, it would support the practice of screening assessors on measures of these 
constructs, or to use them in assessor training and development interventions. In the 
following sections, the main research findings will be synthesized and embedded in 
the extant literature. Furthermore, practical implications and directions for future 
research will be carved out. 
Cognitive Factors 
In three of the four research studies reported on in this dissertation, cognitive 
predictors of judgment accuracy in personnel selection received considerable 
attention. Overall, empirical evidence suggested that cognitive factors play a 
dominant and consistent role in judgment accuracy. For example, the good judge in 
our research was intelligent (i.e. high cognitive ability) and also had well-developed 
understanding of others’ behaviors, traits, and situational activation of traits (i.e. 
higher dispositional reasoning) (Christiansen et al., 2005). Both these constructs 
showed consistent small to medium effects (uncorrected .14 < r < .33) (Cohen, 1988) 
with our accuracy measures. It must be pointed out that the effect size for overall 
dispositional reasoning as a predictor of interviewer judgment accuracy in our study 
(uncorrected r = .34; moderate) was not as large as the effect size (r = .42) reported in 
Christiansen et al. (2005). Nevertheless, our results suggest that better social 
information processing allow accurate assessors to process, store and recall targets’ 
behavior better than poor assessors are able to. Our systematic review of the 
individual differences literature shows that effect sizes for cognitive ability factors 
overall are moderate (and sometimes large) and these appear to be relatively 
consistent. The important role of cognitive factors in judgment accuracy is logical: 
the accuracy of interpersonal judgments in personnel selection devices relies heavily 
on cognitive processes (DeNisi, et al., 1984; Lance, et al., 2004) and the individual 
differences that drive them (Jones & Born, 2008). 
In Chapters 3 and 4, two studies were reported with dispositional reasoning as 
focal construct. In the first (Chapter 3), we were able to explore the internal construct 
validity of our revised measure of dispositional reasoning (RIJI) (De Kock et al., 
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2015) by assessing its factor structure. In the second investigation, we built on these 
findings by conducting empirical tests of dispositional reasoning against classic 
criteria for an intelligence measure (Chapter 4). Results showed that together, trait 
induction, trait extrapolation and trait contextualization are more than likely to be 
specific intelligence measures that reside in the social-cognitive domain. Together, 
these components also predicted rating accuracy when controlling for general 
mental ability. Dispositional reasoning components were also relatively 
uncontaminated with personality as our analyses revealed discriminant validity of 
the components with personality measures.  
In summary, our results suggest that dispositional reasoning may be a useful 
predictor of judgment accuracy of interview dimensions in the field. In doing so our 
findings replicate those of earlier investigations (Christiansen, et al., 2005; Powell & 
Goffin, 2009) showing the utility of dispositional reasoning in explaining rating 
accuracy outcomes. When embedding the results of our study in the growing 
literature on dispositional reasoning, our component-approach may add a new angle 
to the study of this construct as a predictor of judgment accuracy in personnel 
selection ratings. 
The conclusion that dispositional reasoning resembles the characteristics of an 
intelligence construct is underlined by our confirmatory factor analysis results 
(Chapter 3) – the factor structure underlying dispositional reasoning scores from our 
study appears well-represented as a hierarchical model, that is, one with an 
underlying general factor influencing the components. In doing so, the internal 
composition of dispositional reasoning observed in the results of our analysis 
follows in the footsteps of intelligence constructs (Carroll, 1993, 2003) that are often 
constituted in different strata. Taken together, our two studies on dispositional 
reasoning built a case for it as nomologically placed squarely in the cognitive ability 
domain. As a result of its stability as predictor of accuracy outcomes, the prominence 
of dispositional reasoning and its components in individual differences research can 
only grow further. 
Regarding the role of specific components of dispositional reasoning, our 
results reported in Chapter 4 point out that interview dimension judgment accuracy 
may depend more upon understanding how traits co-vary (extrapolation) and how 
situations affect trait expression (contextualization), than on knowing which traits 
are signalled by behavioral cues (induction). For example, the relative weights 
analysis confirmed that extrapolation and contextualization exerted the strongest 
influence in predicting accuracy. Practically, this means that interviewers who are 
better able to fill in missing information about an interviewee by extrapolating 
information about the interviewee’s other traits (using their implicit personality 
theories) were also more accurate judges of interview dimensions. Although we are 
not suggesting that interviewers should deviate from strict reliance on observable 
behavior to infer the characteristics of the interviewee (Gatewood & Field, 2011), our 
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results suggest that more developed implicit personality theories may assist the 
interviewer to develop a cohesive mental picture of the interviewee.  
Personality Factors 
Neither our review of the extant empirical literature nor our empirical studies 
reported on in this dissertation could find support for the view that personality traits 
are important in interpersonal judgment. There is, however, room for more work to 
explore more complex hypotheses. Personality may be more complexly related to 
accuracy, for example as a moderator of the effect of cognitive variables on judgment 
accuracy (e.g. Christiansen et al., 2005). Or, personality may influence accuracy 
indirectly through its effect on the assessors’ behavior during the interview. For 
example, Letzring (2008) reported that accurate judges used certain behaviors 
related to cue elicitation. It is likely that these behaviors are a function of the judges’ 
personality, but why traits themselves do not seem to predict accuracy, is a question 
that remains unanswered. 
In our final study (Chapter 5), we introduced chronically accessible personality 
traits as potential predictors of trait-level accuracy. We expected that interviewers 
would be more accurate at reading traits in others if they had elevated levels on 
these traits themselves. Stated otherwise, we wanted to determine whether it truly 
‘takes one to know one’ in personality judgments. As chronically accessible traits 
represent more salient behavior information in the judges’ perceptual schema 
(Higgins, 2012), we reasoned that interviewers would be more adept at detecting 
and using behavior cues that represent these traits. In turn, the enhanced cue 
detection and utilization this affords should promote accuracy (Funder, 2012). 
Our hypothesized predictive, incremental and mediating role for chronic 
accessibility (in conjunction with personality) in judgment accuracy received only 
partial support. Openness to experience and extraversion accessibility predicted trait 
judgment accuracy for the same traits. But this finding did not extend to the 
remaining Big Five traits – accessibility for agreeableness, conscientiousness, and 
neuroticism did not predict accuracy for corresponding traits. As such, trait 
construct accessibility may contribute to interpreting cues for the same trait, but 
much more research is needed before a firm conclusion can be reached. Further, 
accessibility for openness, emotional stability and agreeableness appeared to spill 
over from the interviewers’ own corresponding personality traits: for example, 
interviewers high on agreeableness also tended to describe others in agreeableness-
related terms. Taken together, our finding lends limited additional support for the 
view that the self may influence how we judge others (Dunning & McElwee, 1995; 
Motowidlo, et al., 2006). 
At the broadest level, the research findings presented in this dissertation are in 
line with theories of judgment accuracy (Funder, 1995, 2012) that suggest that 
assessors are an integral link in the chain of factors that lead to eventual accuracy. 
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We have synthesized the prior literature into a comprehensive ‘good judge’-model 
(see Figure 6.2) of individual differences in judgment accuracy. Further, our model 
outlines clusters of assessor constructs linked to specific judgment processes (cue 
detection and cue utilization) important for accurate judgment. 
Recommendations for Practice 
There are in our view three promising ways to advance practices used for rater 
training and selection, given the findings of the present study. The first is the 
identification of judges on the basis of constructs that can predict accuracy. In 
contrast to earlier scepticism that empirical evidence would be found of individual 
differences that predict accuracy (Funder, 1999; Guion, 2011), it appears there are 
indeed assessor constructs that can consistently predict accuracy. These appear to lie 
mostly in the cognitive domain (e.g., Christiansen et al., 2005; De Kock et al., 2015). 
Our results suggest that organizations may consider using cognitive ability and 
dispositional reasoning measures to select raters, as they may predict judgment 
accuracy in personnel selection and could therefore be considered ‘job-relevant’. In 
addition, dispositional reasoning component scores are job-related and may be 
useful to screen interviewers.  
A second potential way to apply our findings to advance rating practices is to 
consider ways to develop assessor constructs that predict accuracy. But first we need 
to know whether these constructs can be developed. The implicit question is 
whether or not a good judge is born, or made. Dispositional reasoning, for example, 
broadly adheres to the criteria for an intelligence measure. Early attempts to enhance 
one of its components (induction) experimentally have been unsuccessful in 
laboratory conditions (Powell & Goffin, 2009). So, before we can recommend that 
dispositional reasoning training be used to enhance rating quality, we need 
empirical evidence to support its efficacy. Another potentially useful training 
approach may lie in interventions that focus on each component of dispositional 
reasoning (Christiansen et al., 2005). Currently, most rater training is based on frame 
of reference training (Roch, et al., 2012; Woehr & Huffcutt, 1994) – this type of 
training does not typically entail the contextualization and extrapolation 
components, but generally only the induction component. 
Finally, given that the effects we observed for the predictive and incremental 
validity of judges’ personality and chronically accessible traits were generally small 
and somewhat divided, it would be too early to make recommendations for practice, 
pending further research corroboration. At the very least, our results provide early 
indications that it may not ‘take one to know one’ as a judge of personality in 
interviews, that is, in our study interviewers were just as effective to infer the 
personality traits of targets that did not share their own (interviewers’) traits. 
However, we suggest that practitioners consider using the chronic accessibility 
measure presented here to make interviewers aware of their accessible traits and 
potential blind spots for inaccessible traits when interpreting others’ behavior. 
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Future Research Directions 
Our series of studies have brought a number of potential future research directions 
to the fore. The respective studies reported on in this dissertation have generated a 
comprehensive list of research questions. 
A few of the more promising questions are outlined next. For example, there 
are some questions about dispositional reasoning to be addressed in future research 
work. Our research could not test all the criteria for dispositional reasoning as an 
intelligence measure and, therefore, studies are needed to determine whether 
dispositional reasoning increases with age (Mayer, et al., 1999). Furthermore, the 
nomological network surrounding dispositional reasoning can be explored further. 
Consider the conceptually related constructs of emotional intelligence and social 
intelligence (Lievens & Chan, 2010). We call for more studies that would test the 
relationships between dispositional reasoning and social and emotional intelligence. 
These studies could also try to disentangle the relative importance of these 
constructs in predicting accuracy. 
Questions also remain about the role of the rating context in assessors’ reliance 
on individual difference constructs. For example, would the components of 
dispositional reasoning relate differentially to accuracy criteria if the judgment 
context were altered? In one of our studies, a high-structure interview was used. 
When standardized rating materials, instructions and criteria are provided (typical 
in high-structure interviews) judges are encouraged to use normative theories 
(relating to job-related dimensions) to interpret behavior, rather than personal, 
idiosyncratic theories (Uggerslev & Sulsky, 2008), implying that implicit personality 
theories (i.e. extrapolation) would be irrelevant in high-structure rating tasks. Also, 
when standardized rating materials (e.g. behavioral checklists) specify which 
interview dimensions are implied by certain behaviors, the role of the induction 
component could be diminished. In summary, aspects of the rating context may 
potentially act as boundary conditions for the relative importance of dispositional 
reasoning components in judgment accuracy. For example, dispositional reasoning 
may predict judgment accuracy stronger in rating tasks that are highly ambiguous 
and more complex (DeNisi, et al., 1984; Lance, et al., 2004), than in rating tasks that 
are simple and relatively unambiguous, because in the former, assessors need to rely 
heavily on constructs that may facilitate cue detection and cue interpretation. We call 
for more research that explores how situations may moderate which components of 
dispositional reasoning influence judgment accuracy. 
Accurate interviewers in one of the studies reported on in this dissertation 
were also able to understand how traits are activated by situations, in line with trait-
activation theory (Tett & Guterman, 2000). In doing so, results add to the growing 
literature base (e.g., Jansen et al., 2013; Rockstuhl, Ang, Ng, Lievens, & Van Dyne, 
2015) that shows the importance of judging situations in personnel selection. In fact, 
situation assessment may be inextricably linked to dispositional inferences, as 
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assessors may do both at the same time (Krull & Erickson, 1995). Along these lines, it 
would make sense to investigate assessors’ ability to read and infer the 
characteristics of situations as potential predictors of judgment accuracy. 
Finally, we have argued that the prominence of cognitive factors as predictors 
of judgment accuracy may stem from the rationale that cognitive factors allow 
assessors to deal with the inherent complexity of the judgment task in HRM ratings 
(DeNisi, et al., 1984; Lance, et al., 2004). As such, there is a strong conceptual overlap 
between the predictor and criterion space (Schmitt & Chan, 1998). Future studies 
that share our interest in uncovering what makes a good judge in subjective ratings 
in personnel selection may benefit from taking a cue from these findings. If we are to 
have any success, we need to stay close to understanding the rating task and 
judgment processes that facilitate accuracy. 
6.3 Conclusion 
 
In closing, the research reported here sought to add to the literature on what makes a 
good judge in HRM. A review of the empirical literature shows that our 
understanding of assessor constructs that explain judgment accuracy has come a 
long way. Assessors that produce accurate ratings of others may share a number of 
characteristics, and cognitive factors are likely to continue playing the principal role 
in individual difference research investigating judgment accuracy. The studies 
reported on in this dissertation shed light on the role and nature of dispositional 
reasoning in interviewer judgment accuracy. In addition, we presented evidence in 
support of the view that dispositional reasoning may form part of the cognitive 
ability domain of constructs. Moreover, results from two of our studies showed that 
dispositional reasoning has distinguishable subcomponents, including induction, 
extrapolation and contextualization. Assessor constructs related to personality were 
also investigated in our systematic review of earlier research, as well as in two of our 
empirical studies. Our introduction of trait-specific accuracy criteria and chronic trait 
accessibility as a predictor did not yield promising results. On the whole, our 
findings corroborated the research base by indicating that personality-related factors 
may play a supporting role in the assessor’s repertoire of constructs utilized in the 
judgment task. Although we are coming closer to understanding the assessor 
constructs that shape judgment accuracy, there are aspects of assessor individual 
differences that have hardly been touched on. Together, studies of these constructs 
hold potential to further enhance the quality of assessment ratings in HRM. 
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De personeelsselectie leunt gewoonlijk zwaar op assessoren als beoordelaars van 
sollicitant-kenmerken. Assessoren zijn bijvoorbeeld interviewers, beoordelaars 
tijdens assessment center opdrachten, en managers die prestaties van sollicitanten 
tijdens arbeidsproeven evalueren. Organisaties gebruiken assessoren veelal om een 
oordeel over de prestaties van sollicitanten tijdens selectieprocedures te verkrijgen. 
Deze beoordelingen zijn belangrijk voor besluiten in personeelsselectie met 
betrekking tot het aanbieden van ander werk of promoties. Gezien hun belangrijke 
rol in de beoordeling van huidig en toekomstig personeel, is het opmerkelijk dat er 
over de rol van assessoren in personeelsselectie tot op heden nog niet veel 
duidelijkheid bestaat (zie ook Guion & Gibson, 1988; Hough & Oswald, 2000; Sackett 
& Lievens, 2008). Hoewel er wel bekend is dat assessoren onderling verschillen in de 
accuraatheid van hun beoordelingen (Borman, 1977; Van Iddekinge, Sager, Burnfield 
& Heffner, 2006) weten we nog maar weinig over de redenen voor deze verschillen. 
Dit proefschrift bestudeert de assessor. Meer specifiek wordt nagegaan of bepaalde 
kenmerken van assessoren de variatie in accuraatheid tussen assessoren kunnen 
verklaren. Anders gezegd, in welke mate kunnen kenmerken van assessoren de 
verschillen in accuraatheid bij hun beoordelingen tijdens personeelsselectie 
verklaren? 
Voor dit proefschrift is hiertoe gebruik gemaakt van de literatuur over sociale 
cognitie en van modellen over de accuraatheid van beoordelingen (bijv. Funder, 
1999). In vier studies die hier beschreven worden is uitgegaan van het zogeheten 
‘Realistic Accuracy Model’ (RAM; Funder, 1955, 1999, 2012). Dit model stelt dat de 
zogenaamde ‘goede beoordelaar’ (the good judge) bijdraagt aan een nauwkeurige 
beoordeling. Een ‘goede beoordelaar’ herkent bepaalde gedragingen van 
sollicitanten en gebruikt deze om tot nauwkeurige beoordelingen te komen. De 
veronderstelling van de in dit proefschrift gepresenteerde onderzoeken is dat 
bepaalde kenmerken van assessoren deze beoordelingsprocessen kunnen 
verbeteren. 
Een geïntegreerd profiel van de ‘goede beoordelaar’ dat is gebaseerd op 
wetenschappelijk onderzoek kan bovendien bijdragen aan het verbeteren van de 
selectie en opleiding van assessoren. Om op die behoefte in te gaan, worden in dit 
proefschrift vier studies beschreven. Op basis van eerdere literatuur zijn er 
verscheidene kenmerken van assessoren geïdentificeerd als mogelijke voorspellers 
voor de accuraatheid van door hen gegeven beoordelingen van sollicitanten. Deze 
kenmerken zijn onderzocht in drie empirische studies. Het gaat om de volgende 
kenmerken: algemene intelligentie, dispositioneel redeneren, de Big Five-
persoonlijkheidskenmerken, chronisch toegankelijke persoonlijkheidskenmerken en 
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demografische factoren. Deze kenmerken zullen hieronder in de bespreking van de 
desbetreffende studie worden uiteengezet. 
Overzicht van Empirische Bevindingen 
Voorafgaand aan en als uitgangspunt voor de drie empirische studies is eerst de 
literatuur met betrekking tot individuele verschillen in de accuraatheid van de 
beoordeling van anderen systematisch bestudeerd (Hoofdstuk 2). Eerdere 
onderzoeken zijn daartoe beoordeeld om na te gaan wat we weten en wat we nog 
niet weten over het profiel van de ‘goede beoordelaar’. Voor dit doel werden 
empirische studies over een periode van meer dan 60 jaar (van 1953 tot 2015) 
geanalyseerd en geëvalueerd om zo verscheidene individuele verschillen te 
identificeren die de accuraatheid van ander-beoordelingen zouden kunnen 
verklaren. Het doel van deze review was om een profiel van de ‘goede beoordelaar’ 
te construeren en aanwijzingen in kaart te brengen voor toekomstig onderzoek over 
individuele verschillen die de accuraatheid in ander-beoordelingen zouden kunnen 
verklaren. 
De review toonde aan dat er meer bekend is over de ‘goede beoordelaar' dan eerder 
werd gedacht (zie Funder, 1999; Guion, 1999). De review omvat 126 individuele 
effecten uit 48 gepubliceerde artikelen en ongepubliceerde proefschriften en theses. 
Uit de review bleek dat cognitieve factoren een dominante en systematische rol 
spelen in de accuraatheid van beoordelingen. Zo lieten oudere studies zien dat 
accurate assessoren niet alleen intelligenter zijn (dat wil zeggen dat ze een groter 
verstandelijk vermogen hebben) maar recente studies (Christiansen, Wolcott-
Burnam, Janovics, Burns, & Quirk, 2005; Powell & Goffin, 2009) toonden ook aan dat 
zij waarschijnlijk over een groter vermogen tot dispositioneel redeneren beschikken. 
Dispositioneel redeneren wordt gedefinieerd als het begrijpen van 
persoonlijkheidseigenschappen van anderen door het verband tussen deze 
eigenschappen en gedrag in te zien, de onderlinge verbanden tussen 
persoonlijkheidskenmerken te begrijpen, en door te hebben in hoeverre specifieke 
situaties relevant zijn voor het kunnen beoordelen van persoonlijkheidskenmerken 
(Christiansen et al., 2005). Algemene intelligentie en dispositioneel redeneren bleken 
behoorlijk goede tot sterke voorspellers te zijn van accuraatheid in de beoordeling 
van anderen (Cohen, 1988). In contrast hiermee liet de review zien dat accurate 
assessoren niet noodzakelijkerwijs een specifieke persoonlijkheid hebben. 
Persoonlijkheidskenmerken van assessoren bleken relatief zwakke (0 < r < .20; een 
klein effect, Cohen, 1988) en inconsequente voorspellers te zijn van de accuraatheid 
van ander-beoordelingen. De review toonde aan dat geen van de Big-Five 
persoonlijkheidskenmerken betrouwbare voorspellers waren van accuraatheid. 
Hoofdstukken 3, 4 en 5 rapporteren empirisch onderzoek naar specifieke individuele 
verschilkenmerken die naar voren kwamen uit de review. Alle studies zijn gedaan 
bij Zuid-Afrikaanse organisaties. 
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In hoofdstukken 3 en 4 stond dispositioneel redeneren centraal (Christiansen et al., 
2005). Volgens het framework van dispositioneel redeneren kan de accuraatheid van 
de beoordeling door de interviewer afhangen van drie factoren, namelijk inductie uit 
persoonlijkheidskenmerken (het vermogen om te weten hoe persoonlijkheidskenmerken 
zich in gedrag tonen), extrapolatie uit persoonlijkheidskenmerken (het begrijpen hoe 
persoonlijkheidskenmerken en de gedragsuitingen ervan kunnen co-variëren), en 
persoonlijkheidskenmerk contextualisatie (het vermogen om situaties die relevant zijn 
voor verschillende persoonlijkheidskenmerken te identificeren). 
Ter illustratie: Iemand die een hoog vermogen tot persoonlijkheidskenmerk-inductie 
heeft, weet bijvoorbeeld dat een kennis die veel praat (i.e., waargenomen gedrag) 
hoogstwaarschijnlijk ook extravert zal zijn (i.e., onderliggende 
persoonlijkheidskenmerk; Goldberg, 1992). Een persoon met een hoog 
extrapolatievermogen is zich bewust van het feit dat mensen die eerlijk zijn, over het 
algemeen ook betrouwbaar zijn (Goldberg, 1992). Beoordelaars met hoge niveaus 
van persoonlijkheidskenmerk-contextualisatie  begrijpen de mate waarin situaties 
gunstig kunnen zijn voor het tot uitdrukking brengen van een 
persoonlijkheidskenmerk. Persoonlijkheidskenmerk-contextualisatie stelt een 
beoordelaar bijvoorbeeld in staat om in te zien dat extraversie zich eerder 
manifesteert in een situatie waarin de persoon omringd is door anderen, dan in een 
situatie waarin de persoon alleen is. 
Hoewel het concept dispositioneel redeneren aanvankelijk opgevat werd als 
opgebouwd uit deze drie theoretisch te onderscheiden componenten, werd het 
inzicht in de voorgestelde factorstructuur van dispositioneel redeneren belemmerd 
door een gebrek aan betrouwbare subschaalscores om de componenten te kunnen 
meten. Als gevolg hiervan was het in eerdere studies niet mogelijk om de 
verschillende componenten te testen en de individuele componenten empirisch 
verder te onderzoeken. 
Vanwege het ontbreken van een meetinstrument voor het betrouwbaar kunnen 
meten van componentscores van dispositioneel redeneren is de ‘Revised 
Interpersonal Judgment Inventory’ (RIJI) ontwikkeld (voor bijzonderheden over de 
herziening van het originele meetinstrument, zie De Kock, Lievens, & Born, 2015). 
Hoofdstuk 3 behandelt de interne meeteigenschappen van de RIJI. De 
componentmetingen werden gedaan bij twee steekproeven uit twee verschillende 
groepen assessoren (managers, N = 160; psychologiestudenten, N = 161) met het doel 
om verschillende alternatieve modellen voor de onderliggende factorstructuur van 
dispositioneel redeneren te toetsen. Een algemeen factor-model (M1), een drie-
componenten-model (M2), en een tweede-orde-model (M3) werden met elkaar 
vergeleken. Het laatste model combineert de drie componenten met een algemene 
hoger-order factor van dispositioneel redeneren. Doordat het meetinstrument bij 
verschillende assessoren typen (managers en psychologiestudenten) was afgenomen, 
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kon de aan dispositioneel redeneren onderliggende factorstructuur tussen beide 
groepen worden vergelijken. 
De resultaten toonden aan dat in beide geteste groepen de RIJI een betrouwbaar en 
valide meetinstrument was. De factoranalyse onderschreef de drie-componenten-
theoretische structuur die door Christiansen et al. (2005) was voorgesteld, maar het 
model was niet metrisch invariant tussen de groep managers en de groep 
psychologiestudenten. Het niet kunnen aantonen van metrische invariantie (de 
factor ladingen bleken niet gelijk tussen de twee groepen) was voldoende reden om 
geen verdere parameter beperkingen te toetsen, iets wat voor het bepalen van 
preciezere invariantie niveaus vereist is. Het hiërarchische model van dispositioneel 
redeneren (met een algemeen latente hoger-orde factor die de drie specifieke 
componenten van lagere orde – inductie, extrapolatie, en contextualisatie – 
beïnvloedt) liet in de gecombineerde steekproef een goede fit (passing) zien. Deze fit 
was niet significant slechter dan de fit van het drie-componenten-model. Hiermee 
werd ondersteuning gevonden voor het idee van dispositioneel redeneren als een 
hiërarchisch geordend construct. Het hiërarchische model toonde voorts een 
aanvaardbare fit in zowel de manager- als de studentensteekproeven, maar het 
toonde alleen configurale invariantie tussen deze groepen. Als meetinvariantie niet 
vastgesteld kan worden, dan kunnen (verschillen in) scoregemiddelden tussen de 
groepen in dispositioneel redeneren niet zomaar vergeleken en geïnterpreteerd 
worden. Het is dan namelijk niet duidelijk of de verschillen in scores toe te schrijven 
zijn aan de werkelijke verschillen tussen de twee groepen in dispositioneel 
redeneren, of aan verschillende psychometrische reacties op de items van de 
testschaal (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002). Deze bevinding betekent dat er verschillen 
kunnen bestaan tussen managers en psychologiestudenten in de wijze waarop de 
componenten van dispositioneel redeneren zich uiten. Het is dan ook van belang om 
verder onderzoek te doen naar de oorzaak van de verschillen in reacties op de items 
tussen managers en psychologiestudenten. 
Samenvattend, de resultaten tonen relatief aanvaardbare meeteigenschappen van het 
meetinstrument voor dispositioneel redeneren in de groepen waarin de steekproef is 
uitgevoerd, namelijk managers en psychologiestudenten, met uitzondering van 
meetinvariantie. 
In Hoofdstuk 4 werd nagegaan in welke mate dispositioneel redeneren de 
accuraatheid van beoordelingen van sollicitanten kon voorspellen tijdens een 
interview. Deze studie week op twee manieren af van eerder onderzoek over 
dispositioneel redeneren. Ten eerste werd uitgegaan van de componenten-opvatting 
van dispositioneel redeneren zoals dit in Hoofdstuk 3 beschreven is. Dat wil zeggen 
dat de rol werd onderzocht van de sub-componenten van persoonlijkheidskenmerk-
inductie, persoonlijkheidskenmerk-extrapolatie en persoonlijkheidskenmerk-
contextualisatie in het voorspellen van accuraatheid. Hiertoe werd de RIJI 
afgenomen bij een steekproef (N = 146) van managers op middenniveau bij de 
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politie. Tegelijkertijd maakten deze respondenten een intelligentie- en een 
persoonlijkheidstest, en deden ze een taak met betrekking tot 
beoordelingsaccuraatheid. Deze taak bestond uit het beoordelen van gestructureerde 
interviews van acht sollicitanten. 
Door middel van de bestudering van dispositioneel redeneren, was het mogelijk om 
twee dingen te onderzoeken. Ten eerste wilden we onderzoeken of er voldoende 
bewijs was voor het opvatten van dispositioneel redeneren als een vorm van 
intelligentie. Om deze vraag te kunnen beantwoorden, onderwierpen we 
dispositioneel redeneren aan verschillende relevante conceptuele en empirische 
criteria (Carrol, 1993; Flanagan, Genshaft, & Harrison, 1997; Mayer, Caruso, & 
Salovey, 1999). Deze reeks tests leverde ondersteuning voor de nomologische 
plaatsing van dispositioneel redeneren en de drie componenten ervan (inductie, 
extrapolatie en contextualisatie) ten opzichte van intelligentie en persoonlijkheid. 
De resultaten van dit onderzoek lieten zien dat de componenten van dispositioneel 
redeneren onderling ‘intern’ voldoende convergeerden en ‘extern’ voldoende 
gerelateerd waren aan algemene intelligentie om bewijs te kunnen leveren voor een 
zogenaamde ‘positive manifold’ (Horn & Cattell, 1966). ‘Positive manifold’ houdt in 
dat metingen van cognitieve vermogens relatief hoog met elkaar correleren. Elke 
component voorspelde ook (.14 < r < .33; ongecorrigeerd) ons ‘externe’ criterium 
voor accuraatheid, namelijk de nauwkeurigheid in interviewbeoordeling, en voldeed 
daarmee aan het correlatie-criterium voor een meetinstrument voor cognitieve 
vermogens. Voorts vertoonden de componenten incrementele validiteit (klein effect; 
Cohen, 1988) bovenop algemene intelligentie in de voorspelling van 
beoordelaarsnauwkeurigheid; de componenten verklaarden variantie in 
nauwkeurigheid die nog niet door algemene intelligentie was verklaard. Tenslotte 
leverden de resultaten ook bewijs voor de discriminante validiteit van de 
componenten met persoonlijkheidsconstructen. 
Kortom, de resultaten leverden bewijs voor een nomologisch netwerk waarbij 
dispositioneel redeneren gezien kan worden als een vorm van intelligentie. Dat wil 
zeggen dat onze resultaten ondersteuning geven voor het idee dat dispositioneel 
redeneren een specifiek verstandelijk vermogen is dat door goede beoordelaars 
aangewend wordt in hun beoordeling om gedragsinformatie in selectie-interviews te 
gebruiken. 
In het hier beschreven onderzoek waren managers met een beter vermogen tot 
extrapolatie en contextualisatie accuratere beoordelaars van anderen tijdens 
interviews dan diegenen met onnauwkeurige impliciete persoonlijkheidstheorieën 
(lage extrapolatie) en een gebrekkig begrip van het activeren van 
persoonlijkheidskenmerken door specifieke situaties (lage contextualisatie). De 
inductie-component bleek overigens minder bij te dragen aan het nauwkeurig 
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beoordelen van anderen in interviews. Replicatie van de gevonden resultaten is 
echter van belang. 
Onze laatste onderzoeksvraag week af van het thema van cognitieve kenmerken dat 
in Hoofdstuk 3 en 4 aan de orde was gekomen. In Hoofdstuk 5 ligt de aandacht bij 
persoonlijkheidskenmerken van de assessoren als voorspellers van hun 
beoordelaarsaccuraatheid. 
Uit ons eerdere overzicht van individuele verschillen als voorspellers van 
beoordelaarsnauwkeurigheid (Hoofdstuk 2) kon worden geconcludeerd dat 
persoonlijkheidskenmerken, ondanks hun potentiële theoretische relevantie, minder 
belangrijk lijken dan cognitieve factoren in het verklaren van de accuraatheid van 
ander-beoordelingen. Wij beargumenteerden voor deze conclusie dat de te 
voorspellen criteria te algemeen waren. In eerder onderzoek werd bijvoorbeeld 
gekeken hoe een interviewer sollicitanten accuraat kon evalueren op een totaal-set 
van persoonlijkheidskenmerken. De impliciete aanname in deze studies is dat 
mensen alle persoonlijkheidskenmerken even lastig vinden om anderen op te 
beoordelen en daarom zou een overkoepelend accuraatheidscriterium vastgesteld 
dienen te worden op het niveau van het persoonlijkheidsprofiel zonder onderscheid 
in afzonderlijke persoonlijkheidskenmerken. Onderzoek van Allik, Realo, Mõttus, en 
Kuppens (2010) demonstreert echter dat persoonlijkheidskenmerken onderling 
verschillen in hoe accuraat zij beoordeeld kunnen worden. Bijvoorbeeld, in een 
eerder overzicht van 32 studies (Kenny et al., 1994), was de overeenstemming tussen 
de beoordeling door verschillende waarnemers van dezelfde proefpersoon hoger 
voor de beoordeling van extraversie dan voor andere persoonlijkheidskenmerken. In 
een recentere studie (Borkenau et al., 2015) waarin studenten de persoonlijkheden 
van anderen moesten beoordelen op basis van hun essays, waren de beoordelingen 
van ‘openheid voor nieuwe ervaringen’ (openness to experience) het accuraatst. Bij 
elkaar genomen, lijken er voldoende argumenten te zijn voor het gebruik van 
accuraatheidscriteria voor specifieke persoonlijkheidskenmerken/ per 
persoonlijkheidskenmerk. Op deze wijze kan gesproken worden over metingen van 
accuraatheid per persoonlijkheidskenmerk, zoals extraversie-accuraatheid. 
In Hoofdstuk 5 werden dan ook demogelijke effecten van 
persoonlijkheidskenmerken op beoordelaarsaccuraatheid voor elk kenmerk apart 
onderzocht. We berekenden accuraatheidsmetingen voor elk van de Big-Five 
persoonlijkheidskenmerken afzonderlijk waarop anderen beoordeeld moesten 
worden. 
Eerdere bevindingen suggereerden dat de zelfbeoordeling van beoordelaars een 
belangrijke basis vormt van waaruit beoordelaars hun indrukken van anderen 
vormen (Alicke, Dunning, & Krueger, 2005). De kennis over bepaalde 
persoonlijkheidskenmerken van anderen zou immers kunnen voortkomen uit de 
persoonlijkheidskenmerken van de interviewer zelf. Anders gesteld, misschien zijn 
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assessoren beter in het beoordelen van persoonlijkheidskenmerken waarmee ze zelf 
zeer goed op de hoogte zijn. Bijvoorbeeld, een consciëntieuze assessor zal wellicht 
beter zijn in de beoordeling van consciëntieusheid bij anderen. Het ‘Realistic 
Accuracy Model’ (RAM; Funder, 1999) ondersteunt dit idee: De ontdekking van 
bepaalde cues bij anderen en het gebruik hiervan zouden makkelijker zijn voor 
persoonlijkheidskenmerken waarmee de interviewers bekend zijn omdat deze 
persoonlijkheidskenmerken deel van hun eigen persoonlijkheidsprofiel uitmaken. 
Onder verwijzing naar de construct-toegankelijkheid theorie van Higgins (2012), 
formuleerden we de hypothese dat de deskundigheid in beoordeling van 
persoonlijkheidskenmerken voortkomt uit de mate waarin de betreffende 
persoonlijkheidskenmerken toegankelijk zijn voor de interviewer. Bijvoorbeeld, een 
persoon die ‘toegang’ heeft tot het construct consciëntieusheid zal geneigd zijn om 
anderen meer te beschrijven in woorden gerelateerd aan consciëntieusheid dan in 
woorden die andere persoonlijkheidskenmerken beschrijven. Om deze hypothese te 
toetsen werden twee studies uitgevoerd waarin een zelf-rapportage 
persoonlijkheidsvragenlijst werd afgenomen (Studie 1: studenten, N = 183; Studie 2: 
managers, N = 223; Deze steekproeven waren onafhankelijk van de steekproeven in 
de andere hoofdstukken). Tevens beantwoorden de managers (Studie 2) een open 
vraag over construct-toegankelijkheid (Higgins, 1982), waaruit hun meest 
toegankelijk persoonlijkheidskenmerk kon worden afgeleid. Voor zover wij weten, 
zijn er geen eerdere studies gedaan naar de verhouding tussen de voor interviewers 
chronisch-toegankelijke persoonlijkheidskenmerken, hun eigen 
persoonlijkheidskenmerken, en hun beoordelaarsaccuraatheid met betrekking tot 
deze persoonlijkheidskenmerken. 
De resultaten van deze laatste studie lieten zien dat een hoge eigen score op een 
persoonlijkheidskenmerk (bijv. ‘ik ben een zeer hartelijke persoon’, een aanduiding 
van extraversie; Goldberg, 1992), deze persoon niet deskundiger maakte in het 
beoordelen van anderen op datzelfde kenmerk. Als voorbeeld, extraverte 
participanten in onze studies waren in vergelijking met introverte participanten niet 
beter in het beoordelen van bepaalde extraversie-gerelateerde gedragscues van 
anderen. Onze resultaten repliceerden daarmee eerdere studies (bijv. Borman, 1979; 
Borman & Hallam, 1991; Christiansen, et al., 2005; Hjelle, 1969; Lippa & Dietz, 2000; 
Powell & Goffin, 2009; Vogt & Colvin, 2003) die vonden dat 
persoonlijkheidskenmerken van de interviewers geen voorspellende waarde hadden 
voor de accuraatheid in de beoordeling van anderen op diezelfde 
persoonlijkheidskenmerken. 
Wel bleek dat interviewers die meer geneigd waren om anderen te beschrijven in 
termen van extraversie en ‘openheid voor nieuwe ervaringen’, ook accurater waren 
in het beoordelen van deze persoonlijkheidskenmerken in anderen. Dit resultaat 
geeft daarmee gedeeltelijk steun aan onze hypothese dat chronische toegankelijkheid 
tot persoonlijkheidskenmerken de beoordelingsaccuraatheid voor deze 
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persoonlijkheidskenmerken kan voorspellen, namelijk voor extraversie en ‘openheid 
voor nieuwe ervaringen’. 
Conclusie 
Het onderzoek dat in dit proefschrift wordt beschreven, laat zien dat 
assessorkenmerken de accuraatheid van assessoren in personeelsselectie kunnen 
voorspellen. Op deze manier draagt dit proefschrift bij aan het beantwoorden van de 
vraag: ‘wat kenmerkt de goede beoordelaar’? 
Uit een overzicht van de empirische literatuur blijkt dat ons begrip over kenmerken 
van assessoren die relevant zijn voor hun beoordelingsaccuraatheid, al grote 
vorderingen gemaakt heeft. Een belangrijke bevinding is dat assessoren die accurate 
beoordelingen over anderen geven een aantal kenmerken met elkaar gemeen lijken 
te hebben. Vooral cognitieve kenmerken lijken van belang. 
De empirische studies in dit proefschrift geven onder andere verdere duidelijkheid 
over de aard en de rol van dispositioneel redeneren bij de beoordelingsaccuraatheid 
van de interviewer. Tevens werd bewijs geleverd dat dispositioneel redeneren 
behoort tot het domein van cognitieve vermogens. Bovendien bleek dat 
dispositioneel redeneren onderscheidende sub-componenten heeft, namelijk 
inductie, extrapolatie en contextualisatie. 
De persoonlijkheidskenmerken van assessoren werden onderzocht in de 
systematische review van eerder onderzoek en in twee van de drie empirische 
studies. De introductie van persoonlijkheidsspecifieke criteria en chronische 
persoonlijkheidstoegankelijkheid als voorspellers, leverde geen veelbelovende 
resultaten op. Meer onderzoek is nodig om deze bevindingen te repliceren. 
De resultaten geven een aantal praktische richtlijnen voor assessorenselectie en -
opleiding. Het is belangrijk om assessoren te screenen op dispositioneel redeneren; 
de scores op de ‘Revised Interpersonal Judgment Inventory’ (meetinstrument voor 
de componenten van dispositioneel redeneren) kunnen beoordelingsaccuraatheid 
voorspellen. Er is verder onderzoek nodig om te bepalen of dispositioneel redeneren 
ontwikkeld kan worden en indien dat zo is, wat de beste methode daarvoor zou zijn. 
Tot slot, met betrekking tot de persoonlijkheidskenmerken van assessoren, werden 
de resultaten van eerder onderzoek bevestigd: Persoonlijkheidsgerelateerde factoren 
lijken geen directe rol te spelen in de accuraatheid van beoordelingen van 
assessoren. 
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Dankwoord 
“I always knew that deep down in every human heart, there was mercy and generosity.” 
― Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom 
 
Sonder die vrygewigheid van vele sou hierdie proefskrif telkens gesneuwel het! Dit 
is my voorreg om elkeen te bedank wat bygedra het op welke wyse, klein óf groot. 
 
Spesiaal wil ek my promotors, Marise Born en Filip Lievens, bedank. Jul uiters 
bekwame leiding het my deurgaans die moed gegee om my vlerke te sprei. Wat ‘n 
voorreg om hierdie reis met julle te kon meemaak! Desondanks besige skedules het 
julle tyd gevind vir oorlegpleging, skryfbegeleiding, en motivering. Dikwels het dit 
gepaard gegaan met reis weg van jul geliefdes. Dankie ook aan Arnold Bakker, 
Reinout de Vries, en Henk van der Molen vir jul inskiklikheid om te dien in die 
leeskommissie. Ek was inderdaad deel van ‘n prima span. 
 
Dankie aan ons navorsingsvennote by verskeie instansies. Die hulp van Kolonel 
Charlotte Kotzé, Bevelvoerder van die Polisie Akademie van die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Polisiediens (SAPD), asook Prof Deon Meiring van die Universiteit Pretoria, het die 
aanvanklike navorsingstudies moontlik gemaak. Lede van die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Militêre Gesondheidsdiens het belangrike bydraes gemaak tot die voorafgaande 
ontwikkeling van die navorsingsmateriaal. In besonder, Generaal Warren Burgess en 
personeel by die Militêre Psigologiese Instituut (MPI), Luitenant-kolonel Natascha 
Bruwer, Majoor Yasmeen Ibrahim, en bedryfsielkundiges van die Instituut. Sonder 
finansiële ondersteuning sou die navorsing nie kon begin óf tot voltooiing gebring 
word nie en daarom bedank ons graag die volgende organisasies: Andrew W. 
Mellon Foundation (VSA), National Research Fund (NRF), Universiteit van 
Kaapstad Navorsingsfonds, en Departement Bedryfsielkunde van die Universiteit 
van Stellenbosch. Verskeie deskundiges het sonder huiwering gehelp met advies, 
navorsingsinstrumente, of programkode, onder andere Neil Christiansen, Walter 
Borman, Barbary Byrne, Deborah Powell, Lorne Sulsky, Bill Balzer en Brenton 
Wiernik. Baie dankie vir die vrymoedige gees waarin dit gedoen is. 
 
Die respondente in ons navorsing verdien spesiale vermelding. Hieronder tel 
studente van die Universiteit Kaapstad, Universiteit Pretoria, asook offisier-leerders 
van die SAPD Akademie. Bestuurders en personeel van verskeie organisasies (bv. 
Sanlam, en ander wat anonimiteit verkies) het ook bygedra. Ons wense is dat die 
bedryf in gelyke mate sal baat vind by die navorsingsbevindinge en vrae ontsluit 
vanuit ons navorsing. 
 
Dankie aan my kollegas by die Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam (EUR), Universiteit 
Kaapstad, en Universiteit Stellenbosch, vir jul professionele ondersteuning. As 
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‘buitenpromovendus’ van EUR was ek diep getref deur kollegas se begrip en deernis 
met my unieke behoeftes. Die mildelike geduld van my departementshoofde (Johan 
Malan, Suki Goodman, en Anton Schlechter), mede-dosente, en studente, was soms 
nodig met onvoorsiene vertragings in my response op boodskappe, nasienwerk en 
administrasie. Verder wil ek my mentors bedank vir die steierwerk wat bygedra het 
tot sukses met hierdie projek: Elize Kotze, Gielie van Dyk, Johan Malan, Callie 
Theron, Gert Roodt, en Gert Huysamen. 
 
Dankie aan my paranimfe wat, ten spyte van hul eie werkslading, dikwels tyd 
gemaak het om ‘n luisterende oor, of helpende hand, te verleen. Anton, jou 
opbouende woorde en begrip het my gereeld aangemoedig om nog ‘n tree vorentoe 
te gee. En Gera, ten spyte van die afstand (tussen Kaapstad en Rotterdam) het jy 
dikwels uit jou pad gegaan om sake vir my te beredder. Dit is lekker om julle langs 
my te hê met die uitroep van “Hora Est!”. 
 
Vriende het ons gesin deur dik en dun bygestaan: Jaco, François, Evert, Ester, en die 
Rossles, Swarts, Adamse, Liversages en Schoemans. Dit het ongelooflik baie beteken 
vir ons. My broers, Deon, Wilhelm, en Charl, dankie vir jul broederliefde. En my 
skoonouers, Dan, Lynette en Pieter, en stiefpa, Joe, dankie vir jul deurlopende 
belangstelling en ondersteuning. My moeder, Marilen, jy is van kindsbeen my 
grootste ‘cheerleader’; dankie dat Ma nooit opgegee het nie. In my hart wens ek ook 
dat Pappa (Willem) hierdie groot oomblik kon meemaak. En laastens, aan my vrou 
Jammies (wat die spreekwoordelike sewe sakke sout moes trotseer): woorde kan nie 
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Dieter en Jana: Pappa is nou klaar met sy ‘boek’! Julle is vir my kosbaar. 
 
Dankie aan elkeen. Laastens, dankie aan my Hemelse Vader vir hierdie voorreg. 
François 
Kaapstad, 2015 
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